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AGRARIAN REFORM IN RELATION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
In Iraq, agriculture is characterized by feudalistic 
small-scale peasant farms. Sharecroppers working the land 
with primitive implements make no use of modern fertilizing 
and are further hampered by inadequate means of handling 
irrigation and drainage. Consequently, despite the amount of 
labor devoted to farming, the yield per man and per acre is 
very low.
Primitive crop-rotation and poor fertilizing practice 
have led to soil exhaustion and deterioration of yields. Lack 
of drainage facilities has caused between 30 per cent and 50 
per cent of the cultivated land to be salted. Low productiv­
ity leaves little margin for improvement and reserves against 
bad seasons; and accompanying malnutrition means greater in­
cidence of disease and lower working efficiency and initiative,
Rural unemployment and underemployment are very high.
In the cities there is similarly a pool of unemployed or
2irregularly employed, composed of landless persons forced by 
debt or hunger to the cities in search of employment.
However, while Iraq possesses all features of back­
wardness, such as low per capita income per head, low labor 
productivity, high rate of illiteracy, bad health conditions, 
lack of non-agricultural pursuits, etc., it is endowed with 
other favorable factors which distinguish it from the typical 
model of an underdeveloped country. The country is sparsely 
populated, it is blessed with fertile land and abundant water. 
Finally, unlike many underdeveloped countries, Iraq does not 
lack the financial resources for capital investment. The 1951 
oil agreement all but eliminated the problem of capital short­
age. These oil royalties make it possible for the country to 
further economic development without first cutting down 
consumption.
Thus, Iraq has good potential prospects for using 
more capital, labor, and natural resources of raising per 
capita income.
During the first four decades of the national rule, 
the country made no progress and efforts which were made in 
order to move agriculture from stagnation were doomed to 
failure.
In the year 1950, in order to assist the agricultural
3sector, the government established the Development Board for 
Irrigation Work and Promotion of Agriculture. After ten 
years of capital investment in agriculture and irrigation con­
trol, the situation did not change much.
The regime which came to power following the revolu­
tion of 1958 passed the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 calling 
for confiscation and redistribution of cultivable land held 
in large tracts. The regime has considered the existing 
feudal land tenure system as a fundamental barrier to economic 
development in Iraq.
From the economic point of view, agrarian reform was 
justified on the following bases: (1) a considerable propor­
tion of savings from rent fails to find its way into capital 
formation, (2) of the savings which are invested, a large 
part is invested in purchasing new land which serves not for 
the improvement of agricultural productivity but leads to the 
creation of more under-utilized resources, (3) absentee land­
lords fail to provide organizational and technological ar­
rangements which would maximize output from farm operations, 
and (4) extreme inequality in landownership places the land­
lord in a monopolistic position which can be used to exploit 
the tenant cultivator because the peasant often receives in­
come considerably less than his productivity warrants. The
4monopolistic exploitation of the cultivators results in a 
restricta.r’;'domestic market which weakens the inducement to 
invest, not oï^y of the landlords, but merchants and traders 
as well. Concentr/^cion of land in a few hands and the lack 
of work opportunities outside agriculture enable the land­
lords to receive a very high rent which leaves the tenants 
with a low purchasing power which severely restricts the mar­
ket for any industrial development.^
The terms "agrarian reform" and "economic develop­
ment" have been used in close association with each other.
In this process of association, agrarian reform is treated 
as a necessary or highly desirable condition of economic
development.2
The relationship between agrarian reform and economic 
development has frequently been misunderstood. Many of those 
who advocate agrarian reform do so on the ground that it is a 
panacea for all ills of economic and social backwardness. 
However, it is to be noted that a redistribution of land may 
not lead to improvement in productivity. The immediate effect
^William 0. Thweatt, "Economic Growth and Distribution 
in the Middle East," American Journal of Economics and Soci­
ology, XVI (January, 1957), p. 124.
p
Raleich Barlowe, "Land Reform and Economic Develop­
ment,'' jJjDunrrwaJ. joi: JFajrni jSçxDiiofnijçE;, XXXV (May, 1953), p. 173.
5of such measures may improve the standard of living of the 
peasants, but such gains would be bound to be short-lived.
In a sense, it will not lead to an increase in farm output 
unless plans are also advanced for ensuring an adequate in­
vestment of capital in agriculture, diversification of crops, 
selection-of seeds and adoption of new farming techniques, 
and transforming farming into market-oriented business.
In the debate and analysis of this subject, the term 
"agrarian reform" is frequently used rather loosely by advo­
cates of conflicting objectives. In order to limit the dis­
cussion, it is helpful to give some essential definitions of 
the terms "agrarian reform" and "economic development."
The expression "agrarian reform" was here used to in­
clude measures aimed at liquidating subsistence farming as 
the principal form of agricultural activity and transforming 
agriculture into a specialized, labor-divided, and market- 
oriented industry.
To some economists, the term "economic development" 
is identified with a reduction of the percentage of the coun­
try's labor force engaged in agriculture. More adequate uses 
of the term relate to increases in the ratio of capital to 
labor inputs, rates of net capital formation, and rises in 
per capita income. As used in this study, the term reflects
6the concept of development proposed by Meier and Baldwin: 
"Economic development can be defined as as increase over time 
in per capita output of material goods.
As a general proposition, the way in which agrarian 
reform affects economic development will, to a large extent, 
depend upon what role the agricultural sector as a whole is 
expected to play in the process. Taking agriculture as a 
whole, it is highly probable that an economic surplus gener­
ated in this sector of Iraq's economy comprises at least one 
half of its national income--apart from oil industry. More­
over, agriculture in Iraq employs about two-thirds of the 
population. Thus, the development of this sector would pro­
vide a higher level of output and serve as an economic base 
for the growth of industry by providing food for the increas­
ing industrial labor force and raw materials for the develop­
ing industry. What is more, the saving of labor represents 
one of the main advantages of modernizing agriculture and con­
stitutes an indispensable prerequisite of industrialization.
It is the purpose of this study to describe and ana­
lyze how changes in land tenure system can affect capital
^Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic De­
velopment : Theory, History, Policy (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 2-8.
7formation and investment in agriculture. Stated differently, 
how agrarian reform contributes to economic development by 
helping to promote an increase in agricultural productivity 
in land, labor, and capital and, perhaps, an increase in the 
level of employment, besides contributing to a higher rate of 
industrial growth.
Chapter I will give a discussion of the land tenure 
system in Iraq, the demographic position of the population, 
and some natural and climatic factors affecting agriculture 
in Iraq.
Chapter II will survey the agrarian problem in Iraq. 
Some views on its causes, the social structure, the political 
power, and the pre-revolutionary decades of agrarian reform 
in Iraq will be discussed. An attempt will be made at eval­
uating the economic and social impact of the feudal organiza­
tion of agriculture.
Chapter III will be devoted to analysis of the gen­
eral argument for agrarian reform in Iraq, and factors con­
tributing to the enactment of the 1958 Agrarian Reform Law, 
its objectives, provisions, and execution.
Chapter IV will review recent literature on economic 
development of backward countries and its relevance to the 
situation of Iraq. Economic and social aspects brought by
8the 1958 Agrarian Rerorm Law will be examined with view to 
evaluating their importance.
Chapter V is intended to test what has been done to 
realize the economic, social, and political objectives of the 
Agrarian Reform Law of 1958. The effects of the law on ten­
ure arrangements, agricultural production, and income distri­
bution in favor of the peasants will be evaluated with view 
to determining policy priorities.
Chapter VI will present a discussion of problems of 
agricultural planning in Iraq. A brief survey of the state's 
role in the economic development of Iraq will be emphasized. 
Early and present economic plans and their impact on the 
Iraqi economy will be evaluated here. Finally, Iraq's agri­
cultural prospects are considered.
Chapter VII will emphasize some problems and trends 
confronting the development policy in Iraq. The oil indus­
try's general economic effect on the Iraqi economy, as a 
source of finance is discussed. New methods of financing 
economic development in Iraq are proposed.
Finally, Chapter VIII contains a summary and an eval­
uation of the major findings. Constructive suggestions and 
recommendations concerning further development of Iraq are 
made.
CHAPTER I 
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE BEFORE 1958
On September 30, 1958, an Agrarian Reform Law was 
passed by the Government of Iraq. It is necessary to examine 
the conditions that prevailed in Iraq during the first half 
of this century and to see if there was a defective system of 
land tenure which could be considered as making an agrarian 
reform necessary or advisable. It is intended here to give a 
brief survey of the land and people, some natural and climatic 
factors affecting agriculture in Iraq, and the land tenure 
system prevailing before 1958.
Land and the People
The area of Iraq is about 177,777,200 donums (175,000 
square miles).^ In 1958-59, the Principal Bureau of Statis­
tics published its report on the agricultural and livestock 
census of Iraq which gave figures related to cultivable and 
cultivated areas. The area of the country was divided
^Donum = Meshara = 0.62 acre.
9
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according to cultivable area and the type of this cultivation 
as shown by Table 1.
TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION AND USE OF LAND IN IRAQ, 1958-59 
Area and Type of Cultivation Donums Percentage
Area devoted to seasonal planting 
Area could be planted after the
21,286,712
completion of irrigation system 9,000.000
30,286,712
Fruit trees and vines 512,551
Pasture 923,465
Woodland 207.230
31,930,058 17.7
Desert land 73,812,000 41.5
Rest 72.035.142 40.8
Grand Total 177,777,200 100.0
Source: Government of Iraq, Principal Bureau of Statistics, 
Report on the Agricultural and Livestock Census 
1958-59 (Baghdad, 1961), pp. 2-6.
Area can be classified according to the types of ir­
rigation as shown in Table 2.
According to the 1957 population census, the popula­
tion of Iraq was approximately 6.5 million. About 1,750,000 
people live in cities and towns, including Baghdad, and the 
rest of the people, 4,670,000, live in villages and in the 
countryside. The number of nomads was estimated at about
11 
TABLE 2
IRAQ: AREA WITHIN IRRIGATION SYSTEM, 1958-59
Kind Area (Donums)
Rain-fed zone 11,006,249
Flow-irrigated area 6,740,944
Pump-irrigated area 4,478,106
Area irrigated by other means 430,107
22,657,400
Area could be irrigated after
completion of irrigation system 9,000,000
31,657,400
Rest land (desert, etc.) 146,119,800
Total 177,777,200
Source: The Agricultural Census 1958-59 (Baghdad, 1961), p. 5.
70,000. The following table shows the figures of male and 
female population for 1947 and 1957.
TABLE 3
POPULATION IN IRAQ (in millions)
1947 1957 Increase
Annual % 
increase
Total 5.20 6.50 1.30 2.35
Males 2.65 3.30 0.65 2.40
Females 2.55 3.20 0.65 2.30
Rural 3.45 4.05 0.70 2.00
Urban 1.75 2.45 . 0.60 2.80
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization Mediterranean
Development Project, Iraq, Country Report (Rome, 
1959), p. 6. Henceforth will be cited as FAO 
Report.
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Iraq is one of few underdeveloped countries which 
faces no population problem. The acreage of land which is 
suitable for agriculture, reduced to a per capita basis, is 
3 to 3.5 acres compared with the Asiatic average of only 0.5 
acre per head.^
The number of persons employed in gainful occupations 
in Iraq has been estimated at about 2 million for the year 
1956. This figure excludes students, soldiers, pensioners, 
and housewives. The distribution is as follows:
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING POPULATION 
IN IRAQ BY SECTORS, 1956
Sector Number engaged Percent of
(in thousands) total
Agriculture 1,610 78.8
Industry and public utilities 115 5.6
Mining of petroleum 13 .6
Transport 56 2.7
Building public works and banking 38 1.9
Distributive trades 60 2.9
Personal services, including
government and professions 116 5.6
Total 2,046 100.0
Source: A.P.O. Poyck, Farm Studies in Iraq, an Agro-Economic 
Study of the Agriculture in the Hilla-Diwaniya in 
Iraq (Wageningen: Laboratory of Agricultural Economics 
of the Tropics, Agricultural University, 1962), p. 6.
fy
Doris Adams, Iraq's People and Resources (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1958), p. 23.
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Agriculture absorbs about four-fifths of all persons 
gainfully employed, a proportion out of line with the contri­
bution of agriculture to the national income. The estimates 
of the income per capita of the agricultural population for 
1950 and 1956 are ID 17 and ID 16 respectively.^ The table 
below shows the estimates of the per capita income for 1950 
and 1956 for the various sectors.
TABLE 5
PER CAPITA INCOME FOR 1950 AND 1956 
BY SECTORS
1950 1956
Agriculture 17 ID^ 16 ID
Non-ag r i cu 1 tu ra 1 
and non-oil 75 ID 120 ID
Disparity factor 0.23 0.13
^Id = Iraqi dinar = $2.80 
Source; A.P.O. Poyck, cit., p. 7
Natural and Climatic Factors 
One of the main limiting factors of agricultural 
production in Iraq is water. Fertile land is abundant, but 
much of it cannot be cultivated because there is not enough
O
A.P.G. Poyck, 0£. cit., p. 7
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water to raise crops. This is due in large part to the des­
truction of the old irrigation system.
The country could be divided into two regions. The 
mountainous region, which lies in the north and northeast of 
the country, receives an adequate amount of rainfall in the 
winter time which makes cultivation possible without irriga­
tion, but the rainfall is inadequate for summer cultivation. 
Secondly, the central and southern regions which secure in­
adequate rainfall depend in the main part on artificial irri­
gation in order to be cropped. Furthermore, there are great 
fluctuations in the total amount of rain from year to year 
and serious shifts in the pattern of its distribution. The 
flow of Tigris and Euphrates rivers shows considerable varia­
tion from year to year and within the year. The important 
point with respect to these rivers is the relationship between 
flood, low water, and the agricultural cycle. The improvement 
of this relationship calls for "development," a process con­
sisting of flood control works, storage-dams, irrigation bar­
rages, and land reclamation.
The country possesses, in its two rivers, an abundant 
amount of water, but the variation of the flow of the rivers 
puts a limit to any extension of agricultural development.
The rivers reach their minimum flow in September and their
15
maximum flow in the spring, too late for winter crops and 
too early for summer crops. Moreover, except in the moun­
tainous region, the land is flat and only a little above sea 
level. The rivers flood, on the average, every two or three 
years with the result of great damage to the crops and other 
urban areas. Despite the fact that these floods bring with 
them, as Lord Salter says, alluvial soil which creates an ex­
ceptional fertile region, they are liable to salt up, and 
without adequate drainage, an important portion of the region 
becomes unsuitable for cultivation. The Higher Irrigation 
Development Committee, for example, pointed out that almost 
60 per cent of the irrigated lands has been seriously affected 
by salt, and it is said that almost 20 to 30 per cent of the 
cultivable lands has been abandoned in the last few decades, 
due to high water table.^ This was confirmed by the Haigh 
Report which showed that approximately 60 per cent of the ir­
rigated lands has been affected by salt and yield on the re­
maining lands has declined by 40 per cent to 50 per cent.5
^The Higher Irrigation Development Committee, Report 
on Irrigation in Iraq, quoted in Hassan M. Ali, Land Procla­
mation and Settlement in Iraq (Baghdad, 1955), p. 31.
^Hassan M. Ali, o£. cit., p. 31.
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The Need for Irrigation
More effective use of the water supply is thus the 
central problem of Iraq. National and international efforts 
were directed at resolving this problem. In 1930, Sir Ernest 
Dowson, the British expert in land problems, made a compre­
hensive sum/ey of land tenure, methods of cultivation, and 
other related questions. He estimated the cultivable area as
92.000 square kilometers--41,000 in the rainfall zone, and
51.000 in the irrigation zone--and that only a fraction of 
the zones was cultivated in any one year.^
In 1945, it was estimated that out of the total of
180.600.000 donums, the potentially cultivated area was about
48.400.000 donums, and that only about 10,500,000 donums were
irrigated.7
The United Nations Report indicated that only
12.800.000 donums, 5,200,000 under irrigation, were culti­
vated out of 24,000,000 cultivable.®
g
S. E . Dowson, ^  Inquiry into Land Tenure and Re­
lated Questions, Proposals for the Initiation of Reforms 
(Letchworth, 1932), p. 11.
^Great Britain, Overseas Economic Survey, Iraq Review 
of Commerce Conditions (London, 1945), p. 3.
Q
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1949-50 
(New York, 1950), p. 45.
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In 1951, the Bank Mission to Iraq could not state 
with any certainty the cultivated and cultivable areas. Ac­
cording to the mission, the official estimates indicated that 
the amount of cultivable land was about three times that 
under cultivation, but the definition of cultivability was 
not established and no accurate figures were available.^
Regardless of the exact statistics, it is generally 
agreed that the major potential for development in Iraq lies 
in agriculture. It was held that perhaps more than half of 
the land was not cultivated. It was held also that with a 
little effort and systematic organization, the area under 
cultivation could be increased, and that with better and more 
intensive cultivation, the wealth and earning capacity of the 
country could be substantially increased. The Bank Mission, 
for example, concluded that: "Aside from oil, water and land 
may be said to be the principal natural resources of Iraq."10 
It was alleged that the area under cultivation can be doubled 
as the irrigation projects are carried out. Thus the Bank 
Mission again pointed out that: "In the rain-fed zone the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 8. Henceforth will be cited as 
IBRD Report.
^^Ibid., p. 136.
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area under cultivation could theoretically be more than 
doubled; and in the irrigation zone it could be almost tri­
pled. The Consulting Engineers Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett- 
McCarthy envisioned 70 per cent increase in cultivated land 
if their recommendations concerning irrigation and drainage 
were carried out.^^
In 1954, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency 
projected a 90 per cent increase in cropped land between 1955 
and 1975.13
In 1954, the Development Board invited Lord Salter, 
the British economist, to draw a policy recommendation con­
cerning development programs. Lord Salter wrote that: "The 
principal natural assets of Iraq are, of course, her alluvial 
soil and her water, and the greatest natural opportunity of 
development is through irrigation and drainage."1^
^^Ibid., p. 137.
1 2Government of Iraq, Development Board, Development 
of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley (Baghdad: Al-Ani Press. 1954), 
pp. 4-5.
13United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales­
tine Refugees, Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development,
No. 11 (Beirut, 1954), p. 1.
^^Lord Salter, The Development of Iraq, A Plan for 
Action (Baghdad: The Development Board, 1955), p. 15.
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From the foregoing brief survey we may conclude that 
irrigation and water supply have received the main emphasis 
and accordingly, Iraq's development policy was oriented 
toward achieving these results.
Historical Development of Land Tenure
Up until the end of Ottoman period, the basis of land 
ownership was the tribal dirah, a large area over which a 
tribe exercised a customary right to occupy. Big tribal hold­
ings were appropriated by the sheikhs. These tribal lands, 
which had no legal basis, were regarded as state lands with 
the tribal occupants as tenants-at-will.
Under the tribal system, cultivation was communal and 
the organizational functions of the land and its cultivation 
were managed by the sheikhs' representatives (sirkals), the 
sheikhs had primarily political functions.Only a small 
fraction of the land was cultivated, and farming shifted as 
canals silted full and land was exhausted or became saline. 
Individual ownership was unknown and occupancy of a specific
^^Fahim Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq : 1950-57 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1958), p. 82.
^^U. S. Department of Agriculture, The Agricultural 
Economy of Iraq (Washington: Economic Research Service, 1965), 
p . 9.
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plot of land for a long period was not u s u a l . 17
The land law of 1857 was a first attempt to settle 
the land problem in Iraq. This law had defined the right of 
use and transfer of Miri Sirf (state) lands.
Through the land code which was promulgated in 1858 
and the land registration law of the year after, the Ottoman 
government sought to establish one system of tenure, the tapu. 
The attempt was not only a failure but also added to the gen­
eral confusion.
The Ottoman land-registration law enabled various in­
fluential persons in collusion with corrupt officials to regis­
ter in their names huge areas which in many cases the claimant 
had never seen. The peasant cultivator, fearing that regis­
tration would subject him to military conscription and addi­
tional taxation, renounced his opportunity to acquire title to 
the land he worked by registering it in the name of some well- 
to-do protector, and therefore being reduced to the status of 
tenant or even day-laborer. In other cases the practice of 
shifting agriculture barred the cultivator from registering 
since few of them could prove ten-year occupancy. Grants were
17
Ibid., p. 9. 
l^Hassan M. All, op. cit., p. 57.
21
generally made without any examination of conflicting claims
and were used as a means of rewarding the favored few.
The grant of tapu tenure led to local clash and even
actual fighting between sheikhs and tribesmen, and to such
confusion that general registration could not be c o m p l e t e d . ^0
During the British occupation, the feudal system was
upheld. The administration's policy attempted to use the
land for political purposes. It had sought to conciliate
tribal sheikhs, as the strongest social force in the country,
by bestowing material and political favors in return for good 
2*1
conduct. The administration gave the sheikhs high posts in 
the administration and by special decrees large holdings were 
given to them. The sheikhs exploited their political power 
to get the tribal lands registered as their own freehold; and 
the status of their tribesmen was thus degraded to that of 
serfs legally tied to the land
In the 20th century, the introduction of pump irriga-
19Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle 
East (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
1948), p. 109.
20
Ibid.. p. 109.
^^George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1961), p. 139.
22U. S. Department of Agriculture, og. cit., p. 9.
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tion added new complications. Many city merchants financially 
able to buy pumps entered into arrangements with holders of 
Miri land for the supply of water (pump) and in return re- 
ceoved a specified share of the crop, thus creating new claims 
to land without resolving any of the pre-existing claims.23
In 1931, Sir E. Dowson was requested to study the 
land problem in Iraq. Dowson suggested the acceptance of the 
actual existing tenancy rights and registering them officially 
and providing the people with documents ensuring their fu­
t u r e . 24 His findings were that probably four-fifths of the 
cultivable area of the country is lawfully and freely owned 
by the state. He recommended that the settlement of title 
should be made on the basis of the confirmation and mainte­
nance of beneficial occupational use. Dowson also emphasized 
the idea that the state should register the tenure as lease­
hold, because in a country with great agricultural potential­
ities like Iraq it was important for the state to retain its 
right of ownership so that it could make use of the land at a 
later stage for purposes of development.25
23
IBRD Report, 0£. cit., p. 138.
^^Quoted in Hassan M. Ali, 0£. cit., p. 63.
2 5Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle 
East, p . 110.
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Land Tenure Laws of 1932 and 1938
New tenure laws were promulgated in 1932 and 1938, 
which recognized four forms of tenure system and inaugurated 
a cadastral survey to be conducted by Stttlement Committees.
In the 1932 law lazmah tenure was introduced. This
type of tenure was designed to recognize prescription of
rights to tribal lands. In practice, however, this law 
opened the way for the influential groups and sheikhs who 
have benefited from this provision. The law had indicated 
that lazmah grants could be obtained on proof that the land
was cultivated for at least three consecutive years. Land
settlement officers who were inexperienced and subject to the 
influence of the sheikhs and other persons, accepted from 
such persons the most flimsy proofs. In this way, a high 
proportion of the lands was transferred to the sheikhs, who 
became the legal owners.
Furthermore, the lazmah tenure system had provided 
an opportunity for city merchants and moneylenders who had 
established irrigation pumps to get some lands under lazmah 
tenure.
After all, the law provision enabled the state to
^^Hassan M. Ali, 0£. cit., p. 65; IBRD Report, op. 
cit., p. 141.
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rent Miri Sirf (state) land for a period of not more than 
six years. This enabled the landlords and sheikhs to control 
these lands. Due to the fact that tribesmen could not afford 
to pay the rent, they had to work the land as sharecroppers.
The Rights and Duties of Cultivators 
Law of 1933
In 1933, the government passed a law "Governing the 
Rights and Duties of Cultivators" which in fact served the 
interest of the landlord rather than that of the sharecropper. 
The law legally had the effect of making the fellah (peasant) 
serf tied to the land and landlord. Article 13 of the law 
stated that when a peasant sharecropper was dismissed or moved 
from the land he must pay his agricultural debt to the land­
lord immediately and that while the debt was unpaid, unless a 
certificate of release was obtained from the landlord, employ­
ment elsewhere in the economy was prohibited.27 As the peasant 
was perpetually in debt, the landlord legally made sure of his 
labor supply and thereby denied flexibility of supply to other 
interests.28
27
Government of Iraq, Law No. 28 for 1933.
28
Kathleen M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 68.
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Land Ownership
I'Jhile the Land Settlement Laws of 1932 and 1938 
failed to correct the land distribution problem, they were, 
however, the beginning of a cadastral survey, and set up a 
land classification system still in use. This classification 
recognized four basic categories: mulk, land which is held in 
absolute private ownership; matruka, land reserved for public 
purposes, i.e., roads, unsettled public pasture, threshing 
floors, etc.; waquf, land held in trust for religious or char­
itable purposes; and miri, land which is state-owned and 
broken into three subcategories. These subdivisions are: 
miri-tapu, land held in permanent tenure from the state, with 
the holder able to sell, mortgage, or will his right to this 
land to others; miri-lazma, land similar in tenure to miri- 
tapu land, except the state may veto any transferrals; and 
miri-sirf, land which belongs absolutely to the state and un­
der its effective right of disposal.
By 1958, some 32,154,813 donums had been classified 
as shown by Table 6.
Size of Holdings
The Agricultural Census of 1958-59 provides a classi­
fication of numbers of agricultural holdings in size-groups.
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TABLE 6
TYPE OF LAND OWNERSHIP CLASSIFIED 
BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY, 1958
Type Donums Percentage
Miri
(a) Tapu 12,481,588 38.82
(b) Lazma 10,587,676 32.92
(c) Sirf 4,683,560 14.57
Waquf 439,075 1.37
Private land (mulk) 357,988 .80
Unsettled land 3,704,916 11.52
Total 32,154,813 100.00
Source: Government of Iraq, Agricultural and Livestock 
Census of Iraq for 1958-59 (Baghdad: Government 
Press, 1961), pp. 2-6.
For the purpose of the Census, a holding is a unit of manage­
ment, not a unit of property. It is defined as "a farm or 
agricultural estate organized as one unit." Table 7 shows 
distribution of holdings by size in Iraq.
If we assume that for each agricultural unit there is 
one owner, this means that the total number of landowners 
constitute only 1.9 per cent of the total population in Iraq. 
Also Table 7 shows that about 91 per cent of cultivable land 
is owned by about 26 per cent of the total landowners ; and 
that the total number of those working on the land (landless) 
is 1.5 million. This is indicative of the small number of
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS BY SIZE, 1958-59
Size group 
(in donums)
No. of 
Holdings
Area covered 
(in millions)
Share of total 
area as %
No. of landowners 
as % of total 
population
Under 100 92,024 2 9 1.416
100 and under 1,000 29,402 7 31 .452
1,000 and under 10,000 3,347 9 40 .051
10,000 and over 272 4.5 20 .004
Total 125,045 22.5 100 1.923
Source: Derived from Talat El-Shaibani, Reality of Landownership in Iraq 
(Baghdad: Dar Al-Ahali for Publication and Distribution, 1958), 
pp. 12-13.
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peasant proprietors. On the other hand,' holdings of over
1.000 dunums accounted for 60 per cent of the total of pri­
vately owned land.
According to Table 7, the property in land holdings 
was classified into four types according to the area. Those 
land ownerships under 100 donums were considered as small 
units, the ownership between 100 and less than 1,000 donums 
were considered as medium-sized units and ownership over
1.000 donums and less than 10,000 donums were considered as 
large units. Holdings over 10,000 donums were considered as 
abnormal, or very large units.
From this classification we find that small farms 
with less than 100 donums constitute about 74 per cent of the 
total numbers of land ownership but the area they constitute 
is only 9 per cent of the total cultivable areas. Medium­
sized units with 100 and less than 1,000 donums constitute 
only 23 per cent of the total agricultural units, but the 
areas occupied by these units constitute only 31 per cent of 
the total cultivable land.
The large and very large agricultural units with 1,000 
donums and over constitute 2.8 per cent of the total ownerships 
in Iraq, but they occupy about 60 per cent of the total culti­
vable land.
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However, the importance of large holdings is under­
estimated by these figures. The cadastral survey has pro­
ceeded by areas known as units. In a number of cases land­
owners have holdings in several units but these have been 
registered as separate holdings. According to the cadastral 
survey, there is only one holding in Rut province in excess 
of 100,000 donums (namely 174,251 donums). But the IBRD Re­
port showed that there were several holdings well over 300,000 
29donums. Also Dr. Warriner shows that two landowners are 
reported to own properties exceeding 1 million donums, and 
five or six others are credited with properties of about half 
a million donums.
After this statistical survey, it appears that land 
tenure and land ownership in Iraq have been complicated. Re­
distribution through legal means has created large feudal 
holdings and pitifully small operational units which have not 
served to improve production in general or the social and 
economic conditions of tenant cultivators. Mobility of peas­
ants was further reduced by laws favorable to the landowner.
oq
IBRD Report, op. cit., p. 141.
o n
Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East (2d.; London: Royal Institute for International 
Affairs, 1962), p. 142.
30
Legislation forbade the peasant to leave the land he culti­
vated while indebted to the landlord, and most peasants were 
in debt. The Land Settlement Laws were to have been an im­
provement, but as was stated in the FAG Report of 1959,
"there was probably no single cause of abject poverty greater 
than this system which divided the agricultural land into 
large holdings, which were subdivided into pitifully small 
operational units.
^^Quoted in U. S. Department of Agriculture, 0£. cit.,
p. 9.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN IRAQ
In the following pages, primary attention is given 
to the validity and importance of some earlier suggestions 
and proposals regarding the agrarian question in Iraq. Pre- 
1958 Land Settlement Program is also evaluated here. Finally, 
economic and social problems associated with land ownership 
and land tenure conditions are discussed.
Four Western Views on the Agrarian 
Problem in Iraq
Several writers have already begun the task of dis­
cussing the agrarian problem in Iraq and have come to differ­
ent conclusions and suggestions. The following are the main 
points and proposals presented by some Western writers.
1. Inadequate Water Supply; Some have suggested 
that the agrarian problem in Iraq is caused by a shortage in 
water supply. Atkenson, for example, has made a statistical 
comparison between the situation in Iraq and that in Egypt 
as shown by Table 8.
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TABLE 8
WATER SUPPLY IN EGYPT AND IRAQ, 1949
Average quantity of water Tigris and Euphrates Nile
(in cubic milliard) 71 82.7
Maximum amount of fertile Iraq Egypt
land (in millions of feddan) 19.7 8.3
Population (in millions) Iraq Egypt
4.75 17
Source: T . El-Shaibani, Reality of Landovmership in Iraq
(Baghdad: Dar Al-Ahali for Publication and Distri­
bution, 1958), p. 31.
It is clear from the table that the quantity of water 
provided by the Nile River is greater than that provided by 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Iraq, although the fertile 
land in Egypt is less than that in Iraq.
According to this approach, the water supply in Iraq 
will be a critical factor in determining cultivated land in 
Iraq and will limit the extension of agricultural land.
On the other hand, the KTAM, a New York engineering 
firm, has emphasized that Iraq has a surplus of water which 
could irrigate all the cultivated and cultivable land in 
Iraq. Naturally, this assumption denies the existence of any 
agrarian problem with regard to water supply.
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2. Shortage of Labor Supply: This concept relates 
the agricultural problem in Iraq to the shortage of labor 
force. Bonne has indicated that the underdevelopment of 
Iraq's agriculture is due to the lack of people, which ac­
counts for the miserable conditions of life prevailing among 
the rural population. VJhat Iraq, he says, most required was 
people.
Once more. Bonne has emphasized this question as
follows :
The shortage of labor, especially for the cultiva­
tion of large irrigated stretches, iÿ so acute that 
it has led to the institution of quasi-compulsory 
labor on the part of the "fellahin"! together with 
the abolition in fact of their right to freedom of 
movement.2
This question was also emphasized by D. Warriner in 
1948, when she said, "an expansion of agricultural area in 
Iraq would require a comprehensive plan for the purpose of 
encouragement of agricultural labor migration from other 
countries to Iraq, and this action necessitates a complete 
study of population density in other countries concerned."3
^Fellahin = plural of fellah, or peasant.
2
Alfred Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, LTD, 1955), p. 132.
D^. Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East,
p. 132.
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In 1949, the United Nations Mission to the Middle
East declared that:
Although Iraq has great potential for agricultural 
development, it is difficult to assume any agricul­
tural development in Iraq as long as the prevailing 
agricultural methods remain unchanged and the coun­
try is "underpopulated," (and the population is small 
in relation to the country's resources).
The mission suggested two solutions: first, encourage­
ment of migration in Iraq, and secondly, the introduction and 
use of mechanization in the agriculture.
In addition more emphasis was put on lack of skilled 
labor in the agricultural sector.
One should not fail to mention that those studies were
made during the 1940's when the population of Iraq was about
i
four million; since then the growth rate of population in 
Iraq was rapid and by 1966 the population was doubled (in 
1966 Iraq's population was estimated at about 7.5 millions).5 
While the country's past record shows that Iraq had 
supported 20 millions or more, the present population of Iraq 
is only 7.5 millions. Such a reduction in population may
^United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Mission for the Middle East, Final Report of the United 
Nations Economic Survey, Part 11 (New York, 1949), p. 31.
^Government of Iraq, Law No. 87 of 1965, The Five 
Years Economic Plan 1965-69 (Baghdad, 1965), p. 75.
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itself be a phenomenon to be explained in terms of insuffi­
cient investment, employment, and income.
There is no reason, however, to expect the size of 
population per se to exercise a major influence on economic 
development by inducing more investment for the following 
reasons: (1) As far as the relation of population changes to 
effective demand is concerned, it is not the number of people 
but the increase in purchasing power. An increase in the 
number of people does not broaden the market. (2) On the 
other hand, one does not expect an increase in labor supply 
to affect investment by exercising pressure on the wage level 
and leading to higher profits, thus promoting capital accumu­
lation and rendering investment at the same time more attrac­
tive to the capitalist entrepreneur.
With the absence of investment, population increase 
would lower the wage level due to the competition for jobs 
among workers. This would lead to further reduction in ag­
gregate consumer's demand which in turn will discourage in­
vestments. Further, the availability of cheap labor would 
tend to weaken the incentives to introduce labor-saving 
techniques, the application of which in itself represents an 
important investment opportunity. Thus the increase of labor 
supply and the cheapening of labor might lead not to growth
36
of investment and output but rather to growth of unemployment. 
Such a result is suggested by the experience of underdeveloped 
countries that cannot complain about insufficient supply of 
labor.
In fact, the presence of technological progress and 
investment projects will call forth the labor supply that is 
needed for their realization. The experience of Iraq during 
the 1950's and early 1960's, when the development expenditures 
and public investments rose sharply, indicated the possibility 
of obtaining labor at low wages, and there was not much in­
crease in consumption, because the supply of unskilled labor 
was inelastic.^ "Lack of opportunities in the rural areas, 
and Iraq's first efforts at industrialization have resulted 
in a drift of rural labor from the countryside to the cities-- 
thus crowding urban centers with unskilled laborers well in 
excess of the demand
3. Shortage of Capital : Some writers have considered 
the agrarian problem in Iraq as caused by the acute shortage 
of capital invested in land. The lack of capital, according 
to this view, has contributed to uphold the stationary
D^. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 132.
U^. S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit., p. 13.
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character of the agricultural economy.&
This shortage of capital, the argument goes, is due 
in part to the low productivity and in part to the distribu­
tion of the returns from cultivation which by virtue of the 
land tenure systems prevailing deprived the actual cultivator 
of his full rights. The landlords who receive the rent of 
land and the interest charged on advances to the farmers con­
sume this revenue rather than invest it in the land.
There is no question about the validity of this argu­
ment, but the question which may be raised is this: will cap­
ital investment, without touching the other social and eco­
nomic factors, lead to agricultural development and, since 
landlords do not make investment in their lands, then who is 
going to do the investing--the State? If the State does this,
then who is going to benefit from these investments, the
landlords or the peasants?
The essential factor of economic development is the 
increase in the productivity of agriculture. This is
achieved in three ways. The first one is the accumulation
of part of the product of the economy for purposes of produc­
tive investment; the second is technical progress; and the
g
A. Bonne, op. cit., p. 161.
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third is the inçrovement of organization of economic activ­
ities . All these three ways of increasing the productivity 
of human labor in agriculture are related one to another, ap­
pear in every developing economy, and are common to all pat­
terns of economic development. Of these, productive invest­
ment is the most important.
In Iraq, the stagnation of agriculture was maintained 
by the existence of various obstacles. Some of these ob­
stacles are these: There was very little capital which could 
be invested productively. This is not to say that capital is 
scarce in Iraq but that very little of the available capital 
found its way into productive investment. With the low pro­
ductivity of a peasant, the income saved after meeting soci­
ety's need for consumption was very small. In addition, the 
major part of this saved income was used for non-productive 
purposes. This was due to the prevailing feudal system. The 
patterns of economic activity were determined by tradition 
which was not conducive to innovation, nor to improvement in 
the technology of production. These factors contributed to 
perpetuate the agricultural stagnation in Iraq.
In order to start development these obstacles must be 
overcome. This itiçlies overcoming the feudal system of social 
relations and the mentality of traditionalism attached to it.
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This is necessary in order to be able to tuilize a major part
I
of the available resources for purposes of productive invest­
ment .
Up to 1958, Iraq's investment was over 20 per cent 
(in some years reached 27 per cent) of the national income.
The Development Board's activities during this period 
were concentrated on irrigation, flood control, and drainage 
projects which accounted for more than 30 per cent of the 
planned expenditures for development. However, the benefit 
from the extension of the cultivated land was realized only 
by those who were able to claim land.^ It was said that the 
Kut barrage, for example, mostly benefited three men, one of 
whom owned an estate the size of Switzerland, while the 
peasant sharecropper became increasingly in debt to the land­
lord and m e r c h a n t . 10 This situation was described by the FAG 
Report as follows :
The failure to raise the standard of living and to 
achieve economic growth was the direct result of the 
deep social unbalance in the country due to the con­
centration of land ownership in few hands. The laws 
ostensibly framed to secure the land to those who 
worked on it served, in fact, to entrench the powers
^The Development Board's policy is discussed at 
greater length in Chapter VI.
10Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq (London, 1959, p. 37.
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of a small minority. Thus the abject poverty of the 
landless workers was not mitigated directly through 
the development projects, though the elimination of 
floods did negatively contribute to the welfare of 
all.11
With extreme backwardness, illiteracy, inadequate 
health conditions, lack of educational facilities, and de­
fective tribal feudal system, Iraq, even though it has abun­
dant amount of capital and is endowed with a potential supply 
of land and water resources, could not solve its agrarian 
problem. The medieval relations prevailing in the country­
side halted progress in agriculture. "The lavish sums de­
voted to the Development Board resulted in the enrichment of 
contractors and landlords and bureaucrats while the country
stagnated.
4. Institutional Reform: This approach was sug­
gested by Dr. Warriner. Warriner indicated that the main 
factor contributing to underdevelopment of Iraq's agriculture 
is the prevalence of "Institutional Monopoly" in land owner­
ship linked with a monopolistic supply of capital to agri­
culture: "the great landlordship of South Iraq resembles the 
Lati Fundia of Latin America in its broad social and economic
llpAO Report, 0£. cit., p. 127.
l^Harvey O'Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New York: MR 
Press, 1962), p. 314.
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e f f e c t s , w h e r e  great estates, worked by semi-serf peons, 
effectively prevent access to landownership for the farm 
laborers, keeping wages low and land use extensive.
Dr. Warriner shows that the need for reform is two­
fold: a social need for higher income for the cultivator,
and an economic need for better farming through more invest­
ments and better methods.
Dr. Warriner has put the blame on the land system 
and considered it as responsible for the great inequality of 
incomes, the lack of an expanding market, the low wage influx 
into the slums, and the lack of agricultural policy. "With­
out land reform the oil money can do little to raise the 
standard of living.
Early Attempt at Reform
The land, which ought to be a primary source of 
wealth in Iraq is kept unproductive by the tribal feudal sys­
tem which dominated the country. Yet agriculture remains
13D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 7.
l^Ibid.. p. 6.
l^Ibid.. p. 7.
l*Ibid.. p. 7.
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the only base, in Iraq's economy, from which to initiate gen­
eral economic development. The nature of this system is ex­
pressed in the simple fact that the land is largely owned by 
a very small group of tribal sheikhs, aghas, and city land­
lords ,
This system of land tenure is characterized by the 
following features: (1) Within the rural sector a few land­
lords received a greater share of the produce and at the same 
time no attention was paid to improving agricultural produc­
tivity.^^ Furthermore, since the agricultural sector com­
prised about 78 per cent of the population and produced only 
20 per cent of the national income, the peasant's income was 
further affected in favor of the urban population.^® Thus 
the poor peasants, who constitute the majority of the people, 
cannot be expected to generate savings for investment on the 
land to improve productivity, nor can it generate any sizable 
demand which would encourage an industrial development. (2) 
Most of the peasants have no draft animals or equipment and
M. Langley, "Iraq, Some Aspects of the Economic 
Scene," The Middle East Journal, XVIII (Spring, 1964), 180-88.
^®Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in 
Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967),
p . 66.
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still use tillage methods that are little different from 
those that were used centuries ago. No animal manure or com­
mercial fertilizer is used and crop rotations are not prac­
ticed. Farming practices are based on the fallow system which
involves cultivating only less than half of the cultivated 
19land. (3) Inadequate irrigation and drainage facilities 
are among the factors which limit any improvement of agricul­
tural productivity.
Under these circumstances, the development policy 
would be expected to include a development program which 
would provide better distribution of income, improved methods 
of cultivation, and provision of drainage and irrigation 
facilities.
Instead, a considerable portion of the Board's invest­
ments were concentrated in the areas of engineering and phy­
sical works projects: dams, water schemes, flood control, 
reservoirs, and drainage. These capital investments were 
financed mainly at the expense of public revenues, derived 
from oil royalties. Improved production on existing land 
would increase incomes. Most of the existing cultivable land, 
however, was privately owned or held on leases (tapu or lazma)
19U. S. Department of Agriculture, og. cit., p. 13.
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that approximated ownership; thus the incomes of the land­
lords would inevitably have increased without an improvement 
in the conditions of the tenant sharecroppers.
As a result, there was a great demand for more equal 
distribution of income and the need for an agrarian reform 
program.
Instead of launching a program to improve and develop 
the existing conditions in the agricultural sector, the gov­
ernment launched its land "settlement program" utilizing 
selected areas of state-owned (Miri Sirf) land to settle 
small landowners. This moderate reform assumed that the tribal 
feudal system would not disappear and that it would have to 
compete with governmental schemes such as Dujaila project.
Why was this indirect and slow solution adopted? "By concen­
trating on the development of Miri Sirf lands, the board appar­
ently hoped to circumvent the problems of land tenure, taxa­
tion, and payment of services rendered by the use of public 
funds."20 Dr. Warriner has given the answer as follows:
No legislation which would infringe on the property 
rights of the large landowners can secure parliamen­
tary approval. The parliament is composed of the 
landowners, who secure election by means of their 
dominance over the cultivators, and this dominance
20
K. M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 122.
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is unquestioned by any internal political force.21
"In the meantime, successive governments have usually 
felt that new legislation on land tenancy must be kept within 
the bounds of what will not be actively resisted by land­
owners ."22
Miri Sirf Land Development Laws
The policy of land reform was initiated by the promul­
gation of MSLD law no. 23, 1945, entitled "The Dujaila Land 
Development Law." Under this law the state lands in the new 
Dujaila canal were to be distributed among the peasants free 
of charge. This law was approved by the parliament because 
the sheikhs landowners in the neighborhood of the Canal hoped 
to get the new irrigated state lands for themselves. Accord­
ing to some writers, the sheikhs were able to secure nearly
23half the new land as their registered property.
The land was divided into plots ranging in size from 
100 to 200 donums, and from 50,000 applicants, only 1,540 
persons were given land.
21D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 157.
^^Lord Salter, o£. cit., p. 54.
23D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 159.
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In 1951, a new law authorized the establishment of a 
special department to make arrangement for settlement of un­
cultivated afeas. This department was concerned with the 
granting of land to new settlers following the same pattern 
of the Dujaila project.
The Development Board planned to develop about 6 mil­
lion donums of new land and expected to have realized about 
one-sixth of its goal by 1960.24 Many advantages were 
claimed; the farmer will be benefited from this reform, be­
cause he will become a landowner instead of a tenant, hence 
his income will be improved, and he will try to raise his 
production. Secondly, the existence of such projects would 
cause a shortage of labor force on the land of large estates 
and this will induce the landlords to improve the conditions 
of the farmers.25
By early 1958, 4,200 families had settled in seven 
settlement areas; 1,540 families had settled on the Dujaila 
project, and 935 families had settled on the Sinjar scheme.
In addition, 431 families had received cultivable land in the 
latest area, the Mussayib project, an area of 303,000 donums.
24
K. M. Langley, The Industrialization in Iraq, p.
122 .
Burns, "The Dujaila Land Settlement," The Middle 
East Journal, V (Summer, 1951), pp. 77-79.
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Most of these families had received cultivable land that did 
not include experimental and extension centers.26
Table 9 shows land settlement projects in Iraq. In 
addition to the smallness and slowness of distribution, these 
figures are inaccurate and misleading. The Sinjar scheme
TABLE 9
MIRI SIRF PROJECTS IN OPERATION BY 1957
Name
Date
Opened
Size of Project 
(in donums)
Units
Distributed
Size of 
Units (in 
donums)
Dujaila 1945 250,000 1,540 100
Hawij a 1950 37,650 462 200
Shahrazoor 1951 32,500 380 70
Latifiya 1952 25,000 442 50
Makhmoore 1953 7,200 100 18 2/3
Sinjar 1956 1,000,000 935 150-300
Mussayib 1956 303,000 431 66
Total 1,644,350 4,200
Source: Warren E. Adams, "The Pre-Revolutionary Decade of
Land Reform in Iraq," Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change, XI (April, 1963) , p. 272.
26The Government of Iraq, The Development Board and 
Ministry of Development, Second Development Week (1957) .
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accounts for the greater part of this distribution, but ac­
cording to some authors, large areas of the best state land 
in this region have been granted in registered title to some 
of the powerful sheikhs in the region.Furthermore, the 
president of the MSLD program reported that the total areas 
distributed to small settlers amounted to only 232,960 donums 
and the number of beneficiaries was 3,434.^8
Defects of Land Tenure Projects Tried
Physical and geographical differences, lack of flood 
control and drainage facilities, fundamental education, medi­
cal services, mismanagement, and landlords' opposition were 
among the factors responsible for MSLD failure.
The projects were opened without preparation for de­
tailed soil studies and construction of drainage system. A 
short time after the settlement of Dujaila, flood took over 
the area due to the lack of protective dikes. Due to salin­
ity a large area of Dujaila was either abandoned or planted 
sparsely with the result that the yield was very low. As a 
result of this destruction of fertility of the soil, about 
300 peasants had to move to another area. Salinity also
27
D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 161.
no
Hassan M. Ali, op. cit., p. 175.
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caused a fall in the yield from 400kg. per donum in the ear­
lier years to 250kg. per donum.
The MSLD law provided that a certain percentage of
the holdings shall be allocated to graduates of agricultural
school, officers of army and police, religious schools, and 
civil servants. This provision opened the way to a mass of 
non-agriculturists and led to the creation of absentee land­
lords. None of these individuals was ready or had the desire 
to settle on the projects and cultivate the land by himself, 
preferring to live in Baghdad or Kut, not on the projects. 
This provision was disapproved of by the Bank Mission, which 
had emphasized that it would be a serious danger, that these 
types of beneficiaries would tend to become landlords who 
would entrust the farming of their plots to others.
In Latifiya project (30 miles from Baghdad), 40 per 
cent of the settlers were ex-officials and ex-service men, 
who generally sublet their holdings.
The selection of this type of settler retarded the 
improvement of the program and created a sharecropping
29D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 165.
30
IBRD Report, o£. cit., p. 15.
^^Warren Adams, op. pit., p. 274.
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system. This fact was emphasized by Warren Adams:
Absentee owners and tenants of Latifiya were a 
barrier to improvement program and produced little 
improvement over surrounding feudal agriculture and 
were contravention of the law. Resident settlers 
lacking agricultural experience also raised serious
p r o b l e m s . 3 2
Attempts were made to establish agricultural cooper­
atives which terminated in failure. Many factors were re­
sponsible for the failure. Among these were cultural, educa­
tional, and religious ones. However, the main factors re­
sponsible for this failure were the active role played by 
the landlords who opposed the MSLD program from the beginning 
and the lack of a suitable environment for the technicians 
and government employees on these projects.33
Lack of credit was apparent and a high percentage of 
the settlers on these projects were indebted to their former 
landlords.The burden of usury and moneylenders was rising. 
It was reported that many settlers were sinking into debt and 
paying interest rates well over 100 per cent. It seems there 
was a tendency to pass the development benefits to the money-
3 2 i b i d ., p. 282.
33lbid.. pp. 282-3.
Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 170.
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lenders rather than the settlers.
In fact, the opening of new projects seemed to be 
expensive. It was estimated that about ID 300 was required 
to settle one farmer. The best, and a great portion of the 
land, had been registered in the name of the big landlords. 
Much of the state land had been abandoned and not registered 
as private property because it was riiarginal and less fertile, 
as in the cases of the Sinjar and Shahrazoor projects. Even 
in the cases of the Dujaila and Sinjar projects, the MSLD 
law did not prevent the sheikh landlords from securing half 
of the newly opened land as their registered property.
In sum, these types of land reform in general are 
mainly resettlement programs. They do not involve the break­
up of large estates, but the opening of new lands, their re­
clamation, and the transfer of peasant populations to these 
previously uninhabited areas. Aside from the callousness in­
volved in transferring indigenous peasant populations from 
soil to which they have been attached, such "reforms" have 
serious economic and political drawbacks. In particular, 
they do not break the political power of the landlords. Hence, 
the landlords are able to resist adequate land-taxation and 
land-utilization.
For these reasons a frontal attack on the big estates
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would surely have to be made for the sake of economic effi­
ciency and fiscal equity, even if all the landless agricul­
tural workers could be provided for by the opening of poten­
tially cultivable lands. This is so because the problem of 
agricultural development in Iraq is not to expand the culti­
vable land but to concentrate on improving the agricultural 
productivity of the existing land which is kept unproductive 
and under-utilized.35 "As land reform or tax reform was 
blocked, the government hoped to alleviate inequality by ex­
tending the irrigated areas rather than by intensifying cul­
tivation on already farmed land."36
The FAO Report described the situation as follows:
The extreme inequality in the land distribution, 
together with the system of sharecropping and the 
effort to by-pass the need for a reform of the 
system by opening up new settlements, rather than 
draining existing irrigation areas, combined to 
render a catastrophe well-nigh inevitable.37
Land taxation presents a similar story. In Iraq, 
there is no land tax. There was one form of tax which was 
imposed on agricultural products sold at the market. This 
tax was a consumption tax because its amount was paid by
35K. M, Langley, The Industrialization in Iraq, p.
122.
36
FAO Report, 0£. cit., p. 128.
^^Ibid.. p. 128.
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the buyers of agricultural produce and not the landlords.
The 1956 tax law abolished the agricultural tax-istihlak, and 
no landlord was subjected to any form of taxation, including 
income tax. Thus, due to the absence of land tax, agricul­
tural land value was inflated and a rigid land distribution 
pattern was encouraged. The absence of such charge on ab­
sentee owners of estates and an income tax on large landowners 
has discouraged a needed déconcentration of ownership, or a 
more intensive and more productive use of land, or b o t h . 38
Early in 1952, the state passed a law by which it as­
sumed power to control the rents. The law determined the 
share of the cultivator in the produce of the land and it 
provided that the landlord may not take more than 50 per cent 
of the produce. It also prohibited the landowner from making 
special levies such as raising money from the farmers in 
order to buy a car for the landlord or to educate his son 
abroad, a practice which was in common use. However, this 
law was not enforced. This fact was emphasized by the pres­
ident of MSLD Committee when he said:
This law does not improve the miserable conditions 
of the peasants, since the application of the law
38United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Progress in Land Reform: Third Report (New York, 1962), p.
6 .
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is greatly doubted, and even if applied, the peasants' 
share of the crop is far from being enough to cover 
the cost of reasonable living.39
In 1952, the parliament passed the Ainara Law, by 
which the peasants were entitled to claim land, but it was 
in fact so worded and executed that sheikhs and their families 
grabbed most of the lands available. Consequently, the peas­
ants exercised their right of appeal against the decisions 
of the settlement officers. The result was that the sheikhs 
retaliated by destroying their houses and turning out their 
families. The peasant's response to this action was migra-
tion.40
A bill providing for the cost of drainage to be met 
in installments by the owners of the land was passed by the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1954. However, it was not approved 
by the Senate and did not become law.^l Again, in 1956, a 
law passed by the parliament rendered income from the rent 
of agricultural land liable to income tax. In 1957, an at­
tempt was made to meet the budget deficit by taxing the 
capital value of landed estates. None of these laws was
39Hassan M. Ali, o£. cit., p. 135.
Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the
Middle East, p. 153. 
41Lord Salter, o£. cit., p. 55
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executed.42
The Economist wrote that an imposed land reform was 
the only way of making the irrigation program pay its way, 
since to settle peasants at ID 300 a head on second-best land 
is financially as well as socially u n s o u n d . 43
Thus the Development Board's development policy was 
far too slow to relieve the peasants of their poverty and 
failed to stop the peasants' flight to big c i t i e s , 44 Dr. 
Warriner observed that rural exodus from Amara province was 
proceeding at a rate of ten lorry loads a day for Baghdad,
The Economist emphasized that sheikhs in the Amara area were 
complaining early in 1957 that they had no one to row them 
to market, and no beeters, because "their" peasants had gone 
off to look for an alternative e m p l o y m e n t .46 One of the big 
landlords in Arbil area declared that in a few years' time
"Development in Iraq," The Economist in Middle 
East in Transition, edited by W. Z. Laqueur (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1958), pp. 278-279.
43lbid.
UU
FAO Report, 0£, cit., p. 127.
45o. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 154.
46ibid., p. 133.
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there would be no labor left on the land at all.^^
Thus since the state failed to stimulate the enact­
ment of significant reforms, it is not surprising that the 
minimal goals of economic development were not approached 
either.
The Economic Impact of Feudal 
Organization of Agriculture
From an economic standpoint, it is necessary to in­
vestigate the impact of the feudal system on the following: 
(1) agricultural productivity, (2) standards of living of the 
peasants, and (3) saving and investment.
Low Agricultural Productivity
The landlord is not mainly concerned with raising 
the productivity of the land but with preserving his social 
status and maintaining his political power. He leaves his 
farm's management to his sirkal (agent) who collects rents 
and gives instructions to the farmers as to what and how 
much to cultivate. The landowner makes little, if any, in­
vestment in the land.
The sharecropper has no incentive to improve the 
land by making investment or utilizing modern methods due to
47lbid., p. 133.
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the following factors; first, the insecurity of tenure dis­
courages long-term investment; second, any increase in the 
yield will be taken by the owner who did not contribute to 
its cost in labor or capital, and third, with a very low in­
come the sharecropper is unable to make any investment.
Agricultural production is produced by subsistence 
peasants who in turn constitute the bulk of the labor force. 
Their productivity (per man and per acre of land) is ex­
tremely low. The peasants' marginal productivity is so neg­
ligible that a departure from agriculture of a sizable part 
of the rural population would not lead to a reduction of 
aggregate output. The productive efficiency of the fellah 
is very low, even as judged by Middle Eastern standards. 
Wheat, rice, and barley yields, which are the main crops in 
Iraq, are the world's lowest.
From 1930 to 1948, the cultivated area increased by 
95 per cent of the previous area, while at the same time, the 
country's population increased by 75 per cent. Virtually, 
this might indicate that the Iraqi peasant's efficiency was 
improved. However, according to the official statistics, no 
increase in productivity has been achieved. The United Na­
tions report in 1949 concluded that the per capita productive 
capacity of the fellah has altered but little since
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TABLE 10
CROP YIELDS IN IRAQ AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
(Average three years, 1955-57, crop per hectar, in lOOkg.)
Country Wheat Barley Cotton Rice Tobacco
Iraq 5.6 8.6 1.6 1.6 7.0
Turkey 10.0 12.1 2.4 3.2 6.8
Iran 9.3 10.0 2.7 3.2 6.8
Egypt 23.1 23.1 4.8 53.9 -  —  —
U.S. 13.8 15.4 4.4 31.7 17.0
U.K. 32.2 30.2 —  —  — —  —  —  — —  —  —  —
Denmark 40.0 36.7 ------ -  —  —  — —  —  —  —
Australia 22.7 10.7 1.3 48.6 9.2
Italy 18.2 12.2 2.2 49.2 14.8
Source: FAO, Year Book of Statistics (New York, 1958).
1918.^® Since 1945 cultivated area has been doubled. How­
ever, as Table II shows, the absolute amount of principal 
crops has been decreased. The increment in the produce is 
less than the increment in cultivated area. With the wide­
spread progress in technology and the advantages of large- 
scale production, productivity might be expected to have 
increased.
Despite the fact that the acreage of cultivated land, 
reduced to per capita basis, is 3 to 3.5 acres compared with
^^United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Mission for the Middle East, Final Report of the United Na­
tions Economic Survey, Part II (New York, 1949), p. 31.
59
the Asiatic average of only 0.5 acre per head, Iraq was a 
net importer of agricultural products instead of a net ex­
porter. Agricultural imports rose from ID 10 million in 1951 
to ID 23 million in 1957.49
TABLE 11
ACREAGE AND OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL FIELD CROPS, 1935-1955 
(Million donums and million tons)
Crop 1935 1945 1955
Area Output Area Output Area Output
Wheat 2.64 0.48 3.00 0.40 5.70 0.45
Barley 2.97 0.58 3.30 0.65 4.82 0.76
Rice 0.61 0.21 0.78 0.25 0.22 0.08
Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Development in the Middle East 
1945-1954 (New York, 1956), p. 94; United Nations, 
Statistical Year Book (New York, 1956), pp. 79, 82, 
and 84.
It follows from the above tables that the deteriora­
tion in the agricultural sector was very considerable, de­
spite the country's historical record which pointed out that 
Iraq has in the past supported a much greater population than 
the present o n e . 5 0
49Govemment of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1954-1957 
(Baghdad, 1958).
^%.N., Mission for the Middle East, Final Report of 
the U.N. Economic Survey, II, pp. 32-35.
60
In Iraq estates are large units of operation, but 
leased to tenants in small lots. The average size of peasant 
farms is very small. Cultivators hold these plots on a cus­
tomary basis, with no legal agreement to define their obliga­
tions. The peasant does not even cultivate the same plot of 
land from year to year; the landlord changes the distribution 
of these plots from year to year. The peasant therefore has 
usually one aim, to get the best out of his plot during his 
short tenancy, regardless of the effect on the fertility of 
the soil.
Under this land tenure system, the fellah is a share­
cropper contributing his labor and receiving a certain por­
tion of the produce as his labor price. The Iraqi type of ' 
estate ownership is sometimes described as absentee-ownership. 
Non-residence of the landlord leads to a growth of intermedi­
ary rent collectors who take a share in the product and so 
increase the burden of rents. In most cases, the landlord 
provides only the land, and is a rent receiver only, contrib­
uting no productive services. Even when working capital is 
provided by the landlord, the lack of work opportunities out­
side the agricultural sector enables landlords to exact rents
51u .N., Mission for the Middle East, Final Report of 
the U.N. Economic Survey, 11, pp. 32-35.
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greatly exceeding that which economists would care to justify 
on the basis of required growth incentives, and the elements 
of pure rent form the greater part of the income received.52 
It follows that the tenancy system in Iraq is a power­
ful obstacle to agricultural improvement. First, the tenant 
has little incentive to increase his output, since a large 
share in any such increase will accrue to the landlord who 
has incurred no part of its cost. Secondly, the high share 
of the produce taken by the landlords may leave the tenant 
with a bare subsistence minimum, with no margin for invest­
ment. Thirdly, it means that wealth is held in the form of 
land, and that the accumulation of capital does not lead to 
productive investment.53
Standards of Living of the Peasants
The conditions under which the rural population lives
are truly miserable; the standard of living is extremely low,
while Credit and aid from the state do not reach them. Dr.
Warriner described these conditions as follows:
Near starvation, pestilence, high death rates, soil 
erosion, economic exploitation. . . this is the 
pattern of life for the mass of the rural population.
It is a poverty which has no parallel in Europe,
5^Ibid., p. 17.
53Ibid., p. 18.
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since even clean water is a luxury. Money incomes 
are low, ID 5 to ID 6 per head per year--but money 
comparisons alone do not convey the filth and dis­
ease, the mud-hut8 shared with animals, the dried 
dung fuel. There is no standard of living in the 
European sense--mere existence is accepted as the 
standard.54
At least four out of every five peasants get no cash 
incomes for their toil. They are paid in kind, sometimes as 
little as two-sevenths share of the produce. " . . .  the 
peasant in most districts obtains a small part, generally be­
low one-fifth of the crop of the land he farms. It may even 
fall to 1/25 of the total p r o d u c t . "^5
In 1958, the agricultural sector produced ID 89.2 
million, while the agricultural population was estimated at 
4.67 m i l l i o n . 56 At best, let us assume that the share of the 
landlords of this produce will be 50 per cent; then the aver­
age per capita income of the rural population is determined 
at about ID 10.^7
. Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East,
p . 1.
^^M. J. Choosy, "A Study in the Theory of Economic 
Development with Reference to Iraq," Middle East Economic 
Papers (American University of Beirut, Economic Research 
Institute, Beirut, 1954), p. 138.
Haseeb, "National Income of Iraq 1962-1963," 
(Baghdad, 1965), mimeographed, p. 20,
^^The per capita annual income of the Iraqis for the 
year 1958 is reported to be ID 58.2.
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In spite of this meager income, the peasant is bur­
dened with heavy contributions to the state and numerous 
people, partly self-installed and partly representatives of 
authorities and of landowners. In addition to the state tax 
the peasant has to meet the claims of the sirkal and other 
mediating persons between his and the aforementioned claim­
ants .
Some of the peasant's income is deducted for local 
expense, such as religious contribution, and often the peas­
ant has to make some contribution to the sirkal in the form 
of gifts as the price of security. More often the landlord 
is at the same time the creditor who supplies the peasant on 
credit with seed and often with implements, with high rates 
of interest (in many cases exceeding 200 per cent). As a 
result of all these claims, nothing is left for the peasant. 
He is in fact consuming his share before the harvesting time 
since he again starts borrowing in order to meet his sub­
sistence consumption. This means that reaping a harvest does 
not necessarily imply eating it.58 "it is clear that the 
peasant cultivator of the land is," says Bonne, "a victim of 
the conflicting claims, upon him and upon his land, of the
58A. Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East 
(London: 2d. Routledge and Kegan, Paul, Ltd., 1955), p. 34.
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state, of the Mosque, of the landlord, and of the money­
lender; the various claimants disagree among themselves as 
to the division to be made of the peasant's p r o d u c e . "59
The impact of the land tenure system is to depress 
the peasant's standard of living in two ways: first, it 
causes peasants to operate plots too small to provide a sub­
sistence minimum for the cultivator and his f a m i l y . S e c ­
ondly, it enables the landowners to exploit the tenant peas­
ant, that is, to pay the cultivators less than their marginal 
productivity. The Bank Mission emphasized this point as 
follows :
In a country where capital is scarce in relation to 
man-power, the ability to provide the means of pro­
duction, land, seed, animals and machinery almost 
invariably also carries with it the ability to exact 
a high proportion of the return.
With the capitalist sector undeveloped, the peasants 
are forced to remain on the land and take the price offered 
however disadvantageous it may be. Under these conditions, 
a competitive market for agricultural labor does not exist. 
Not only do the peasants receive less than their marginal
59
Ibid., pp. 132-33.
^®U.N., Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure 
as Obstacles to Economic Development, p. 6.
^^IBRD Report, o£. cit., p. 6.
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product, but the exaction of the landlord appears to be a
significant cause of the backwardness of the agricultural
sector in Iraq.^Z This conclusion was also confirmed by the
Bank Mission’s report in pointing out that:
The depressed economic condition of the fellah or 
sharecropper undoubtedly retards progress. It under­
mines the health and vigor of the rural population, 
limits the market for industrial products and may in 
the long run jeopardize the stability of the social 
order. Cultivated land is largely owned by sheikhs 
and urban proprietors who have neither the equipment 
nor the knowledge to increase production. As the 
land assigned to the cultivators generally changes 
from year to year, they have virtually no incentive 
to improve it.63
This analysis received special attention and is a
strong indication of a defective agrarian structure. Ninety
per cent of Iraq is illiterate, the average life-span is
twenty-six years and per capita income is less than $90 per
year.^^ In the fall of 1958, Quint wrote:
The facts of life in UMM al-nahr give one pause-- 
95 per cent of the villagers have at least one 
endemic disease, 80 per cent have at least two, 
and 60 per cent have at least three. Parasites 
such as schistosamiasis, ankleystomn, ascares
62
William 0. Thweatt, "Economic Growth and Distribu­
tion in the Middle East," The American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, 16, No. 2 (January, 1957), p. 120.
63
IBRD Report, o£. cit., p. 122.
. Horowitz, The Free World Colossus (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1965), p. 191.
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and amoeba infest the villagers, tuberculosis of the 
lungs and the bones is everywhere, bajl (a form of 
yaws) is prevalent and even leprosy is present. . . . 
After all, a doctor is a luxury. The visitor would 
neither see nor hear any manifestation of our 20th 
century and its resources of t e c h n o l o g y .
"The peasant," says Dr. Keen, "is imprisoned within 
the walls of his own agricultural system, year by year his 
numbers grow and the walls r e m a i n . " T h e  walls are the 
systems of land tenure which stand in the way of progress, 
wasting capital and preventing investment.
Saving and Investment
How does land tenure affect the accumulation and 
flow of capital in the economy? Speaking generally, it is 
extremely difficult to say with certainty why the landlords 
seldom invest their savings in agricultural improvement or 
in other business enterprises. Landlords who have managed 
for centuries to exact rents from land were unable or un­
willing to channel these rents into productive investments.
The argument for large-scale production in agri-
^^Malcolm M. Quint, "The Idea of Progress in an 
Iraqi Village," Middle East Journal, XII (Fall, 1958, p. 370
A. Keen, The Agricultural Development of the 
Middle East (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), 
p . 109.
^^D. Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East,
p , 4.
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culture is based on the assumption that the oxmer of a large 
estate is making capital investment and using new agricul­
tural techniques in order to raise productivity and thereby 
increasing the income from the estate. This situation is ab­
sent in Iraq. The ways in which landlords usually direct 
their savings are often regarded as "unproductive" compared 
to the socially desired results that could arise were these 
savings employed in a manner to generate capital.
Traditionally, there were two channels into which 
landlords usually directed their savings. First, in Iraq, 
landownership is a means to superior social status and pres­
tige, and therefore the savings of the landlords were habitu­
ally devoted to the purchase of land estates. This is quite 
different from making investment in land in the form of 
fertilizers or new techniques which would lead to an increase 
in productivity of land. On the contrary, it leads to the 
creation of more under-utilized resources. Secondly, there 
is a cultural aversion to savings due to the presence of 
traditional domestic forms of conspicuous consumption. A 
major portion of the landlord's income is absorbed by his 
excessive consumption.
In Iraq, which is almost devoid of non-agricultural 
employment, rents form a significant share of national income
68
Consequently, the inequality in landholdings reduces thé in­
come that would accrue to the capitalist class, and this in 
two ways: first, by unproductive uses of the "surplus" income 
derived from agriculture, and secondly, by the unnecessary 
restriction of the domestic market due to the depressing of 
the wage incomes of cultivators.
The exceedingly high consumption standard of the 
landlords was considered as unreasonable. This not only re­
duces their savings but it is often true that traders and 
merchants, in an attempt to emulate the landed class, consume 
more than they otherwise would, and so further reduce the 
community's savings. Many of the landlords were maintaining 
a tribal feudal style of life with large outlays on housing, 
servants, tribal guards and army, travel outside the country, 
and other many luxuries. It is also true that the landed 
class increases its consumption standard as it attempts to 
emulate the western way of life.G9
Often large foreign balances are held in financial 
centers such as London and New York. Some savings are
fLQ
S. B. Himadeh, "Economic Factors Underlying Social 
Problems in Arab Middle East," The Middle East Journal 
(Summer, 1951), p. 271.
Thweatt, op. cit., p. 116.
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invested abroad, as distinct from mere holding of foreign 
balances in foreign banks, and their earnings from these in­
vestments are kept abroad to provide "safety" funds for the 
rich in the event of increased political instability at 
home.70 " . . .  such study will observe torrential flow of
currency from Iraq to Lebanon in the shape of real estate 
investments or ostentatious consumption."7^
Hoarding is another drain of saving. It was esti­
mated that hoarding, in the form of gold, jewelry, and foreign 
exchange, constitutes about 10 per cent of the national income.
Lastly, the high consumption pattern leads to high 
rate of import which in turn decreases the rate of capital 
accumulation. The wealthy class often prefer foreign-made 
goods, not only because as is so often the case, foreign-made 
goods are superior in quality, but because of the "prestige" 
their purchase conveys. Even where the country can manufac­
ture, say, cigarettes, beer, and soap, the richer class feels 
compelled to consume the products of Europe or A m e r i c a . 72
70lbid., p. 116.
^^Jacques Berque, The Arabs, Their History and Future, 
trans. Jean Stewart (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
p . 86.
72W. Thweatt, op. cit., p. 116.
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Furthermore, with their very large incomes, the landlords 
and urban class often desire goods which are only obtainable 
from abroad, e. g ., automobiles, air-conditioners, etc. To 
this extent there is a "leakage" in the flow of consumption 
expenditures. Due to the rise in development expenditures 
between 1950 and 1961, the value of imports increased by 357 
per cent for the same period (see Chapter VI).
As land remains the only source to which savings are 
directed, the price of land goes up (and with it, rents) caus­
ing a large number of small cultivators to sell what little 
land they do own. The bankrupt small peasants use the pro­
ceed to repay their debts to the landlord or moneylenders.^3
This irrational attitude of the landlords was framed 
within the economic laws operating in Iraq. In order to 
organize and operate these large farms, the landlords needed 
to make investment in the form of tractors, tools, machines, 
and fertilizers. Since the non-agricultural sector is un­
developed, these machines and equipment are not made at home. 
They have to be imported from abroad. The cost of imported 
machines and equipment is very high, and since the cheap 
labor is available at a very low price, then it stands to
73C. Iverson, Monetary Policy in Iraq (Baghdad: 
National Bank of Iraq, 1954), p. 70.
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compete with the imported machines and equipment. Economi­
cally, the landlords would find it suitable to employ this 
cheap labor rather than invest in land in the form of ex­
pensive tools and tractors. Furthermore, due to the agri­
cultural nature, the returns of capital invested in this 
sector tend to materialize slowly. With the prevailing high 
interest rate, investment in agriculture is discouraged. In 
addition, investment in agriculture seems very risky, due to 
climatic factors and the fluctuation in agricultural produc­
tion. These factors do discourage the moneylenders and 
bankers from lending their money for agricultural investment. 
This is especially true if these investments are in the form 
of long-term loans.
In like manner, the nature of agricultural business 
in Iraq requires heavy investment in irrigation schemes, 
flood control, drainage, canal systems, etc. These types of 
investments, without question, will raise the agricultural 
productivity. But with the present rent very high and the 
standards of living of the fellah extremely low, the land­
owners will find it impossible to raise the rent on the im­
proved land. As a result the landlords are discouraged and 
have no incentive to make these types of investments.
Attracted by the high rates of interest paid for
72
loans, the landowners have become the moneylenders and the 
bankers of the rural people. Trapped with perpetuating need 
for credit in order to meet his need for consumption funds 
and to keep up his production, the peasant has become the 
first profitable customer for the landlord moneylender. In­
terest rates charged on rural credit often exceed 200 per 
cent per annum, adding another burden to land charges.
CHAPTER III 
THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1958
The analysis of the objectives and provisions of the 
agrarian reform law of 1958 necessitates an analysis of eco­
nomic, social, and political conditions prevailing In Iraq, 
the development of concern about agrarian reform, and some 
Indications of the need for this reform.
Socio-Political Structure
If the question of agrarian reform was Ignored by 
the state. It appears proper to look further Into the socio­
political structure of Iraq for an explanation. The land­
lords were In a position of control In all the representative 
bodies. With the creation of national government, the sheikh 
landlords have dominated the parliament and have come to con­
stitute the majority of the conservative party--the Constitu­
tional Union Party--of the prime minister Nurl es-Said.
Up to 1958, the non-agricultural sector of the econ­
omy was still undeveloped and Indicated relatively little
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activity in the country. Consequently, with the absence of 
this sector, there was no organized middle class which could 
rival the landlords. Moreover, the existence of British 
troops in Iraq, the struggle for political and national inde­
pendence overshadowed the internal social and economic prob­
lems. Furthermore, the peasants, the class most interested 
in agrarian reform were completely isolated from the city and 
the world and were not represented in any political or legis­
lative body.
Rural unrest became noticeable during the late 1940's, 
In a strike which broke out in Amara in 1951, police fired 
on peasant strikers. The Basra riots in 1952, which were re­
pressed by police fire, the rural revolt in Diala, and the 
general peasant opposition to the landlords in Arbil are a 
few examples of this new peasant movement in Iraq.^ In Iraq, 
however, there has been no major peasant revolution that 
could bring about an agrarian reform. As a result, the main 
response to increasing poverty and hardship remained in the 
form of faith, immigration, or death, not initiation of poli­
tical movement, as happened in most European countries after 
World War I.
T^. El-shaibani, op. cit., p. 57.
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While in western countries, the middle class devel­
oped a new economic system, with which they opposed the 
feudal class, the backwardness and poverty of Iraq never gave 
this class an opportunity to assume a leading role in society. 
The small Iraqi middle class sought the accommodation to the 
prevailing order by assimilating the political, moral, and 
cultural values of the ruling class rather than by demanding 
an agrarian reform or developing an interest in any kind of 
social, political, or economic reform. The middle class 
"can not, however, link up with the fellahin and provide the 
political force which would recast the social structure of
O
the country." Finding itself ruled by the landlords and the 
oil company, the middle class sought its main activities in 
whatever industry and commerce developed in Iraq. By means 
of a complex of trade monopolies and a system of import- 
license by quota, the middle class was able to fix prices and
O
hence to realize a very high profit.^
In like manner, the middle class was not able to play 
its political and economic role for reasons which were con­
nected with the internal make-up of the business class itself
2
Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle 
East, p. 172.
3
Caractacus, o£. cit., pp. 31-32.
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which was connected with its traditional attitude toward 
seeking greater social status and economic security by rein­
vesting its earnings in land rather than long-term productive 
facilities
Faced with a growing social and political unrest from 
below, the middle class determined new social and political 
action. Instead of demanding social and economic reforms, 
the middle class, as a substitute for domestic support, began 
to look to foreign powers as its political protector.^
The Development of Concern about 
Agrarian Reform in Iraq
The advocates of agrarian reform were dealing with 
the limitation of the size of large estates, rural develop­
ment, and provision of agricultural credit. Mr. El-dhahir, 
for example, proposed a land policy which limits the maximum 
landownership to 2,000 donums, with a minimum limit of 100 
donums. Any land in excess of this limit should be taken 
over by the state, with fair compensation, and distributed 
among peasants.^
4
M. Halpern, op. cit., p. 48.
^Ibid., p. 48.
^Abdul Razaq El-dhahir, Feudalism and Diwan in Iraq 
(Baghdad: Al-muthanna Press, 1946), p. 85. (in Arabic).
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Dr. El-nahi urged a land policy in Iraq. He empha­
sized that the feudal problem cannot be overcome without a 
strong policy aimed at improving the village life and settling 
the tribe on new bases which should free its members from the 
landlords' domination. This, he said, cannot be achieved 
without the introduction of small-size holdings in all Miri 
Sirf lands. This policy, according to El-nahi, must put a 
maximum limit to landownership and ensure small farmers the 
needed credit and other measures which will protect small 
holders against moneylenders. He suggested the establishment 
of cooperative societies. Furthermore, he urged that the 
state extend its educational program to the village.^
Dr. El-Shaibani wrote that the solution of the peas­
ant's problem lies in liberating him from exploitation im­
posed upon him by the prevailing tribal feudal system. El- 
Shaibani predicted three possibilities that might take place 
if this problem remains without solution. They are;
1. The peasant's first response to the existing
agricultural conditions will be to migrate from 
the countryside to the city looking for better­
ment which will result in unfavorable social, 
economic, and political consequences.
Salah A. El-nahi, Introduction to Feudalism and 
Land System in Iraq (Baghdad; Dar Al-Maarifah Press, 1955) 
pp. 72-73.
78
2o The second possibility is that the peasant will 
revolt against this social and political system 
which has depressed his standard of living.
3. The peasant would accept his reality and stay on 
the land without an attempt to try to change the 
economic and social relation which determined 
his fate. If this possibility would happen, the 
result will be "near starvation, pestilence, high 
death rates, soil erosion, and economic exploi- 
tation.8
El-Shaibani supported the second possibility and saw 
some evidences of its appearance in many sections of Iraq's 
rural sector.
The possibility of the peasant's revolt was also sup­
ported by Keen, when he said: "History has shown that if ab­
sentee landlordism is allowed to continue in existence, it 
inevitably has to be solved through revolutionary land dis­
tribution."^
The position of the political parties in relation to 
agrarian reform was based on measures including the confisca­
tion of large estates and their redistribution among peasants 
All the parties had a clearly defined social and economic 
program related to t h a t . 10 However, due to the fact that 
these parties were outlawed by Nuri es-Said, they were not
®T. El-shaibani, 0£, cit., pp. 57-58.
A. Keen, o£. cit., p. 38. 
lO-r. El-shaibani, 0£. cit., pp. 87-95.
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represented in the parliament and thus could not enforce any 
legislative law in order to implement their policies.
Despite this demand for agrarian reform, the prime 
minister Nuri es-Said was able to ignore completely the ques­
tion of the distribution of landed property. Thus, late in 
1957, in a major address in a broadcast from Baghdad, Nuri 
es-Said announced to the people of Baghdad that:
The chief of the tribe was playing the role of the 
father for its sons, he is responsible for preserv­
ing security, order and cultivation of the land, in 
addition to his responsibility for lending money to 
his tribesmen. Big estates are naturally distributed 
after the death of the landlord, by dividing this 
property among his heirs. Thus, through time, feudal­
ism will disappear.il
This view, of course, recognized the existing economic 
and social unity of the tribe. The tribal chief has become 
the manager of the economic and social affairs of the tribe.
He is responsible for; (1) preserving security and order, (2) 
agricultural management of the land, (3) education, moral and 
social guidance, and (4) providing farm credit. In other 
words, the solution suggested for resolving the agrarian prob­
lem was left to death and inheritance.
lllbid., pp. 75-76
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The Need for Agrarian Reform
It is argued that the worsening of agricultural pro­
ductivity makes agrarian reform all the more imperative. It 
seems that the majority of people perceived that the main 
problem involved in Iraq in the socio-economic issue was the 
defective agrarian structure.
The economic base for this argument was that the 
owners of large estates maintained these estates in an under­
developed condition, unproductive, and paying no taxes. It 
was said that agrarian reform is the necessary starting-point 
for political, economic, and social change alike. The mere 
fact that 80 per cent of the Iraqi people who live from agri­
culture are farm workers is a strong indication of the need 
for this reform. Until this proportion is substantially re­
duced one expects that it will be impossible either to in­
crease the input of management in agricultural enterprises to 
effective levels or to bring rural levels and standards of 
living up to a desired plane.
In like manner, the low production per man and per 
acre is no more than a reflection of the effects of the socio­
economic factors that are kept in force by a social system 
based on big estates which are concentrated in a few hands.
The need for agrarian reform was based on the following:
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(1) lack of skills possessed and used by the majority of the 
population, (2) extremely low investment and poor techniques,
(3) the absence of confidence by the landlords as demonstrated 
by their own export of capital to foreign countries which was 
in effect a standing confession of their disinterest in making 
investment in lands and improving agricultural productivity,
(4) low average levels and standards of living for the peasants 
which are caused by keeping the land unproductive, (5) low in­
terest and incentive which induce the peasant to improve the 
land or to increase production, and (6) two-class system which 
determined that there would be a small class of elite families 
at the top of the social scale, and a large class who are im­
poverished, uneducated, and only slightly productive workers
1 2
at the base of it.
In the main, the need for agrarian reform was present. 
This reform would call for the alleviation of the most glaring 
inadequacies in diet, housing and health, the improvement of 
agriculture through diversification, broadening of landowner­
ship, expansion of cultivable acreage and increasing of modern 
farming techniques, and reform of tax laws.
12
T. El-Shaibani, 0£. cit., pp. 53-59; A. R. El-dhahir, 
On Agricultural and Political Reform (Baghdad: Shafeeq Press,
1959), pp. 49-52, 90-98; D. Warriner, Land Reform and Develop­
ment in the Middle East, pp. 173-182.
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With a low standard of life, there is no more than a 
narrow and restricted home market to encourage private capi­
talists to invest in industry. The subsistence agricultural 
sector cannot form part of the general market of the country. 
The isolation of a great portion of the population affects 
economic growth in general and in particular it is inimical 
to the development of industry. It inhibits the flow of labor 
into occupations requiring industrial skills, and it keeps 
off the market a significant proportion of the country's po­
tential purchases of industrial products.
The low average personal income affects not only the 
size of the local market for industrial products but also its 
nature. The demand in general is for low quality goods and 
for standardized goods for which variations in style or qual­
ity are of much less importance than low p r i c e . " I n  coun­
tries trying to industrialize today, inadequate market demand 
frequently limits their progress. Iraqi industrialists have 
long complained of inadequate m a r k e t . T h e  United Nations 
report emphasized: "Market inadequacy is merely symptomatic 
of underlying forces inhibiting development and the process
11United Nations, Processes and Problems of Industrial­
ization in Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1955), p. 121.
Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 125.
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of enlarging the market is no more and no less than the proc­
ess of developing the economy,
While protection of infant industry was recommended 
by most economists, Iraq, which badly needed this protection, 
was forced to do away with it. Therefore, goods were imported 
from abroad. Consequently, there was no opportunity for prof­
itable investment in the industrial sector of the economy.
Economic development, and in particular, industrial 
development, depends in main on its gathering its own momentum. 
It requires investment in the domestic market which has to 
lead to further investment. In fact, one investment gives 
rise to another, and the second investment creates the condi­
tions for the third. It is the "synchronized" application of 
capital to a wide range of different industries. Yet al­
though, as Allyn Young put it, "division of labor depends in 
large part upon the division of l a b o r , i n  Iraq, as we have 
seen, this sequence took a different course: the small market 
for manufactured goods in Iraq did not become the internal
^^U.N., Processes and Problems of Industrialization 
in Underdeveloped Countries, p. 14.
Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Under­
developed Countries (Oxford, 1953), p. 11.
^^Allyn Young, "Increasing Returns and Economic Prog­
ress," Economic Journal (December, 1928), p. 533.
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market of this country. It was flooded by imported goods 
rather than those produced domestically. The only possibility 
that remained was the oil industry which was founded by for­
eigners. But these investors were induced by one or more of 
the classical factors. "Of these, one is a large and sure 
market; the biggest markets being in the West, the investor ,
. . has tended to put his capital into raw materials that can 
be marketed at home, that are really an extension of his home 
economy and that bring local benefits only as a by-product of 
his operation.Thus, Iraq became a primary producer of oil. 
Its economy, in the main, was dominated by the production of 
this single product and lacked the industrial bases and modern 
infrastructures necessary to achieve self-sustaining growth.
Faced with this situation, the business class devoted 
itself to commerce, attracted by the high profit offered by 
investing in land, real estate, or lending to the perpetually 
indebted peasant. Thus there were obstacles preventing the 
entry of capital into industry or long-term business.
Under these circumstances, agrarian reform would have 
to achieve the following objectives: (1) facilitate and
18
"Proud Borrower and Shy Investor," The Economist, 
November 7, 1953, pp. 402-404.
Halpern, 0£. cit., p. 49.
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increase the growing of new crops to provide the nation's 
industries with raw materials, meet food consumption require­
ments, and develop and expand those items of agricultural 
production intended for exports, a source of foreign exchange; 
and (2) at the same time, increase the consumer market by 
means of progressive improvement in the standard of living of 
those people in the rural areas, which in turn, will con­
tribute by expanding the domestic market. Thereby, it is ex­
pected that industries will be established that are not very 
profitable in a limited market and other lines of products 
will be developed that are limited for the same reason.
Factors Contributing to the Enactment 
of the Law
The regime which came to power following the revolu­
tion of 1958 passed the Agrarian Reform Law which called for 
confiscation and redistribution of cultivable land held in 
large tracts. While there were many factors contributing to 
the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law, the following de­
serve special attention:
1. Failure of Previous Reform Attempts : If there
was a single fact which justified passing the agrarian reform 
law, it was the general disappointment and discontent over 
the Development Board expenditures under the reform law of
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MSLD. As a matter of fact the development of the country did 
not move fast enough to satisfy the growing demand for social 
change, and there was a universal belief that the Board's an­
nual expenditures of ID 100 million ought to show r e s u l t s . ^ 0  
The achievements of the Board fell short of both potentiali­
ties and needs. In the words of the FAG Mission:
Two not unconnected features stand out especially 
in the pattern of economic development of Iraq prior 
to 1958, The first is the woefully small effect of 
the massive expenditure on vast projects on the 
standard of living of the masses. The second is the 
failure of the public investment to evoke a spon­
taneous response outside the oil sector of the econ­
omy, its failure to generate a self-sustaining growth 
on an ever broadening front, beyond the immediate 
effects of the spending of the oil revenue.
The effect of development expenditure seemed to bene­
fit only the rich. It was to make the contrast between rich 
and poor more striking, and its impact was to increase im­
ports which benefited mainly the rich, whose consumption of 
luxuries was very conspicuous.^2
There was no creation of industry on a scale suffi­
cient to employ large numbers of the poor people 
whose miserable huts clustered on spare plots of 
land in the middle of the capital city, and beyond
on
D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 125.
21FAQ Report, o£. cit., p. 127.
2^0. Warriner, loc. cit., p. 125.
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the flood embankment that surrounds it. ' The Board 
did good negative work in stopping the floods, but it 
did not find work for the victims of the country's 
changing social structure.23
One may conclude at this point that the failure of 
the previous development policy was one of the strongest fac­
tors contributing to the passing of the 1958 Agrarian Reform 
Law.
2. Foreign Ideas : During the last two decades, the 
expression "agrarian reform" has received special attention 
in most parts of the world. The new policy orientation was 
based on the assumption that agrarian reform measures aiming 
at the breaking up of large estates, followed by redistribu­
tion of these estates among small holders, would put an end 
to the stagnation of agriculture and establish preconditions 
for the development of the backward countries.
Historically, a first agrarian reform came with the 
French Revolution which led to a widespread emancipation of 
peasants in western Europe.Following World War I, politi­
cal as well as economic considerations influenced the redis­
tribution of agricultural land in Europe. After World War 
II, the demand for agrarian reform became a world issue which
? ?■^Caractacus, 0£. cit■, p. 36.
^^Ralegh Barlowe, o£. cit., p. 174.
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included not just Europe but Asia and other parts of the 
world. Thus the emergence of national states in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America with aspiration for national and economic 
independence has served to bring this issue to the fore with 
renewed f o r c e . ^5
Recently, reference to the need for agrarian reforms 
in many underdeveloped countries has been made at various times 
in the debates of the United Nations' organs concerned with 
the development of these countries. The Economic and Social 
Council, at its Thirteenth Session on September 7, 1951, 
adopted an agrarian reform resolution and recommended that the 
specialized agencies assist governments in improving land use 
and productivity.26
Since the end of World War II, many countries have 
undertaken reform measures for limiting landownership and re­
distributing large land holdings among the peasants. The ex­
tent of these reforms varied from one country to another, ac­
cording to the prevailing economic, social, and political con­
ditions. Of special interest to Iraqis was the agrarian re­
form program undertaken in Egypt. The "demonstration effect"
2 5Alexander Eckstein, "Land Reform and Economic De­
velopment," WorW PolitiSÊ) VII (July, 1955), p. 650.
26
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Progress in Land Reform (New York, 1954), p. iii.
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of the Egyptian agrarian reform has a powerful impact on the 
Iraqi peasant. Its first repercussions were felt in general 
strike in Mosul, riot in Amara, in Basra, Arbil, and Diala.
The enactment of the 1952 Egyptian agrarian reform affected 
1,789 landlords, each with holdings of over two hundred fed- 
dans (feddan = 1,038 acres). Land distribution benefited 
200,000 farm families which comprised over one million in­
dividuals.^7
3. The Military Revolution; On July 14, 1958, a 
group of army officers seized power in Iraq. About a few 
weeks after the revolution, an Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. 
The early date of this reform indicates that it was an inte­
gral part of the revolution. The collapse of Nuri's regime 
from the impact of the revolution of July 1958 was followed 
by the abolition of monarchy and the enactment of the 1958 
Agrarian Reform, The new regime claimed reform as its goal. 
They planned to begin the building of a new Iraq, to eliminate 
corruption and to attack the basic problems of poverty and 
backwardness. The new regime claimed common goals--indepen­
dence, economic development, and modernization.
27Saad M. Gadalla, Land Reform in Relation to Social 
Development in Egypt (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1962), p. 6.
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The landed ruling class was economically dispossed, 
socially displaced, and politically overthrown. Thus, in 
Iraq, the large landowners were few, not exceeding a few hun­
dred, and they were destined to disappear historically.
Objectives of the Law
On September 30, 1958, Premier Qassim pronounced the
birth of the agrarian reform to the Iraqi people in a major
address in a broadcast from Baghdad. He said that "agrarian
reform was the foundation of all social reform, and that the
'revolution' aimed to solve the problems of all the people in
such a manner as to ensure the public interest, welfare, and
a high standard of living for all the people." To realize
these aims, according to Qassim, "the standards of living of
the poor must be raised to a standard of honorable human
beings without intentionally decreasing the just standard of
living of the rich." According to Qassim, the people were
not capable of determining their own welfare. Therefore, "we
must raise the social, educational and health standards of
the people so that they can decide what is good for them."
To achieve this, he declared:
We have broad social reform projects with which we 
will raise the standard of living of the individual, 
particularly the poor. We will not lower the
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standard of the rich but we will raise the standard 
of the p o o r . 28
On November, 1958, in a proclamation on agrarian re­
form issued by Qassim as Premier, it was said;
Agrarian reform is and will continue to be one of 
the most important aims of our revolution, a source 
of good and prosperity for our people and one of 
the most important pillars of social justice in our
beloved fatherland.^9
This statement indicates the diversity in the objec­
tives of the Agrarian Reform Law, economic as well as social 
and political objectives. The economic objective aims at 
raising the level of living through improvement in agricul­
tural land. The social objective aims at abolishing the 
social evils that had resulted from the imbalance in social 
relations, the concentration of landownership in few hands. 
The political objective is implicit in the elimination of 
landlordism as a political and social class. However, this 
statement does not make clear how agrarian reform will lead 
to agricultural development and finally to general economic 
development.
The larger aims of the Agrarian Reform Law were
28Government of Iraq, Agrarian Reform Law, No. 30
for 1958.
^^Al-Zaman (Baghdad), November 7, 1958.
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announced by the Minister of Agriculture, when he declared:
The objectives of agrarian reform are: first, elimi­
nation of feudalism as a system for production. It 
was intended to do away with the "colonial rule" and 
with the survivals of feudalism which impeded economic, 
political, and cultural progress in that country.
Second, to give a lift to a large class of the peasants 
and to raise their social standard in general, and to 
raise agricultural production and national income.
In order to achieve these objectives the new govern­
ment decided to carry out a radical reform aimed at reorgan­
izing the economy through an agrarian reform which sought to 
expropriate the surplus lands of the big landowners and dis­
tribute them among the fellahin.
To accomplish these objectives, the Minister of Agri­
culture stated the following measures were to be undertaken:
(1) limitation on size of holdings, (2) redistribution of 
land to peasants and small farmers, (3) establishment of co­
operative societies, which will improve living conditions of 
farm people, and (4) fair provisions in regard to the rights 
of agricultural laborers.
Moreover, the peasant was to be encouraged to make 
full use of cooperative organizations, demonstration farms, 
educational programs, and available technological advice.
30Government of Iraq, Agrarian Reform Law, pp. 5-7.
31Ibid., pp. 6-7
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As for industrialization, the first aim was "to pro­
duce the means of production and lay the foundations of heavy 
industry." Dr. Kubbah, Minister of Agrarian Reform, declared 
that the revolution was a social revolution aimed at the de­
struction of Iraq's semi-feudal system and the establishment 
of a new national regime which would restore power to the 
people--the workers, the peasants, and the middle class. He 
emphasized that after the government had replaced the old re­
gime, it had begun to set up a new social and economic system 
in the interest of four classes of the people: farmers, 
workers, small bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. He 
characterized the revolution as scientifically a "bourgeoisie 
revolution" and stated that its objectives and achievements 
did not go beyond the framework of socialist-capitalist
relations.32
Beyond these immediate aims, was the general objec­
tive of raising the standards of agricultural production, 
which would raise the standard of living of the peasants and 
provide the requirements for industrialization of Iraq. In­
dustry would receive from the new peasant prosperity raw
32
Benjamin Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq 
(New York: Council for the Middle Eastern Affairs Press,
1960), p. 76.
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materials, a huge expanded market, and food necessary for 
its working class. Kubbah predicted that Iraq's future de­
pended on the successful operation of the Agrarian Reform 
Law. He said: "Not only does the fate of the national
economy depend on the successful and sound application of 
this law, but the fate of the Republic itself and that of 
democracy in our new Iraq also depends on it." But agrarian 
reform, said Kubbah, "would not operate in a vacuum. Its 
success depended on certain social and political conditions, 
the most important of which was political stability."
Our own concept of the political stability is that 
of the revolutionary forces. This concept could be 
summarized in one sense: providing and supplying a 
scientific solution for the political and social 
contradictions which have inevitably to be included 
by any general status.33
Provision of the Law 
Expropriation and Distribution
The Agrarian Reform Law limited individual land own­
ership to 1,000 donums of irrigated land and 2,000 donums of 
non-irrigated land (rain-fed land). Any land in excess of 
these limits was to be taken over by the government and 
distributed among the peasants under specific financial
^^Ibid., p. 76.
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arrangements =
The land in the large tract category and therefore 
subject to the agrarian reform law amounted to 11.4 million 
donums (this did not include Miri Sirf and other types of 
state lands).
A total of 2,803 owners held land in excess of 1,000 
donums of flow or lift irrigated land, or 2,000 donums of 
rain-fed land. If an owner held both types of land, then a 
total of 1,000 units--one donum of irrigated land and two 
donums of rain-fed would equal one unit--would be expropri­
ated. Exception to 1,000 donums of irrigated land and 2,000 
of rain-fed land limit has been made for companies and soci­
eties engaged in reclamation of the land to be used in the 
interest of the national e c o n o m y . ^4 A period of five years 
was fixed as the time necessary for the completion of the 
requisition and distribution of the land.^S Compensation was 
to be paid to landowners for land confiscated by the govern­
ment in the form of treasury bonds bearing 3 per cent inter­
est over 20 years.
^^Government of Iraq, Agrarian Reform Law, Article 3,
^^Ibid., Article 4. 
^^Ibid., Article 8,
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The requisitioned land was to be distributed by the 
state in lots at a maximum of 60 donums of irrigated land or 
120 donums of rain-fed land,^?
A person eligible to acquire land must be an Iraqian, 
18 years of age, working in agriculture and must own less 
than 60 donums of irrigated land or 120 donums of rain-fed 
land. Priority in acquiring land was to be given to those 
who actually cultivate the land, then to the peasants having 
the largest families in the village, next to those possessing 
less wealth among their fellow villagers, and finally to non-
O  O
residents of the village.^
The price of land distributed to peasants was to be 
determined according to the prevailing price of the similar 
land in the area, plus 3 per cent annual interest rate, plus 
20 per cent for the expropriation and distribution expenses. 
The total price of distributed land was to be paid by the
OQ
new peasant-owner in 20 equal annual installments
Agricultural Co-operative Organizations 
Peasants who acquired the requisitioned land were to
^^Ibid., Article 10.
^^Ibid., Article 12.
^^Ibid., Article 14.
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be allowed to join cooperative societies established to pro­
vide agricultural and social services to the members.
Article 33 of the Agrarian Reform Law provided that 
the agricultural cooperatives' functions are: (1) to obtain 
agricultural advances for members ; (2) to provide the peas­
ants with seed, fertilizer, cattle, agricultural machinery, 
storage and transportation means; (3) to organize the culti­
vation of land and exploitation of land in the most efficient 
manner, including the selection of seed and the grading, com­
bating pests, and digging canals and drains; (4) to market 
the principal crops on the behalf of their members and keep 
their accounts; (5) to render all other agricultural and so­
cial services in the interests of their members.
The society might include other members who own non­
distributed land in that area, not exceeding in size the 
maximum prescribed limit of distribution. The agricultural 
cooperative was to be under the supervision of an official 
selected by the government.
Regulation of Agricultural Relations
Article 37 of the Agrarian Reform Law provided that 
landlord-tenant relations were to continue for a 3-year pe­
riod from the enactment of the Agrarian Law; if this period
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was not longer than 3 years, and the landowner should not be 
allowed to ask the tenant to get off the land except under 
conditions where the tenant failed to meet his obligations 
stipulated by the agreement stated below:
The landowner was obligated to render to his tenant 
the following: (1) the agricultural land, and enable him to 
cultivate it according to the agreement between them, and
(2) water for irrigation through flow or lift.
The tenant was obliged to cultivate the land, includ­
ing ploughing, harvesting and other agricultural work re­
quired for agricultural production.
Article 41 stipulated that agricultural produce 
should be distributed between the tenant and landlord as 
follows :
Flow Irri- Lift Irri- Rainfall
gated Land gated Land Land
Land 10 % 10 % 10 %
Water supply 10 20 -  -
Tenant work and
seeds 50 40 50
Ploughing 7.5 7.5 12.5
Harvesting 12.5 12.5 17.5
Management 10 10 10
The Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform retained 
the right to alter these proportions and percentages of the 
produce according to different areas.
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Article 43 provided that agricultural relations 
should be arranged by a written contract signed by those two 
parties concerned. Furthermore, the relationship between 
the actual landowner or his agent and the actual cultivator 
was to be based on a direct relation between them, with no 
intermediaries.
Rights of Agricultural Laborers
The Agrarian Law provided that the wage rate of agri­
cultural workers in various agricultural regions should be 
fixed by a committee appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. 
Article 49 provided that the agricultural laborers be allowed 
to organize unions in order to protect their joint interest.
Execution of the Law 
Administration
The administration machinery of agrarian reform was 
composed of the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, the Ex­
ecutive Agency, and the Judicial Committee. To facilitate 
the execution of the reform's activities, a Higher Committee, 
of which the Prime Minester was chairman, was established.
The Minister of Agrarian Reform, who was a member in the Com­
mittee, was empowered to act for it, while discharging the
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reform activities. Other members were the Minister of Fi­
nance, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Com­
merce, and the Minister of Communication.
The Higher Committee was an independent body, with a 
separate budget and its own rules of procedure, which gov­
erned all budgetary, financial, and administrative matters.
It has the authority to interpret provisions of the Agrarian 
Reform Law, to fix the amount of money needed to increase 
agricultural production on the land requisitioned and dis­
tributed, and to participate in any project for improving 
the condition of the peasants. It had the authority of super­
vision and guidance over agricultural cooperatives.
The Executive Agency, which was attached to the Min­
istry of Agrarian Reform, was to carry out the various opera­
tions of the Agrarian Reform affairs. The Agency was to be 
comprised of several specialized departments for land ex­
propriation, land distribution, land survey, farm management, 
etc.
The Judicial Committee was entitled to deal with the 
judicial objections which were forwarded by persons.
Finance
To insure the ability of the new owners to cultivate
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their plots, the law arranged a financial system to support 
them, and also arranged means to make necessary services 
available; such services as to lead generally to improved 
agricultural production. The Agricultural Bank had been at­
tached to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to replace the 
sheikh landlord lending activities and to extend its lending 
activities to small landowners in the agricultural sector. 
Furthermore, the formation of the Directorate General of 
Agrarian Machinery and Equipment had been empowered to super­
vise and make available machinery and equipment in agricul­
tural stations. The Directorate also was responsible for 
the operation of water pumping stations where n e c e s s a r y . 40
The Temporary Management 
There is a time lag between confiscation and distri­
bution of land among small peasants, because the expropriated 
land needs to be classified, surveyed, and organized. In ad- 
tition, there is a need to render irrigation facilities and 
to investigate those peasants entitled to the distribution.
In order to arrange a temporary management for these lands, 
the Agrarian Reform Law stipulated that the Higher Committee
40Government of Iraq, Directorate General of the 
Diwan. The Planning Section, The Agrarian Reform (Baghdad,
1963), p. 2.
102
should decide to arrange this management by means of hiring 
these lands to their actual cultivator by formation of tempo­
rary management attached to the Institute of Agrarian Reform 
and Agricultural Board in the Provinces.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATION OF 
IRAQ'S AGRARIAN REFORM
From the foregoing analysis of the Iraqi economy it 
follows that the productivity of the agricultural sector can­
not be improved except by investment coming from outside this 
sector and, inversely, the industrial development is in some 
sense dependent on the extent to which supplies can be ex­
tracted from agriculture and the agricultural population, 
helped only by this outside investment.^
This analysis also showed that the poverty of Iraq 
was caused by the stagnant agriculture because the majority 
of the people are engaged in agricultural work, with a sub­
sistence level of living. Accordingly, there is a double 
limitation on the process of development in Iraq. The de­
fective land tenure system had stood as the main obstacle to
^See T. Balogh, "Agricultural and Economic Develop­
ment," Oxford Economic Papers, XIII (February, 1961), p. 27.
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the potential expansion of productive a c t i v i t y « 2  Therefore, 
among the actions required to release the forces which might 
initiate the process of economic development, agrarian reform 
would receive a high priority. The removal of semi-feudal 
social relations always marks the beginning of social prog­
ress and economic development.
In adopting agrarian reform policy, Iraq is con­
fronted with the problem of reorganizing her agriculture on 
new lines which should stimulate economic development, and 
promote capital accumulation and investment, higher worker 
productivity and an increase in total production.
In the debates and discussions of agrarian reform 
policy, different approaches within different frameworks of 
reference have been used rather loosely by advocates of con­
flicting objectives. It is constructive here to outline the 
now widely held "liberal" notion of agrarian reform which 
seems to influence the development policy of many underdevel­
oped countries.
New Institutional Structure
Economists often argue that agriculture can provide 
the economies of underdeveloped countries with the impetus
^Food and Agricultural Organization, Mediterranean 
Development Project (Rome, 1959), p. 37.
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for économie development but that to do so it requires a re­
organization that is centered in appropriate land tenure 
structure.
After World War II, with the growing preoccupation 
with economic development a i the rising question of inter­
national cooperation, attempts were made to find new ap­
proaches for the development of underdeveloped nations. The 
new literature on "economic development" emphasized that both 
the static neo-classical analysis of the allocation of given 
resources between various uses and the Keynesian short-run 
analysis of how given resources are employed were quite in­
adequate. It is said that the market mechanism operates more 
imperfectly in the underdeveloped than in the advanced coun­
tries for various reasons, such as a greater degree of im­
mobility, indivisibility of resources, and imperfect knowl­
edge . ^
If the capitalist economic system does not provide 
an institutional structure to make development of backward 
countries possible, then the economists' task is to look for 
an alternative to this system which might provide a new frame­
work and make it possible to solve the agrarian problems of
O
Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (New York: 
Doubleday Company, Inc., 1964), p. 101.
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these countries. Thus, the new emphasis is that models of 
economic development should include a reference to the need 
for agrarian reform. In underdeveloped countries, institu­
tional reforms aimed at eliminating feudal obstacles are con­
sidered indispensable,^
It is argued that feudalism is no longer serviceable 
for the reason, if no other, that having come in close con­
tact with capitalistic institutions, it ceases to be suffi­
ciently feudal. Thus, Georgescu-Roegen points out that:
the increasing contact with the West revealed the 
existence of other economic patterns and at the 
same time the feudal social contact began to weaken.
This caused an ever-increasing number of landlords 
to switch to the capitalist sector, freeing them 
from their traditional obligations towards the peas­
ants . This process leads to absentee landlordism, 
rook renting, and all those evils, which ruin
agriculture.5
Feudalism, however, was replaced by a new agrarian 
doctrine of individual peasant holdings which seems to work 
to a point. Georgescu-Roegen, for instance, declared that: 
"for countries with an agricultural over-population individ­
ual peasant holdings and cottage industry constitute the
^T. Balogh, o£. cit., p. 28.
^Georgescu-Roegen, "Economic Theory and Agrarian 
Economics," Oxford Economic Papers, XII (February, 1960), 
p . 33.
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best economic p o l i c y . Therefore agrarian reform aimed at 
dividing large estates was considered, from the purely eco­
nomic point of view, as a powerful tool which would result 
in creating incentive to land development and intensive cul­
tivation on the new small landholdings. The problem, in this 
view, was reduced to one of organizing the requisitioned land 
into economic units and supplying the desired implements and 
technical know-how.^
The new agrarian doctrine has three primary features : 
First, agricultural production activities are organized in 
family operational units, that is, in the form of the indi- 
vidual-proprietorship type of economic organization. Sec­
ondly, large holdings are divided up into smaller, more evenly 
distributed holdings. Thirdly, small operational units are 
combined into larger group units--i.e. "cooperative farming."^ 
A close examination of these objectives will lead one to be­
lieve that there is contradiction between them. Achieving 
one objective may counteract the achievement of the other.
^Ibid., p. 34.
T^. Balogh, 0£. cit., p. 35.
®Even J. Long, "The Economic Basis of Land Reform in 
Underdeveloped Economies," Land Economics, XXXVII (May, 1961), 
p. 113,
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Consider an efficient farm holding, managed and operated by 
the owner, which exceeds the acreage ceiling imposed by law. 
As a consequence, the efficient farm holding will have to be 
broken up in effecting objective two. Again, the implementa­
tion of objective three would involve the sacrifice of ob­
jectives one and two.^
This new approach to economic development seems to 
influence the development thinking of many economists, includ­
ing foreign advisors. A functional relationship between 
agrarian reform, economic development, and capital formation 
was emphasized by an American writer who represents the views 
of many policy makers in saying:
Productivity of (Iranian) agriculture is very low; 
a large share of the product goes to the landlord; 
the landlord is not interested in reinvesting in 
agriculture or is unable to do so; the peasant can 
neither afford nor is interested in investing in 
agriculture, the land not being his own. As a re­
sult, capital formation is precluded under this 
system of land holding and one must therefore rea­
lize "the significance of land reform as a pre­
requisite to effective technical assistance," if 
the latter is designed to promote development.^®
9lbid., p. 113.
H. Kristjanson, "The Agrarian-Based Development 
of Iran," Land Economics (February, 1960), p. 1.
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A Critique of the Agrarian Reform Law
The Agrarian Reform Law is designed to: (1) raise 
the standard of living of a major segment of citizens--the 
peasants--and to provide for raising their social standards,
(2) raise the level of agricultural production in the coun­
try as a major component of a growing national income, and
(3) encourage industrial growth by making agriculture pro­
vide more raw materials to industry, by creating large and 
expanded markets, and providing food necessary for industrial 
workers.
The objective provided by the Law can be classified 
as political, social, and economic.
Political Objective
Political reasoning about agrarian reform appears to 
follow some such process as that (1) a sense of security 
among the peasantry as a basis for needed political stability, 
and (2) political requirements--and perhaps social justice-- 
demand the breaking of big into small holdings. Within the 
past decades, the political involvement of the peasantry has 
shown extraordinary advances. The secret peasant associations 
began by organizing the peasants in the remote province of 
Amara in 1944 and were slowly extended after the war into the
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Lower and Middle Euphratesj Northern region and Rut on the 
Tigris. Revolts in which these associations played a part 
helped to undermine the foundations of the old regime, and 
became a factor in social unrest in Iraq. Because of peas­
ant organizations, the government began to give the peasants 
an immediate interest in urban decisions about who gets what, 
and how soon.^^ Thus the question of political power was a 
primary concern. Agrarian reform was pressed forward so as 
to curb the power of the landlord class over the peasants. 
Since the landowning class was the dominant one in the social 
and political affairs of the country, it was the principal 
target of every opposition group to break the traditional 
variety.
Social Objective 
In organizing agricultural property attention must 
be paid to the social and human objectives. The purpose of 
agrarian reform here is (a) to ensure the full employment of 
agricultural workers, and (b) to ensure a high level of 
agricultural incomes.
1. Full Employment of the Agricultural Workers : It 
is said that agrarian reform should ensure the full employment 
1 1
M. Halpern, op. cit., pp. 94-97.
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of the peasants and the,adequacy of agricultural incomes in 
absolute terms, as well as in relation to other incomes. 
Georgescu-Roegen, for instance, points out that "agrarian 
doctrine, clearly aims at using as much labor in production 
as is forthcoming." This may mean using labor even to the 
point where its marginal productivity becomes zero.^^ Ac­
cording to this concept, the family labor is not governed 
by considerations of marginal productivity but by considera­
tions of maximization of total output. The family labor pre­
sumably works to the full limit of zero marginal productivity 
and it works better because it is rewarded by the entire
13product of its labor--no share is going to the landlord.
Employment, of course, must be created, not just for 
those unemployed workers, but also for those who are season­
ally unemployed. Thus the principle of small peasant holding 
is easily extended to light industry and small scale and cot­
tage industry which might promote self-employment.
Agrarian reform in Iraq does not by itself lead to 
higher employment of the agricultural labor. According to 
the 1958 census, only 18 per cent of the total area of Iraq
12Georgescu-Roegen, o£. cit., p. 35.
M. Dandekar, "Economic Theory and Agrarian Re­
form," Oxford Economic Papers, XIV (February, 1962), p. 73.
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consisted of land in farms. About 44 per cent of the crop­
land was left fallow in any single year, and only 48 per cent 
of the cropland was provided with irrigation facilities. In 
1965, the population of Iraq was estimated at about 8.3 mil­
lion. The number of persons employed in the different sec­
tors of Iraqi economy has been estimated at 2.4 million for 
the year 1960.^^ In I960 government sources listed some 1.6 
million persons engaged on holdings, most of whom were mem­
bers of family groups. Only 40,486 were reported as earning 
money wages. In addition to these almost 170,000 were re­
ported to be working for a share in the produce. The esti­
mates omitted the nomads and semi-nomads who contribute to 
agricultural output and those who work at agricultural pur­
suits in the "marsh" land.^^
Generally speaking, there is a common observation 
that a considerable unemployment and underemployment in the 
rural sector exists. "A substantial number of farm workers 
can be attracted away to new occupations without serious re­
sult to cultivation in which they are now engaged and this
14
This figure excludes students, soldiers, pen­
sioners, etc., and also housewives and other women engaged 
in unpaid domestic duties.
Ï5u. S. Department of Agriculture, 0£. cit., pp. 12-
13.
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number can be greatly increased by m e c h a n i z a t i o n T h e  
Uo S„ Department of Agriculture indicates that most of the 
Iraqi agricultural and non-agricultural population is under­
employed, It shows that the typical Iraqi farmer is employed 
only about one-third to one-half of the year.^^
The existing underemployment and unemployment cannot 
be explained in terms of over-population or under-population, 
but by the fact that Iraq's resources are underdeveloped and 
only little capital is used in productive investment. The 
idle labor power and low marginal productivity of it are due 
to the lack of productive plant and equipment, techniques, 
technology, etc. The country is sparsely populated. Small 
clusters of mud huts or small towns at the bends in the river 
typify the settlement in most of the region between Baghdad 
and Basra, The methods of farming are wasteful and primitive; 
extensive farming is practised on irrigated land, and both 
land and water are wasted. How serious is the situation? Is 
it progress or economic error in this underpopulated country? 
At one extreme is agriculture, with low productivity and idle 
manpower and at the other extreme is the modern oil industry,
^^Lord Salter, op. cit,, p. 33.
S. Department of Agriculture, op, cit., p. 13.
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the only sector as yet to have contributed to development,
employing an insignificant number of workers, The output
per worker in the non-oil sector of Iraq's industry has six
times the value of that per worker in agriculture, and the
value of output of each worker employed in the oil industry
1 8is about 127 times that of each worker in agriculture.
It follows that under prevailing conditions in Iraq, 
where the irrigated land does not exceed 8 per cent of the 
total country's area, the agricultural sector is relatively 
over-populated. But an additional employment can only be 
created by providing sufficient water supply, drainage facil­
ities and other measures that should accompany agrarian re­
form programs. In August 1959, it was reported that at best 
only 50 per cent of Iraq's peasants could be supplied with 
land by means of agrarian reform programs. This estimate 
supposed that each peasant would receive 30 donums of irri­
gated land or 60 donums of rain-fed land.^9 Thus, 50 per 
cent of the peasants will remain without land, and the opti­
mum size of family holding will never be achieved and the 
principle of equal units of family-size farms will lead to
18K. M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 5.
^^The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), August 6, 
1959, p. 3.
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the establishment of agricultural holdings far below the op­
timum size which is supposed to maximize output. On the con­
trary, there is a threat that agrarian reform measures will 
lead to the creation of a subsistence level economy rather 
than a market economy.
It is also true that large-scale farming ensures a 
higher level of employment than small farming, because its 
size makes possible not only the division of agricultural 
labor, but also the diversification of cultivation in such a 
way as to obtain a better utilization of manpower. Further, 
the large-scale farming is able to achieve integration within 
itself through the creation of activities complementary to 
cultivation, such as stock raising, rural industries, etc.^O
2. Ensuring a High Level of Agricultural Incomes : 
From 1953 to 1963, Iraqi agriculture registered a negative 
rate of growth, which showed about 1 per cent negative rate 
of growth. The rural income was deteriorating and no real 
improvement was achieved. The Iraqi farming finds itself in 
such an impasse because it is unable to provide a secure 
basis for a rising standard of living. The inability of
Akhras, "Economic and Social Criteria in the 
Organization of Agriculture," in Lectures on Agrarian Tenure 
and Agricultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin, II 
(Beirut, Lebanon: Institute of Rural Economics, 1963), p. 50.
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agriculture to get out of its stagnant condition has indeed 
affected the whole economic pattern and has weakened the 
momentum which would carry industry forward.
It is clear from the above fact that the incomes of 
the peasant will be affected to the extent that the agricul­
tural productivity of the small land holding is raised. The 
incomes of the peasants are affected by factors other than 
those of the agrarian reform effect. The problem in Iraq is 
not just that personal incomes of the peasant are extremely 
low, whereas those of the landlords are high, but also that 
little income is redistributed through public services and 
investments such as schools, roads, etc. Thus a better in­
come distribution will lead to development of adequate markets 
to absorb more production. Since the whole pattern of eco­
nomic growth under the feudal-type system is dependent upon 
the consumption and investment decision of a small dominant 
group, there will be no guarantee of developing a market or 
creating a purchasing power which gives stimulus to higher 
production. Therefore, agrarian reform was assumed to bring 
about this distributive effect which in turn will lead to 
agricultural development.
In this connection, the Agrarian Reform Law, aimed at 
the elimination of the landlord class and the reduction of
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rents, has this redistributive effect as one of its main 
goals. Furthermore, the abolition of the feudal-type system, 
an ill-defined right and obligation which enabled the land­
lords to exploit the tenants, will lead to improvement in the 
income distribution in favor of the peasants. Again, the 
agrarian reform has provided another distributive effect 
which resulted from the reduction in the number of claimants 
to land income shares. This has been done through the regula­
tion and reduction of rent as well as the elimination of ab­
sentee landlordism. In the past the social prestige attached 
to land ownership, the absence of investment expenditures, 
and the lack of adequate credit facilities created complex 
tenure rights unjustified by any realistic division of serv­
ices rendered in production. Under this situation, money­
lenders, marketing agents, landlords, Mosques and the state 
and the sirkal have shares in land produce at levels often 
above those defined by economic rent.21
Under this system of farming, there can be no rational 
financing of the pricing system as a distributor of income. 
Pressures of population upon resources, inadequate capital, 
and lack of job opportunities outside agriculture have given
p  1
See A. Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle 
East, p. 133.
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rise to factor-product price relations out of all proportion 
to actual contributions to the production p r o c e s s . ^2
Thus the Agrarian Reform Law, providing that rent be 
reduced and credit planned, and the marketing process under­
taken by the agricultural cooperatives, will have a strong 
redistributive goal and is justified on economic grounds in 
that it provides a better relationship between tenure right 
and tenure function.
Economic Objectives
In tracing the economic effects of agrarian reform, 
it may be useful to distinguish between effects (1) upon farm 
output, and (2) upon savings and capital formation in and out 
of agriculture.
1. Effects upon Farm Output : The agrarian reform
advocates believe that the security of tenure will give the 
owner an incentive to utilize as fully as possible the labor 
power of the peasant and his family. Agrarian reform will 
lead to intensive labor, and more investment, since the 
secure peasant has a highly positive attitude towards his
22gee Philip M. Raup, "Agricultural Taxation and 
Land Tenure Reform in Underdeveloped Countries," Papers and 
Proceedings of the Conference on Agricultural Taxation and 
Economic Development, ed. H. Wald (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 
p. 253.
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land, and security of capital already invested in agricul­
tural production will lead to further investment.
We do not believe that we are laying bare a secret 
when we say that in a country such as Iraq, the uncertainty 
of tenure is the main evil, and not the size of the farm.
This uncertainty has resulted from the system of share crop­
ping which discouraged capital investment by the peasant cul­
tivator and prevented his adopting new techniques. Up to 
1958, the failure to provide a settlement for title in both 
Amara and Nassiria provinces inhibited both the sheikh holders 
of the large estates and the peasant cultivator from making 
any improvements in agricultural land. A legal basis for 
claims was not established and the result was unrest and trib­
al clash between the big landlords. The absence of cadastral 
survey and land-title recording systems and the consequent 
difficulty in establishing ownership rights and in developing 
a mortgage-based credit system were examples of the lack of 
secure tenure. Thus one objective of the agrarian measures 
in Iraq was to create new tenant owners. The certainty ef­
fects of this reform were assumed to increase production be­
cause the new owners could undertake capital investment with 
confidence that the fruits would return to the peasant 
cultivator.
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The present tenure arrangements are a major obstacle 
to achieving better land use and farm organization. The 
large estates are presently operated extensively and ineffi­
ciently. They are large estates, not large production units. 
Cultivation is done under the system of share cropping where 
large estates are divided into small strips leased to the 
peasants. Agrarian reform in such a system simply means the 
transfer of ownership from the landowner to the cultivator 
of the existing small holding. The size of the farm is not 
affected, for there are no large farms. Most often these 
large estates are cultivated extensively or left untilled. 
Thus there is a possibility that the break-up of large hold­
ings will tend to lead to more labor-intensive types of farm­
ing. This means diversification, less dependence upon one 
crop, greater livestock, density per acre, and increased out­
put of vegetables and livestock products.23
Despite the above mentioned advantages, the small 
farming system suffers from economic, financial and technical 
disadvantages. The main economic principles which must guide 
our choice in the organization of agriculture are two: first, 
the cost of production, and secondly, output. In other
23A. Eckstein, o£. cit., p. 657.
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words, the optimum size of a farming unit must be determined 
in terms of the maximization of output and productivity of 
the farming unit, as well as in terms of achieving minimum 
production costs in order to obtain maximum profit, both on 
the individual and the national l e v e l . ^4
From the economic point of view a measure of strip 
parcel consolidation indicates an increase in productivity due 
to the application of modern techniques of production, division 
of labor, rational field rotation methods, savings in the cost 
of transportation and marketing with the consequence of higher 
farm income and higher tax revenues.
The major thesis about the small individual proprietor 
is that the independent farmer will be guided by the price 
level with respect to what commodities to cultivate, how much 
to retain for his own consumption, and how much and what to 
sell. Objection could be raised against the free decisions 
made by the small peasant in this connection. Thus Brand 
emphasized that the farmer, according to this thesis, cannot 
be relied upon to deliver the quantities of foodstuffs re­
quired to feed the industrial workers and the industrial mate­
rials to keep the industrial sector g o i n g . ^5 Mitrany, dealing
Akhras, o£. cit., p. 46.
25#. Brand, The Struggle for a Higher Standard of 
Living (Leiden, 1958), p. 41.
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with agrarian problems in Russia, explained that:
Nationalization of the land and at the same time its 
division into small lots were not economic measures 
but political moves. The first simply served to 
sweep away feudal landholding and relations . . . 
the equal division. . . . was simply necessary to 
gain the support of the peasants.26
Historically, Brand explained, farmers in the ad­
vanced countries seem to have responded to market incentives 
whether arising from domestic or foreign demand. "If the 
agricultural sector," Brand says, "had been left to private 
initiative, it would have meant that, in order to induce the 
farmer to produce more or make him give up a larger propor­
tion of his crops, consumer goods would have to be offered in
exchange."27
The peasant in Iraq works hard to achieve some tradi­
tionally determined minimum standard of living, but has no 
motivation for increasing his income above that level because 
of tradition-bound consumption patterns. Also consumer goods 
are not produced at home, but imported, with the result that 
these consumer goods will be beyond the reach of the peasant 
due to the high prices of imported goods. Halpern, in dis­
cussing the agrarian problem in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, has
2^D. Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant (New York; 
University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 62.
27W. Brand, op. cit.
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this to say;
The peasant's eagerness for more land is not a mani­
festation of capitalist individualism. It is, prima­
rily, a striving to escape the threat of starvation 
and; secondarily, a striving for status. Land hun­
ger, in so far as its motivations are traditional, 
is a drive not for greater elbowroom for initiative 
and enterprise, but rather for private holdings that 
are large enough to make their owners independent 
and free of the need to work. The peasant's striving 
for individual ownership of land, therefore, need not
be conducive to modernization.28
The inevitable conclusion is that the implicit or ex­
plicit objective is to preserve a rural value orientation in 
society, even it assures no more than a certain minimum level 
of economic security and well-being.
2. Effects upon Capital Formation; Economists most 
often associate agrarian reform with capital accumulation.
In this context, it may be useful to distinguish between (1) 
capital formation resulting from confiscation and distribu­
tion process, and (2) capital formation which is connected 
with production and consumption processes.
Beginning with the first, it should be recalled that 
the general economic argument for agrarian reform as distinct 
from the social argument for more equal distribution of in­
come, is based on the assumption that the cultural attitude
Halpern, o£. cit., p. 102.
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in many underdeveloped countries has placed high social and 
economic value on landownership which has not led to high in­
vestment in land improvement or agricultural production. By 
setting an effective limit on size of the holdings and an 
equally decisive restriction on rent, it is expected that 
the state can transfer capital from the agricultural sector 
to the non-agricultural sector in order to develop the indus­
try. It is too early to see whether this evolution will take 
place in Iraq. Amer, in his study of the Egyptian economy, 
shows that the limitation of land ownership in Egypt did not 
serve to transfer capital from agriculture to industry. He 
shows that the capital that was just released from agricul­
ture was invested in buildings and urban house property 
rather than in industry. In 1955, for example, the capital 
transferred from agriculture and invested in real estates 
amounted to about 45 million Pounds, while only 6 million
po
Pounds of the mentioned capital were invested in industry.
This effect of the agrarian reform in Egypt is likely to be 
the same in Iraq.
One of the main problems in Iraq has been the practice
29Ibrahim Amer, Land and the Fellah, the Agrarian 
Question in Egypt (Cairo: Al-Dar Al-Misriyah Press, 1958), 
p. 153.
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of the landlords of sending their capital to foreign coun­
tries. The implementation of the agrarian reform in Iraq 
assumed the responsibility of preventing the export of this 
capital and of maintaining it within the country. It was 
claimed that peasant consumption will not increase as much 
as the amount of capital that previously was exported and 
the result will lead to an increase in the total amount of 
capital available for productive investment in the economy. 
The mobilization of this capital, of course, requires a tax 
reform. This, however, requires a firm policy aimed at the 
current flight of capital which is now growing at a rapid 
pace due to the uncertainty of the political system and the 
fear that further nationalization will be implemented by the 
state.
Nor would the situation appear to be different when 
it comes to the question of saving and investment affected 
by the agrarian reform programs. Generally speaking, the 
main principle, which concerns the whole of the national 
economy, is the permanent maximization of the national prod­
uct. This in turn requires a constant maximization of in­
vestment. If our main concern is capital formation, then 
this process will be easier to achieve in an economy charac­
terized by concentration of landholdings than in an economy
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where landownership has been subdivided. It is a matter of 
fact that the marginal propensity to consume has a tendency 
to rise when landholding is divided, to the detriment of the 
propensity to save, and consequently of capital formation.
In the opinion of many economists, the typical peasant saves 
little or nothing. Higgins characterized underdeveloped 
countries by "practically zero saving for the large mass of
on
the people." According to Lewis, the landed aristocracy, 
the peasants, the wage and salary-earning classes, all ex­
cept the capitalist class, which is conspicuous by its ab­
sence in such countries, have a mentality directed toward 
spending.31
D. Warriner shows that, in Eastern Europe, under the 
recent agrarian reform, peasants tend to eat more. In Italy, 
according to Warriner, farmers who receive land under the re­
form like to spend on manufactured goods, and form coopera­
tives to buy television sets. In India, farmers may buy ad­
ditional land or a bit of g o l d . 32
on
B. Higgins, Economic Development (New York; W. W, 
Norton and Company, Inc. Press, 1959), p. 11.
O 1
A. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: 
George Allen and Unium, LYD, 1956), pp. 227-229.
33d . Warriner, "Land Reform and Economic Develop­
ment," Agriculture and Economic Development, C. Eicher and
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Mead, writing on the Egyptian land reform, stated 
that "in the past the large-scale landlords provided one of
the main sources of funds to finance an expansion in the in­
dustrial sector; with the substantial income redistribution 
which has taken place as a result of the land reforms, it 
seems likely that the supply of savings from agriculture made
available to the rest of the economy has f a l l e n . "^3
In Iraq, capital formation is hindered because much 
of the agricultural produce is taken by the landlord in the 
form of rent, and is transferred to the city where it is used 
for consumption. If we consider the economic surplus (capi­
tal formation) as the difference between production and rea­
sonable consumption, then is there any reason to believe that 
when the peasant becomes land owner he would consume less or 
save more and thus generate capital formation? Professor 
Tuma predicted that agrarian reform in the Middle East would 
establish a subsistence agriculture with little contribution 
to capital formation. This is so because the present living 
standard of the peasant is low and much room remains for
L. Witt (eds.) (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 
pp. 287-288.
^^Donald C. Mead, Growth and Structural Change in 
the Egyptian Economy (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1967), p. 128.
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improvement through increased consumption.34 t . Petran 
wrote that "this trend was accelerated by the fact that the 
reform (in Iraq) did increase peasant consumption and hence 
reduced the landlord's share of the crop which went to the 
towns as surplus product."35
There can be no doubt that the large estates, if cul­
tivated by the owner, which rarely is the actual case, facili­
tate the investment of large amounts of capital in improvement 
such as irrigation, drainage, the use of machines, and the 
division of labor, which are beyond the reach of individual 
small peasants. In Iraq, peasants have had no background of 
experience in investment-decision making. They have not been 
accustomed to the purchase of expensive equipment or produc­
tion requisites. Neither have they had any first hand con­
tact with agricultural markets or the marketing process.
On the other hand, large scale agricultural opera­
tions are more efficient and show more rapid economic growth 
than small operations if there is economy in mechanical cul­
tivation, or in large scale control of irrigation, of seeds,
^^Elis H. Tuma, "The Agrarian-Based Development 
Policy in Land Reform," Land Economics, XXXIX (August, 1962),
p. 268.
33^. Petran, "The Coups in Iraq and Syria," Monthly 
Review, XV (May, 1963), p. 37.
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of disease precautions, of processing, or of marketing. 
Therefore, if we regard the agrarian problem from the angle 
of production, large scale production would be favored.
There is the natural superiority of capitalist production. 
Society's need can be satisfied only by large scale produc­
tion for the obvious reason that the small peasant will pro­
duce mainly for himself while the capitalist farmer produces 
for the market. There is danger that while the mass of small 
holders might be self-supporting, they might produce little 
or no surplus for the cities, and even for the peasants it 
might prove but temporary artificial prosperity.
The conclusion that emerges is that the small size 
of peasant land holding is inefficient economically and 
society's saving is dispersed and consumed. The small farms 
yield very little production, for the productivity of labor 
on them is extremely low. Small, split-up, scattered peas­
ant farms are a hindrance to the use of agricultural machinery 
and advanced agronomic techniques. The division of land 
alone, a mere transfer of the landlords' lands to the peasants, 
does not solve the peasant problem and does not deliver the 
cultivators from poverty, usurers' dominance, backwardness 
and the low productivity of small scale farming. On the other 
hand, we have already seen that the big landownership in Iraq
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acted as a brake on the development of agriculture, and the 
abolition of feudalism became a historic necessity. Keeping 
the feudal-type system as it exists today means perpetuation 
of the well-known extreme technical backwardness of agricul­
ture, desperate poverty of the overwhelming majority of 
peasants, meagerness of the home market and lack of means to 
industrialize the country.
It appears, therefore, that contradiction exists be­
tween these two objectives, economic and social. If our in­
terest is to maximize total production and capital formation, 
then our preference in organizing the agricultural sector 
would be in favor of large scale units, while individual 
peasant holdings should be favored if we were concerned with 
social objectives. But, again, since large scale units are 
more efficient and produce more, then one might say that 
higher production will be an important factor in economic de­
velopment which will lead to higher per capita income for the 
population as a whole, and as a result the peasant's income 
will be higher than if he were farming a small piece of land. 
In addition, there will be a gain for society, as its needs 
could be satisfied more generally only by large scale 
production.
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Cooperatives : A Cure?
Cultivation of small holdings is hopelessly ineffi­
cient. Therefore, the question may be raised as to whether 
the equal peasant holdings should be operated as production 
units individually, or whether they have to be operated 
jointly. What we are concerned with is to find a device con­
sistent with which we can reorganize agricultural small hold­
ings in a way that might achieve the advantage of large scale 
units, instead of dividing land into small uneconomic plots.
If we are in favor of operating these holdings jointly, then 
the optimum size of joint units must be determined. The new 
agrarian reform doctrine seems to suggest the creation of 
equal individual holdings and their immediate merger into 
some form of cooperative production units.
According to this approach, the cooperative society's 
task is to employ all the labor force available. However, 
under population pressure, the marginal productivity of 
workers must fall to zero in order to have full employment. 
Therefore, a part of the labor force has to be used on capital 
works which lead to capital formation. Thus the success of 
the cooperative will depend on its ability to make use of the 
labor force in capital works and create employment for its 
members. In large part, this means that the economic impact
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of the agrarian reform is very much dependent on the work of 
the agricultural cooperatives,
Despite the fact that a policy has been adopted by 
the Government of Iraq aimed at creating agrarian coopera­
tives, the progress in this respect has not been impressive. 
There is a general frame of reference within which discussion 
of agrarian reform proceeded among those who are concerned 
with the development of Iraq who proclaimed that the road to 
achieve an efficient and highly developed agriculture is the 
reorganization of landownership into large size. In other 
words, it is assumed that the Iraqi peasants were not ready 
for cooperative forms of cultivation and would have to go 
through a more or less lengthy preparatory period during 
which they would acquire title to the land they till.
Cooperative organizations require a large measure of 
voluntary participation of peasants. The success of coopera­
tives requires the active support of the peasants, and fin­
ally, the cooperatives will be limited in their ability to 
create market, or accumulate capital, if the members have no 
surplus.
The creation of cooperative farms representing the 
socio-economic framework in which a significant increase of 
agricultural output and the mobilization of the surplus is
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generated depends on the availability of agricultural imple­
ments and other resources with which the newly large scale 
farms need to be equipped. In the absence of these condi­
tions the cooperative farm does not itself represent a new 
productive force, is lacking all material basis and is noth­
ing more than an experiment. This is what appears to be the 
condition under which the Iraqi Government is trying to 
create cooperatives, that is, with no material basis.
A modest acquaintance with economic history shows 
that this problem was solved as a result of the massive pene­
tration of capitalism into agriculture. The large scale 
introduction of technology in industry had preceded a similar 
development in agriculture. The policy of enclosure had re­
sulted in increased food production and had made food sur­
pluses available for cities and towns."Enclosure involved 
both the disappearance of fragmented holdings and the exten­
sion of the area under cultivation."^7 Another consequence 
of this policy had been the influx to the cities of peasants, 
who, having lost their land, provided cheap and abundant man-
^^Paul Alpert, Economic Development, Objectives and 
Methods (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 16.
07
N. S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, Approaches to Eco- 
nomic Development (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), 
p. 127.
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power for the new Industries that had started to d e v e l o p . ^ 8  
Marx explained that the capitalist class rose out of the 
class of independent farmers and landlords who exploited 
labor, and benefited by rising prices. With the break-up of 
the manor and the expropriation of peasants went the de­
struction of domestic industry and the concentration of con­
trol of manufacture in the hands of individual capitalists, 
who gained all the p r o f i t s . ^9 Higgins stressed that: "Since 
the enclosures replaced serfdom with a free labor class to 
some extent, and since the commutation of labor service for 
money rents replaced serfdom with more or less free enter­
prise farming for profit, there can be no doubt that the de­
cay of feudalism was a stimulus to capitalist development."40 
According to Buchanan and Ellis, "the agricultural revolution 
consisted essentially in the larger units of cultivation, the 
improved methods and techniques of cultivation, and the rise 
of a more entrepreneurial^^ minded and commercially oriented 
group of entrepreneurs who found a growing market for their 
output, . . . though this was the nature of agricultural
^®Paul Alpert, op. cit., p. 17 
39
B. Higgins, op. cit., p. 218
40lbid., p. 130.
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revolution, it was the expansion of trade and commerce-- 
foreign and domestic--that was its driving f o r c e . " ^ 1
In sum, the present advanced countries solved their 
agricultural problem, first capitalist development swept over 
agriculture by raising agriculture to a new level, it led to 
its "capitalization," to a new concentration of production 
in the hands of capitalist farmers, to the differentiation 
of subsistence farmers into agricultural laborers and market- 
oriented agricultural entrepreneurs. Secondly, by offering 
the opportunity of industrial development, it transferred 
large numbers of peasants into the industrial labor force, 
in this way relieving the population pressure on the agricul­
tural sector and consequently raising the per capita income 
of those who remained on the land. And finally, by expanding 
industry it came early into a position to offer rural pro­
ducers manufactured commodities in exchange for what they had 
to sell, and was thus able both to secure food for the growing 
urban population and to provide agriculture with implements, 
fertilizers, and the like, which in turn led to an increase 
in agricultural productivity.^^
S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, o£. cit., p. 130.
^^Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New 
York: MR Press, 1962), pp. 168-169.
136
Thus under conditions of capitalism, two things must
happen in order to have economic development: first, agrarian
reform must lead to capital accumulation, and second, it must
be accompanied by an industrial development. This conclusion
was emphasized by Lewis as follows :
Large scale agriculture usually requires fewer 
people per acre than small holdings. . . .  it is 
not desirable to make an agrarian revolution with­
out providing new employment opportunities outside 
agriculture. An agricultural and industrial revo­
lution always go together, the first releasing the 
labor which the second draws off the land. Gov­
ernments of backward countries have therefore to 
put into their agricultural programs projects for 
industrialization.43
Therefore, in the absence of industrial development, 
there is no hope for successful large scale farming in Iraq. 
The organization of the agricultural sector in large scale 
units of production, be it cooperative or collective farming, 
might lead to a large scale enterprise operated by a poor 
peasantry rather than prosperous agricultural enterprises 
providing high living standards to their members and large 
agricultural surpluses for the urban population. Lack of 
machines and equipment in agriculture and lack of consumer 
goods for the peasantry would defeat any attempt at forming
^Arthur Lewis, Development Planning : The Essentials 
of Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1966), p.
420.
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any cooperative or collective fanning in Iraq. Even if we 
assume that these machines and tools can be imported from 
abroad, the agricultural problem will not be solved. Mechan­
ization and increased productivity on large scale farming 
would hardly improve the conditions in Iraq. With the pre­
vailing unemployment and underemployment in both the agricul­
tural and non-agricultural sectors in Iraq, the use of 
machines would displace a large number of agricultural workers 
and deprive them of the meager income they were formerly able 
to earn. Since the agricultural machines and tools and chem­
ical fertilizers operating large scale farming are usually 
imported, their manufacture would not offer offsetting employ­
ment opportunities. Nor could the improvement in agricultural 
productivity be counted on to lead to higher wage rates, be­
cause the excess supply of labor is likely to prevent any 
such improvement. All that would happen would be an increase 
in profits captured by the cooperative or by the state.
CHAPTER V
THE AGRARIAN REFORM OF 1958 AND ITS EFFECTS
This chapter is intended to test what has been done 
to realize the objectives of agrarian reform law of 1958. 
Statistics on land area expropriated or distributed, numbers 
of agrarian cooperatives established, etc., are to be re­
garded as no more than informed guesses. The exact progress 
of land redistribution is difficult to determine. Statistics 
released by one regime have been declared to be false by 
another regime, and it has been claimed that the area of land 
distributed among small peasants was.^xaggerated. Presently, 
the redistribution of land ownership appears to be the major 
element in this reform of Iraq. It is not confined to ex­
propriated land, but includes, also, the state domain (Miri 
Sirf) .
Expropriation and Distribution
The government found the task of land expropriation 
and redistribution a most difficult one. The land held in
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excess of the maximum limit provided by the law was to be 
requisitioned and redistributed within the five-year period.
By 1966, only about one sixth of the requisitioned lands were 
distributed among small peasants. This unusual delay was due 
to the complexities of land survey, registration, and the 
organization of irrigation and drainage.
The number of landlords who have reported that their 
land estates exceeded the legal ceiling was •2,383. Out of 
this number, 1,147 landlords owning 7,580,212 donums were 
announced to be subjected to the agrarian reform law.
Statistics released by the Ministry of Agrarian Re­
form in February, 19 66, showed that a total area of ll,436,00p 
donums was subject to expropriation under the law of 1958, 
that only 6,594,672 donums has been confiscated, and that 
7,109,096 donums were managed by contract between the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform and the peasants.^ With the enactment of 
the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958, the government instituted a 
system of "Temporary Management" of land by the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform after confiscation had taken place and before 
land was ready for the final distribution. The peasants 
leased the land from the Ministry under contract and obtained
^The area distributed and contracted included both 
confiscated and state land (Miri Sirf).
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advances in cash or in kind plus the use of the pumps and 
machinery in order to enable them to cultivate the land. In 
1965, however, almost half of the area leased to peasants 
under contract was state land (miri sirf). In order to avoid 
chaos, the former landlords were called upon by the state to 
manage their land. This makes one feel that the supposedly 
agrarian cooperatives which were to undertake this responsi­
bility were either unable to carry it out or were in their 
formative stage.
The extent of expropriation of agricultural land from 
1959 to 1966 is shown in the following table.
TABLE 12
LAND EXPROPRIATION FROM 1959 TO 1966 
(in donums)
Year Area
Number of Landlords 
Subjected to Confiscation
1959 2,510,365 211
1960 1,546,667 247
1961 1,142,610 273
1962 183,373 89
1963 1,070,418 625
1964 468,754 64
1965/66 551,813 867
Total 7,554,000 2,456
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Re­
port on Agrarian Reform (Baghdad, 1964), p. 15; Minis­
try of Agrarian Reform, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin 
(Baghdad: Directorate General of Planning and Public 
Relations, June, 1966), p. 1.
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Up to June 30, 1966, the government was able to dis­
tribute only 2,334,526 donums while there were 7,109,096 
donums managed by contract between the Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform and the cultivators.^
Table 14 shows that the largest areas distributed 
were in Mosul and Kut because these two provinces had highly 
concentrated agricultural land before 1959. No private land 
was distributed in Nassiria province, due to the fact that 
in this province land title was still unsettled. The 
2,334,526 donums were distributed among 48,194 families with 
population equal to about 241,000 persons (average family's 
number is 5 persons). Table 13 summarizes the area expro­
priated by provinces.
According to the Five-year Plan, 1965-69, it is 
planned to distribute about 3,694,000 donums during these 
five years of which 567,000 donums were planned to be dis­
tributed during the year 1965/66. However, by the end of 
1966, only 80,682 donums were distributed.
According to government sources, 232,000 families 
will receive land and there is a proposal to construct 313
^This land includes confiscated as well as state
land.
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TABLE 13
SUMMARY OF AREA EXPROPRIATED BY PROVINCES, JUNE, 1966
Province
Number of 
Landlords 
Subject to 
Expropriation
Area Subject to 
Expropriation 
(in donums)
Area Already 
Expropriated^ 
(in donums)
Mosul 422 2,806,603 1,728,907
Arbil 178 777,448 416,997
Sulaimania 76 421,636 269,404
Kirkuk 238 980,824 367,986
Diala 294 883,081 602,907
Baghdad 200 631,487 463,862
Ramadi 42 125,625 85,766
Karbala 45 130,029 85,050
Kut 330 1,638,401 1,310,611
Hila 198 683,639 477,222
Amara 27 117,422 85,477
Basra 39 97,766 51,345
Diwania 274 872,245 649,133
Nassiria 93
Total 2,456 10,166,206 6,594,672
*The statistical discrepancies between Table 12 and 
Table 13 are due to conflicting official data issued by suc­
cessive regimes. While total expropriated land amounted to
7,554,000 donums in Table 12, this was reduced to 6,594,672 
donums in Table 13. This was due to the fact that statis­
tics released by one regime were rejected or amended by 
another regime, either because what was expropriated by one 
regime was amended by the present regime or the total land 
expropriated by the previous government was exaggerated.
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate 
of Planning and General Public Relations, June 30, 
1966), p. 2.
TABLE 14
TOTAL STATE AND EXPROPRIATED LAND DISTRIBUTED AMONG FARMERS UP TO JUNE, 1966
(in donums)
Province
State Land 
Irrigated Rain-fed
Expropriated Land 
Irrigated Rain-fed Total
Number of 
Families 
Received 
Land
803,124 10,331
133,724 1,843
173,005 2,394
34,340 1,549
244,394 6,055
72,772 1,438
6,941 163
227,646 6,110
17,175 1,526
506,009 12,481
63,226 1,785
10,680 267
37,624 1,552
3,866 700
Mosul
Arbil
Kirkuk
Sulaimania
Baghdad
Diala
Ramadi
Hila
Karbala
Kut
Diwania
Nassiria
Amara
Basra
5,066
80,426
34,018
81,360
1,790
99,169
10,680
26,468
3,866
149,744
43,460
153,113
6,111
34,650
19,300
4,657
16,845
129,318
19,454
6,941
143,286
15,385
406,840
63,226
11,156
653,380
90,264
15,235
6,318
Total 342,843 406,378 820,108 765,197 2,334,526 48,194
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Quarterly Statistical
Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate of Planning and General Public Relations, 
June 30, 1966), p. 5.
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villages.3 The figures also showed that the total number of 
families receiving land on the basis of lease holding (con­
tract) amounted to 217,561 with area equal to 7,109,096 
donums (Table 15). Thus, the total agricultural land dis­
tributed and contracted together amounted to 13,422,217 
donums.^
TABLE 15
TEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF LAND BY THE MINISTRY 
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, JUNE, 1966
Irrigated
Land
Rain-fall 
Land Total
Number of 
Contractors
Miri Sirf Land 1,352,625 2,880,836 4,233,461 117,731
Expropriated 1,632,688 1,202,934 2,835,622 98,825
Land Under 
the Higher 
Committee's 
Management 21,901 18,112 40,013 1,005
Total 3,007,214 4,101,882 7,109,096 217,561
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate 
of Planning and General Relations, June 30, 1966), 
p . 7.
O
Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
Planning Section, Report on Agrarian Reform (Baghdad, 1964),
p. 7
^Ibid., p . 12.
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Other government sources emphasized that the total 
proposed land for distribution amounted to 26 million donums 
(a large part of this would include land under reclamation 
which will be ready for cultivation after the completion of 
the irrigation system) , This shows that the land reform 
operation was slow and was not accomplished within the five- 
year period specified by the Agrarian Reform Law. The fail­
ure was attributed to the following factors: (1) lack of 
complete cadastral survey;  ^ (2) distribution was undertaken 
without adequate preparation for irrigation and drainage in 
order to cultivate these lands; (3) distribution suffered 
from deficiencies due to hasty settlement motivated by com­
plex political considerations; (4) distribution foundered on 
sheer maladministration, and many peasants packed up and 
headed for the towns; (5) lack of guidance and direction 
with regard to technical supervision; (6) not even a minimum 
effort was paid to organize the farmers in cooperative soci­
eties which could provide them loans and other facilities.
In determining the size of the agricultural unit, no 
attention was paid to the land fertility, soil, the distance
^The incomplete land survey led to some confusion in 
eliminating uncultivable land which was rejected by the peas­
ants after its distribution.
146
from the city or the size of the family» Presently, the 
government is trying to cure these deficiencies and in its 
new plans it proposes the establishment of .3,000 modern vil­
lages to include one-third million families and include
3,000 schools and 300 governmental centers and 312,000 
houses»^ Preparations were made, also, for a general agri­
cultural census which will include agricultural income. These 
programs, however, are slow moving. On the basis of the pre­
ceding figures, we can conclude that the government's land 
distribution program will not be completed for several 
decades »
Agricultural Organization: Cooperatives
The formation of agrarian cooperatives is often sug­
gested as a major branch of government activity to raise the 
agricultural productivity, to promote economic growth and to 
improve the standard of living of peasant producers.7 The 
agrarian cooperatives are still in the process of establish­
ment, of experimentation. It is too early to determine their
^Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
The Land for the Farmer (Baghdad: Directorate of Guidance 
and Publication, September, 1963), pp. 1-2.
T^. Bauer and S. Basil Yamey, The Economics of Under­
developed Countries (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1957), p. 223.
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role in the agricultural development or their success.
The current trend of the establishment of coopera­
tives is to make membership compulsory for all agrarian re­
form beneficiaries. Each member must subscribe to a number 
of shares comparable to the number of donums he acquired.
Theoretically, the control and management of coop­
eratives rest in their elected boards. In practice, however, 
these responsibilities are taken over by official supervisors 
appointed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, The board has 
to obey the general instructions of those official super­
visors who in turn perform their jobs according to directions 
specified by the Ministry, The Iraqi peasants have neither 
the educational background nor the exposure to the socialist 
ideologies of Western countries , With conditions making 
social and economic mobility extremely difficult, it was in­
evitable that the formation of cooperatives in Iraq would, 
out of necessity, require government initiative, assistance 
and supervision. The task of breaking down tradition and 
ignorance has hardly begun. Thus, the Iraqi peasant has 
shown no response towards the introduction of new methods - 
Many analysts of Iraqi society have noted that Iraqis have 
almost no tradition of local self-government, and they tend 
to attribute many of the weaknesses of political democracy
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as it has operated in Iraq in the past to this factor.^
Evidently the cooperative was envisioned by the state 
as the key institution in the new Iraqi landholding system. 
Under Qassim's regime, 1958-1963, plans called for the forma­
tion of 2,000 cooperatives under the agrarian reform program 
during the 1961-65 period. By the end of 1962 only 32 had 
been established.^ xn 1964, the cooperative institute had 
graduated 60 cooperative managers, as an initial step toward 
a corps of professional m an a ge rs. The  present government, 
which came to power in 1963, has decided that agrarian co­
operatives are the remedy for the decline in agricultural pro­
duction. It has started a new program based on increasing 
the number of cooperatives greatly in a short period of time. 
During the first four months of 1964, the Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform initiated cooperatives at a rate of more than 12 a 
m o n t h . T h u s ,  in 1966, the number of registered cooperatives 
had grown to 350. More recently, it was estimated that
Q
See Charles Issawi, "Economic Foundations of Democ­
racy," Middle East in Transition, ed. W. Z. Laqueur, pp. 46- 
47.
9john Simmons, "Agricultural Development in Iraq: 
Planning and Management Failures," The Middle East Journal,
XIX (Spring, 1965), p. 132.
l^U. S. Department of Agriculture, op. pit., p. 58.
lljohn Simmons, pp. cit., p. 132.
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about 800 cooperatives were needed to manage about 12 mil­
lion donums of agricultural land. Yet the number of coopera­
tives planned under the 1965-1969 plan was only 500.
Table 16 shows the cooperative organization in Iraq. 
These cooperatives were classified as follows: (1) agricul­
tural and credit cooperatives, (2) consumers' cooperatives, 
and (3) marketing cooperatives.
Although the number of cooperatives amounted to 350 
with total members of 40,563 and about 309 supervisors, the 
organization of these societies did not bring with it large 
scale investment or economies in marketing. And no measures 
have been taken to achieve large scale farming. Political, 
economic, social, and inadequate administrative machinery 
were among the factors making the success of cooperatives 
doubtful.
The obvious lack of experience in collective work 
and the atmosphere of excitement directed these societies 
toward politics rather than production. This was explained 
by the government response by enacting the peasants' soci­
eties Act (no. 129, 1959) that defined such societies as
12Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VI (Baghdad, February, 1966),
p . 12.
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TABLE 16
COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION IN IRAQ, JUNE, 1966
Province
Number of 
Cooperatives
Number of 
Members
Mosul 37 4,858
Arbil 11 1,306
Sulaimania 7 828
Kirkuk 22 2,110
Diala 15 2,030
Hila 44 5,780
Harbala 17 2,177
Kut 51 7,722
Diwania 29 3,042
Amara 34 2,469
Baghdad 49 5,709
Ramadi 10 452
Nassiria 14 1,154
Basra 10 836
Total 350 40,563
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate 
General of Planning and Relations, June 30, 1966),
p „ 8 u
professional organizations aiming at raising the level of the 
peasants with regard to agriculture and the production prob­
l e m s , I n  fact, the mass movement of the peasants frightened 
the landlords and an interested group. Since the Iraqi middle 
class were either owners of land, pumps, or agricultural
13^Al-ahali (Baghdad), September 28, 1960, p . 1.
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machinery, or else traders in agricultural products, this 
group has carefully drawn the reform to serve its interest, 
and thus opposed any peasant c o o p e r a t i v e . 14
Since Iraqi agriculture consists of a wide variety 
of subsistence crop production and markets a minimum amount 
of its produce, it leaves little room to achieve economies 
in marketing by cooperatives. Neither the small surplus 
produced by each subsistence peasant, nor the small urban 
market offered much scope for large scale economies in mar­
keting. As surplus of agricultural produce for sale was 
small, so also were the peasant's savings which limited the 
success of credit cooperatives.
Government sources indicated that the prevalence of 
illiteracy and ignorance limited the possibility of the dif­
fusion of knowledge on the need for and benefits of reform 
measures. Inadequacy of transport and communications, which 
kept the rural population in economic and social isolation, 
weak financial position of cooperatives, and the scarcity of 
trained managerial and administrative personnel for carrying 
out the agrarian reform measures, were listed as major
14
T. Petran, 0£. cit., p. 37
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obstacles to implementation of the p r o g r a m . 15
Thus the establishment of agrarian cooperatives seems 
to be hindered by technical as well as cultural obstacles.
The success of cooperatives, of course, must depend on the 
expansion of the market and on the increase in agricultural 
production. Also government financial aid as well as guidance 
and supervision are necessary if cooperatives are to be suc­
cessfully organized. Under conditions prevailing in Iraq 
it is unlikely that the movement will ever gain sufficient 
strength if it is left to grow without government aid.
Financial Institutions and Services
Traditionally, the main sources of credit to the 
Iraqi peasant have been the landlord, the merchant, and the 
moneylender. Legislation provides that advances made by the 
landlord to his tenants shall be free of interest, but this 
regulation has been easily circumvented when the advance was 
made in kind against a return in the form of a larger share 
of the crop. The tenant has been in a weak bargaining posi­
tion, since he could not leave the farm until debts were
^^Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VI (Baghdad, February, 1966), 
p. 27.
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settled by him or a new employer.Credit from merchants 
and moneylenders has usually taken the form of an advance 
sale of a specified amount of a crop at a given price incor­
porating interest charges. The usual procedure is that the 
peasant starts borrowing a few months before the harvest.
Thus terms of credit are settled in a way which exploits the 
peasant's inability to wait and market his crop himself. For 
loans made against collateral, interest rates have usually 
ranged from 20 to 40 per cent, and most often higher than 
this. In the case of usufruculary mortgages, the creditor 
acquires the right to the crop and markets it himself during 
the duration of the mortgage, which may be for several years. 
The effects on productivity are unfavorable, since neither 
the borrower nor the lender has any interest in improving or 
maintaining the condition of cultivation.^^
The state has attempted to provide more reasonable 
credit for peasants. The principal state institution for 
farm credit is the Agricultural Bank, founded in 1936. In 
the past, the Bank has extended little credit to small 
peasants. It has concentrated mainly on medium-term credit,
S. Department of Agriculture, 0£. cit., p. 59.
^^Ibid., p. 60.
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secured by mortgages on real estates. Thus the credit did 
not reach the majority of peasants who did not own land prop­
erty before 1958. Although loans are, in principle, granted 
under customary banking terms, defaulted installments can be 
postponed without penalty. Frequently, additional loans are 
granted to farmers who have defaulted, and mortgages are not 
foreclosed.
From 1958 to 1966, the amount of credit provided by 
the Agricultural Bank amounted to ID 6,274,988 as shown in 
the following table-
TABLE 17
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROVIDED BY THE AGRICULTURAL 
BANK FROM 1958 TO 1966
Year Number of Loans ID
1958/1959 1,161 241,388
1959/1960 3,780 551,141
1960/1961 2,390 559,457
1961/1962 2,664 910,771
1962/1963 2,684 875,881
1963/1964 2,735 655,259
1964/1965 4,557 1,314,378
4-1-65/3-31-66 2,939 908,315
4-1-66/6-30-66 785 258,398
Total 23,695 6,274,988
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate 
General of Planning and Relations, June 30, 1966),
p . 10.
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Agricultural credit provided by the Bank was used 
for various purposes: orchard improvement, purchase of agri­
cultural machinery, purchase of seeds, and for the redemption 
of mortgages and the like.
Under the Five-year Plan (1965-69), about two mil­
lion dinars were allocated for the Agricultural Bank to be 
spent during the Plan period. Of this amount ID 200,000 were 
to be spent during the first year of the Plan. According to 
the Bank report, the Bank's expenditures passed this amount 
which means that there was a high demand for agricultural 
credit
In 1956, the "Cooperative Credit Bank" was established 
with limited capital, half of which was supplied by the Min­
istry of Finance, and half by the various cooperative soci­
eties . The Cooperative Credit Bank is an additional institu­
tion to provide credit for agriculture. Its function is to 
provide advances to cooperatives and provide them with tech­
nical and economic advice. It even maintains their accounts 
and records, especially those of the agrarian cooperatives. 
From 1961 to 1964, the Cooperative Credit Bank provided
18Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
A General Report on the Investment Program of the First Year 
of the Plan 1965-1969 (Baghdad: Directorate General of Plan­
ning and Relations, 1966), p. 23.
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credit amounting to about ID 48,453 to several agrarian co- 
19operatives,
Agrarian Reform's Effects on Production
It is too early to determine the impact of the agrar­
ian reform program on the agricultural production. Since the 
agrarian reform was not completed and is still in process, 
it seems too early to evaluate its social and economic re­
sults. Because the process is still in its distributive and 
expropriative stage, any evaluation will be doomed to failure 
and it is quite unsuitable at this moment to show these trends 
If someone insists that after seven years of experience there 
must be some evaluation of the program he is likely to be 
told that the agrarian reform has not yet shown any social or 
economic results. It is more likely that agricultural pro­
duction has decreased as a result of this reform, and this is 
an expected result of any agrarian reform during its early 
execution stages. It is generally agreed that the agrarian 
reform will cause a reduction in total output at its first 
implementation, but it is expected that total output will 
then rise.
19Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
Accomplishments of Directorate General of Cooperative and 
Production during Eight Years, June 30, 1966, p. 3.
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A look at the cereal production, as an Illustration, 
will reveal the impact of the reform program. Cereals are 
the most important crops of Iraq. They have been sown in 
about 70-80 per cent of the land that is cultivated in any 
one year. This overwhelming importance has yielded only 
slight diversification in crop production. Wheat and barley 
make up at least 95 per cent of the cereals grown. Rice, 
the third important, cereal, is produced in limited amounts 
and accounts for about 5 per cent of the land in cereals.
Droughts in 1959 and 1960 caused a sharp reduction 
in agricultural production. Between 1960 and 1963, agricul­
tural production increased by 40 per cent due to favorable
weather conditions and an expansion in acreage under cultiva- 
20tion. Unfavorable weather conditions and unfavorable 
political climate in 1963-64 caused a drastic drop in agricul­
tural production: a drop of 57 per cent from the level of the 
preceding year and to a level even lower than that of 1960-61, 
In 1963, however, not only the agricultural sector showed a 
decline, but also other sectors of the economy showed a de­
cline. There was an absolute decline in the national income
90United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Development in the Middle East 1961-1963 
(New York, 1964), 13.
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as a whole in 1963
TABLE 18
CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE TO NATIONAL INCOME, 1953-63
(1956 prices)
Year National Income Agriculture
ID million ID million % of NI
1953 262.8 85.7 32.6
1954 322.6 113.8 35.3
1955 299.0 68.4 22.8
1956 334.8 88.1 26.3
1957 348.4 116.5 33.4
1958 363.2 89.2 24.5
1959 368.6 66.5 18.0
1960 412.7 76.3 18.5
1961 468.6 96.9 20.6
1962 503.1 113.4 22.5
1963 489.5 80.4 16.4
Sources: K. Haseeb, The National Income of Iraq 1953-1961 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p . 20; 
K, Haseeb, "National Income of Iraq 1962-1963," 
(Baghdad, 1965), mimeographed, p. 20.
As an illustration of the failure of the agricultural 
development program. Table 18 shows the contribution of agri­
culture to the national income. The value added in agricul­
ture accounted for 33 and 16 per cent of the national income
21 While 1963 oil revenues increased almost 10 per 
cent over 1962, there was a decline in the per capita income 
from the 1962 level of ID 77 to ID 73 in 1963.
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in 1953 and 1963 respectively. The decline in the agricul­
tural sector does not mean that Iraq's economy is undertaking 
a structural transformation; rather, it is a result of the 
inability of agriculture to grow with other sectors of the 
economy, and even its productivity was declining.
TABLE 19
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1958/60-1964 
(Millions of U. S. dollars)
Year 1958/60 1962 1963 1964
Imports 67.20 81.20 89.60 106.40
Exports 22.30 47.60 42.00 35.40
Deficit 44.90 33.60 47.60 71.00
Sources: U. S. Department of Agriculture, The Agricultural 
Economy of Iraq (Washington: Economic Research 
Service, 1965), calculated from Tables 5 and 6, 
pp. 66-67; Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 
1964 (Baghdad, 1965); Ministry of Planning, General 
Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Trade Section, Bulle­
tin of Foreign Trade Statistics for 1964 (Baghdad, 
1966).
The failure of agricultural development policy is 
shown by the fact that imports of wheat and rice were not re­
duced. In 1960, Iraq imported 206,000 tons of wheat. In 
1961, wheat imports rose to 400,000 tons. In August, 1963,
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an agreement was signed with the United States which covered 
a total value of $6.86 million. Another agreement was signed 
in December, 1963, whereby the United States was to make avail­
able an additional 100,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour. 
Furthermore, another 100,000 tons of wheat were imported.22 
By the end of 1963, an additional 65,000 tons of wheat were 
i m p o r t e d . 23 Table 19 shows Iraq's agricultural imports and 
exports.
It follows that the failure of agricultural develop­
ment policy has helped to turn Iraq from a food exporting to 
a food importing country. Table 20 shows area and production 
of the principal crops.
Nor has the agrarian reform program affected the 
total income in favor of the peasant cultivator. Following 
the present agrarian reform policy, which aimed at giving 
each household an area of about 40 donums, and by applying 
the prevailing fallow system, which involves cultivating only 
less than half of the cultivated land, and using official 
statistics, we can show the extent of the improvement in the 
cultivator's income. This is shovm in Table 21,
22The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., Iraq (London, 
December, 1963), p. 15.
2^ Ibid., p. 15.
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TABLE 20
ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS. 1958-1964 
(1,000 hectars and 1,000 tons)
Year
Wheat Barley Rice
Area Output Area Output Area Output
1958 1,533 757 1,157 954 89 137
1959 1,490 659 1,091 733 59 88
1960 1,300 592 1,038 804 76 118
1961 1,271 875 1,041 911 64 68
1962 1,591 1,085 1,189 1,125 84 113
1963 1,705 466 1,219 790 108 143
1964 1,627 807 1,098 623 109 184
Sources: United Nations, Economic Development in the Middle 
East 1961-1963 (New York, 1964), Appendix, Table 1, 
p. 89; U. S. Department of Agriculture, The African 
and West Asia Agricultural Situation (Washington: 
Economic Research Service, 1966), p. 64; Government 
of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964 (Baghdad, 1965), 
pp. 80-95.
From this total output (ID 57),^^ the cost of produc­
tion, which was estimated between ID 15 and ID 40, has to be 
deducted. This will leave the cultivator with a net income 
between ID 10 and ID 20.
^^In fact the FAO Report estimated that "output per 
worker in the rural sector is to increase from ID 47 in 1956 
to ID 105 in 1965, and ID 175 in 1970, even after providing 
for an annual increase of 1.7 per cent in the size of agri­
cultural employment." FAO Report, 0£. cit., p. 129.
25Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VII (July, 1966), p. 11.
162 
TABLE 21
ANNUAL INCOME OF AN INDIVIDUAL LAND HOLDING, 1966 
(farm area = 40 donums)
Crop Area in Donums Value of Produce in ID
Winter Crop Cultivated Fallow
Wheat 10 20
Barley 10 9
Other 1 3
21 19 32
Summer Crop 4 36 9
Animal Products 16
Total 25 57
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VII (Baghdad, July, 
1966), p. 11.
Perhaps one can conclude that despite the enactment 
of the agrarian reform law, neither redistribution of landed 
property nor the reduction of rent has helped to alleviate 
the rural poverty, and probably cannot solve it as long as 
the agricultural productivity continues to be low and the 
factor proportions within the agricultural sector remain so 
heavily weighted against labor. The agrarian reform measures 
did not represent as revolutionary a change, at least from
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the point of view of land ownership, as was expected. The 
area officially redistributed amounts to only a small percent­
age of the total cultivated area. About 48,000 families have 
received land but represent only a small fraction of the farm 
population.
Factors Contributing to Inefficient Implementation 
of the Agrarian Reform
Agrarian reform suffered from unrealistic delays and 
mismanagement, and made little impact on the social progress 
in Iraq. This result was due to the conflict between the 
landlords and the peasants and between the peasants and the 
government. Initially, the peasants migrated from one dis­
trict to another due to the landlords' opposition to the re­
form and also because the best part of the land was taken by 
the landlords, leaving the peasants land which was unfit for 
cultivation. This led to the modification and amendment to 
the reform law. Thus the military Governor General enacted a 
special law barring the migration of peasants from one dis­
trict to another. There is no process of transformation and 
the peasants have not yet had time to adapt themselves to 
their new conditions. Practically all the land which can be 
cultivated without major investment in irrigation, drainage,
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and clearance is already being used. Crop rotation is un­
known; the mechanization of agriculture is only beginning 
(see Table 22). Improvement of skills by education, demon­
stration, and the like, has made no progress since the begin­
ning of the agrarian reform. But where soil, climate, and 
backward conditions kept the peasants in poverty, backward­
ness itself is due in large part to inability to improve their 
lot by greater investment in improvement--a vicious circle 
hard to break.
Although there were many factors contributing to the 
failure of implementing the agrarian reform program, the fol­
lowing deserve special attention:
1. Political Instability: Political rivalry within 
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, uncertainty of the political 
climate, landlords' opposition to the reform and poor weather 
resulted in a decline in agricultural produce, between 1959 
and 1961, of somewhere between 25 and 40 per cent.
Since the enactment of the reform law in 1958, Iraq 
has been ruled successively by three revolutionary and counter­
revolutionary regimes. The Qassim regime (July 14, 1958- 
February 8, 1963), the Baath Party regime (February 8, 1963- 
November 18, 1963), and the Aref regime (November 18, 1963- 
to present).
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TABLE 22
AGRICULTURAL MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 1966
Province
Tractor 
No. H.P.
Harvester 
No. H.P.
Pump 
No. H.P.
Cars 
No.
Mosul 30 1,610 25 1,750 4 292 24
Arbil 34 1,790 27 1,735 - — — — 8
Kirkuk 46 2,275 22 1,478 - - — 17
Suliamania — — — — — — — — - — — — — — - — — — — —
Baghdad 182 9,231 95 6,439 251 16,770 281
Diala 29 1,501 19 1,320 19 1,273 14
Ramadi 31 1,752 6 480 10 355 12
Hila 17 883 II 775 12 435 14
Karbala 14 736 - - — — — — — 13 938 9
Kut 107 5,852 54 3,674 306 20,251 61
Diwania 37 2,035 43 2,963 60 3,032 28
Nassiria 24 1,183 4 260 2 114 12
Amara 28 1,550 8 570 135 7,261 16
Basra 3 150 15 985 10
Total 582 30,548 314 21,444 827 51,706 507
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (Baghdad: Directorate 
General of Planning and Relations, June 30, 1966), 
p. 7.
These eight years of revolutionary and political in­
stability have been rich in turmoil, violence, and sudden 
changes of economic policy and development program. Under 
this severe political struggle, which dominated the Iraqi 
scene since 1958, both the human and economic resources of
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the country suffered inevitable depletion.
2. Administrative Difficulties : In Iraq agrarian re­
form runs into serious difficulties owing to the scarcity of 
administrative personnel. There is no framework of figures 
for the possible development of agriculture. While there are 
about 8,582 employees in the Ministry of Agrarian reform, the 
quality of administration is very poor. There is no appro­
priate detail, for instance, on the need for agricultural 
26credit. Failure in policy is due to the well-known diffi­
culties of lack of understanding of economic problems on the 
part of the politicians. Poor administration and lack of 
continuity and professional expertise were only some of the 
defects the present regime was expected to cure. The most 
serious bottleneck was the lack of skilled personnel and 
management. The management problem, of course, is one of the 
main characteristics of many backward countries. The Iraqi 
problem was further complicated by a variety of more or less 
extraneous tasks. In the past, the economists were convinced 
that economic development in Iraq required a real "structural" 
change and needed to be guided by the state, by a new manager­
ial and efficient state rather than the old parasitic state.
26John L. Simmons, 0£. cit., p. 135.
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Economists criticized the incapability of the new government 
to inplement its economic policy and to be engaged in politi­
cal crises and issues--domestic and Arab--intensively. Sim­
mons, for instance, writes:
To many observers, except the administrators them­
selves, the limiting factor in agricultural develop­
ment is the administration--its theory and practice.
. . A particularly serious administrative bottleneck 
exists at the very highest level. The Minister of 
Agrarian Reform is responsible for four thousand em­
ployees in his Ministry. More than ten departmental 
Directors General report to him, twice the number 
that he could hope to control and advise effectively.
In addition the Minister hears the grievances of 
innumerable landless peasants who wander in from the 
country to see him. Still more of his time is taken 
up with correcting his own correspondence for errors 
of grammar and spelling, although he has competent 
bilingual and foreign-born secretaries on his staff.
The routine administrative detail permits him little 
time for development and review. But, time con­
tinues to have little v a l u e . 27
Our inescapable conclusion was not only that the Min­
istry failed to carry out satisfactorily its assigned tasks, 
but that a number of crucial policy lines had yet to be tried 
and mapped out. This began to take the shape of a new organ­
ization which was to have the dual task of coordinating en­
tirely new policies under its own authority.
With the country passing through a serious and pro­
tracted political crisis at precisely the time when the
^^Ibid.. p. 137.
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agrarian reform was launched, the management offered by far 
no solid anchor for the newly contemplated program. Never­
theless, the present government asserted on several occasions 
that agrarian reform remained one of the principal develop­
ment tasks for Iraq and no government could consider a policy 
of retreat from the pursuit of the agrarian reform program. 
Thus, toward the middle of 1963, Iraq exhibited a highly im­
probable conjunction of circumstances. On the one hand, an 
upsurge in political set-up was under way. On the other hand, 
the rapid changeover of regimes resulted in perpetual insta­
bility in the ranks of administrative personnel. In the 
midst of this unrest the new regime began to create an agrarian 
reform policy. But this by no means was assured success, yet 
the chances for substantial economic and social progress 
looked brighter than at previous times.
Conclusion for Policy
Aside from the decline in agricultural production, 
the situation seems to be that the decline in the marketed 
surplus of agriculture is a fundamental barrier to the further 
improvement of the urban standard of living. "By 1961, barley 
exports had all but ceased, and rice and wheat were imported
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to cover 40 per cent of the c o n s u m p t i o n » "28
The main reason for the decline in marketed surplus, 
however, is to be sought in the very character of the 1958 
agrarian reform. In pre-1958 period, the large-scale land­
lords marketed the surplus; with the income redistribution 
which has taken place as a result of the agrarian reform, it 
seems likely that the supply of surplus made available to the 
rest of the economy has f a l l e n . ^9
At the production level, the sheikhs' withdrawal from 
land management left a vacuum which could not be filled by 
the small subsistence peasants. It seems that the current 
tendency to settle the problem of traditional large farms by 
breaking them up disposes of a problem without solving it.
It makes the improvement of agriculture even more difficult 
because it results in replacement of a small number of large 
units by thousands of small subsistence ones.
What Iraq actually needs is a technical improvement 
in the methods of cultivation. But agriculture based on 
small units of production would offer little opportunity for 
an improvement in productivity. It is possible to raise
28
Ibid.. p. 131.
Petran, og_. cit., p. 37.
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the peasants' income through the supply of better seeds and 
better livestock, or by providing agronomic advice and credit. 
The rate of improvement that can be achieved in this way is, 
however, so small that the population growth is likely to 
prevent any significant increase in per capita o u t p u t . it 
cannot be expected to give rise to surpluses. Moore empha­
sized that an agrarian reform, if it takes place in the midst 
of general backwardness, will retard rather than advance a 
country's economic development. While temporarily improving 
the living standards of the peasants, it will depress aggre­
gate output and eliminate what little surplus agriculture used 
therefore for productive purposes.
The above does not mean that we regard current agrar­
ian reform in Iraq as inevitably doomed to failure or not a 
move in the right direction. What we want to say is that 
agrarian reform is far from being a sufficient condition for 
economic development and for raising agricultural productivity 
in particular. It cannot be the single factor necessary for 
economic and social development. Historical experience shows 
that its role is quite uncertain. Its success will depend on
30
A. Eckstein, 0£. cit., p. 656.
0 1
W. Moore, Economic Demography of Eastern and South­
ern Europe (Geneva, 1945), pp. 55-98.
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the conditions under which it takes place and on the forces 
by which it is implemented. While it is both the expression 
and the source of a new spirit in Iraqi agriculture, and it 
is considered a major advance along the road to progress and 
it is indispensable to meet the aspiration of the cultivator, 
and to create the prerequisites of economic and social devel­
opment, its success is very much dependent on the work of the 
agencies that follow, the agrarian cooperatives, and on how 
far it is to be carried on and on the ability of the adminis­
tration to implement it rightly.
So long as industry remained undeveloped, it could 
supply neither the means of industrial construction nor 
finished consumers' goods for the village in adequate amount. 
It seems that industrial prices must be lowered and consumers' 
goods imported and thrown on village markets in order to 
induce further production. The peasantry as a whole still 
suffered worse terms of trade between produced and manufac­
tured goods than in previous time.
Although per capita income seems to be gaining re­
markably, the gains have gone largely to the urban 
sectors and to migrant labor. Agriculture--with 
five million out of a population of seven million--
has hardly benefited.
32J. Simmons, o£. cit., p. 130
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In terms of grain equivalents, which have been used as a 
tool for measuring standard of living in the rural sector, 
Iraq has had a decline from 1934. The 1961 grain equivalent 
is 291kg/capita and includes 25kg/capita for rice.^^
Under these circumstances, the solution seems to re­
quire an industrial program which would help to introduce 
large-scale farming on cooperative lines as the only answer 
to this problem.Cooperatives, as we have seen, had been 
of meager proportions to date and not markedly successful. 
"There has hardly been any progress toward the social and 
economic goals. Cooperatives have hardly begun to replace 
the supervision and control of the l a n d l o r d s . "35 The step 
from subsistence cultivator to trade, credit, and coopera­
tive production in agriculture would raise problems of a 
purely educational and material character. Efforts at organ­
izing the peasants into cooperative farming would encounter 
suspicion and opposition on the part of the peasants. The 
possibility of inducing the peasants to join cooperative or 
collective organizations depends upon making them understand
33
Ibid., p. 130 (footnote).
^^See W. A. Lewis, Development Planning, p. 420.
35J. Simmons, 0£. cit., p. 131.
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that this action is in their own interest. The new system 
should not be implanted on the village as an alien growth, 
arousing deep-seated peasant hostility towards importation 
from the town. It seems, however, that the authority is try­
ing to impose these new methods rather than to demonstrate 
the advantages of adopting them by example and success. The 
government officials do not
. . . understand the ineffectiveness of imposing 
such methods from above. The need for carefully 
ensuring the villagers' creative participation from 
the very earliest planning stage is overlooked. The 
attitude that the government knows best cannot im­
pose cooperative spirit and organization upon the 
peasants.
Moreover, there seems to be little realization among the co­
operative administration that by determining these needs 
which the villagers feel are most important and by satisfying
them, the agent can encourage the peasant's confidence and
thus lay the foundation for more directly productive 
innovation.
The peasant economies of Western countries have 
evolved in very favorable natural conditions, and in a very 
special historical environment. These conditions have
^^Ibid., p. 134.
37lbid.. p. 134.
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enabled them to reach their present high level of cooperation 
which was aided by their industrial development during sev­
eral centuries. But where cultivators in Iraq have been small 
tenants, and have no example of better farming to follow, one 
cannot expect them to suddenly transform their lands into co­
operatives . The Soviet experience showed difficulties which 
confronted any attempt to go directly from a system Latifunda 
to some form of collective farming. Thus, the Russian Bol­
sheviks were forced to distribute the land to millions of 
small peasants and it was only much later after fierce and 
bloody social struggles and agricultural losses that they suc­
ceeded in establishing the collective farm system. Post World 
War II experience in Eastern Europe and China showed that the 
approach to agricultural collective farming would have to be 
indirect: first, the distribution of land to the peasant cul­
tivators, and second, the introduction of agrarian coopera­
tives, and their more or less rapid evolution toward modern 
collective farms.
The experience accumulated in the course of the de­
velopment of agriculture in other countries cannot, of course, 
supply answers to all the questions that might arise in Iraq. 
Each country is facing different problems which require dif­
ferent solutions.
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Though Iraq's resources are underdeveloped, its 
conditions do not correspond with the "underdevelop­
ment" model now most frequently postulated by econo­
mists. Two things are unusual: the adverse natural 
conditions of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, and the 
abundance of capital. Few countries have so much
to develop, or so much to develop it with.^^
There is thus no general formula applicable to all situations 
regardless of time and place. Each and every underdeveloped 
country presents a wide spectrum of economic, social, cultural, 
and political configurations, and nothing could be more fu­
tile than to force them into a rigid model of a "universal 
prescription."
What is the upshot of this review? It may be briefly 
telescoped as follows: An increase of agricultural produc­
tivity is dependent on the use of modern farming techniques
and chemicals, most of which are applicable only under condi­
tions of large-scale farming. The subsistence farmer has 
neither the means for acquiring the necessary implements, nor 
would he be able to employ them on his small plots.
Large-scale farming in advanced countries emerged in 
the course of capitalist development as a result of capitalist 
penetration in agriculture; a process which was accompanied 
by enclosures, and it was possible only on the basis of the
38D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 113.
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transition from the merchant phase of capitalism to indus­
trial capitalism. This transition which led to the capital­
ization of agriculture caused a technological revolution in 
farming, and provided at the same time both a market for the 
produce of large-scale agricultural enterprise and an outlet 
for the displaced rural workers. It is obvious, therefore, 
that it is only through industrialization that a significant 
increase in the productivity of agriculture can be achieved.
At this point one might put the main emphasis on in­
dustry on the grounds that agricultural development in Iraq 
requires cultural as well as educational improvements which 
are, by nature, long-run processes. Accordingly, industrial 
development should be given all support that is feasible, and 
the social, technical, and educational improvements in agri­
culture should wait until industry has gathered sufficient 
strength to establish the material foundations for the recon­
struction of agriculture. Langley has correctly emphasized 
this point in these words :
There are, of course, excellent reasons why Iraq 
should devote resources to industry. Indeed land 
reform cannot proceed very quickly as the trained 
personnel necessary to set up agricultural coopera­
tives and to give guidance in agricultural exten­
sion work are not available in large n u m b e r s . 39
QQ
K. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 126.
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The practicability of such a policy is dependent on 
the availability of resources for the expansion of industry. 
Under Iraq's conditions, it seems premature to say that there 
can be no industrialization without an increase of agricul­
tural output and surplus. The oil revenue, along with a de­
creasing dependency of industry on imports, could well lessen 
the impact of this problem and may well be adequate to finance 
a continuing high level of industrial and agricultural in­
vestment. Clearly, a low rate of growth of agricultural out­
put would make the attainment of these tasks somewhat diffi­
cult; but there is no reason to believe that it would make a 
continuing industrial expansion impossible.
It must—be immediately added that the above should 
not be taken as saying that development should proceed through 
industrialization without a concomitant agricultural improve­
ment. On the contrary, it can take place only by a simultan­
eous effort in both directions, and the present five-year plan 
attests to the earnest desire of the government to bring about 
just such a goal. What it is intended to warn against, how­
ever, is the now widely held notion that emphasizes the pri­
ority of agriculture with the desirability of some consumer 
goods industries. As is usual in the universe of economic 
theory of growth, a sound investment policy--according to the
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theory of Marginal Productivity--is the use of a country's 
resources in the most economical way. And because the mar­
ginal productivity of agricultural investment is lower than 
investment in industry, it logically follows that more re­
sources should be devoted to industry than to agriculture to 
the point where the marginal productivity of both agriculture 
and industry is equalized.
It follows that under these conditions prevailing in 
Iraq, the question--industrialization or improvement of 
agriculture--becomes meaningless, since progress is indi­
visible, with the maintenance of harmony between the two sec­
tors of society being one of the crucial conditions for rapid 
and healthy development. One might expect, therefore, that 
under such circumstances the approach to this problem would 
follow these steps: (1) at present time, the distribution of 
land to the peasant cultivators must be completed or put 
right; (2) efforts must be directed towards training the bulk 
of the peasantry in the sphere of cooperative methods in sale 
and purchase, in hiring machinery, and in organizing agricul­
tural credit as a first step toward cooperative farming; (3) 
after that it would be possible to pass gradually to the co­
operative system of agricultural production which must be 
based on voluntary participation and on the peasants' own
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interest; (4) the development of large scale industry, capa­
ble of assisting cooperative farms with machinery, fertil­
izers, consumer goods, and technicians.
The transition to cooperative farming requires con­
stant and all-around assistance from the government--financial 
and organizational. A considerable part is to be played in 
this connection by the Agricultural Bank with financing agri­
cultural credit societies. This Bank may be the recipient of 
grants from the current Budget or the Planning Board to aug­
ment its long-term credit fund. Furthermore, the government 
may offer these cooperatives some advantages such as the as­
sumption of their entire indebtedness by the Agricultural Bank 
with a reduction of the interest rate, and the like.^^ To 
be sure, progress in that field would be of no avail whatever, 
if it were not to go hand in hand with a far larger striving 
towards the teaching and building of technical staff and ad­
visers, cooperative management and organized credit.
If the government succeeded in organizing agriculture 
into large scale farms and the aggregate land cultivated, part
^^Although the administration has recognized the need 
for credit, the Agricultural Bank has not increased the num­
ber of loans--these loans are not available to members of co­
operatives . The total available loan capital for agricultural 
credit from the Cooperative Band and the Agricultural Bank, 
for example, was ID 0.9 million for 1961.
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of the labor force employed hitherto is rendered surplus.
It is precisely this saving of labor that represents one of 
the main advantages of large scale farming. Employment can 
be found for this labor power in two ways: First, additional 
land is placed at the disposal of the cooperatives. The 
underemployment of labor force in agriculture can be matched 
by underutilization of arable land and by reclamation of ad­
ditional land through irrigation and drainage projects. Al­
though even in such cases major difficulties are caused by 
lack of agricultural implements, fertilizers, and livestock. 
Second, the peasants in question are provided with the means 
and opportunities of engaging in industry. At the present 
stage of development in Iraq, however, priority should be 
given to whatever promises greater output per acre: intensi­
fication, fertilizers, control of water, intensive education, 
etc. The efforts towards a chemical industry should be en­
couraged. A model village, completely mechanized, might be 
installed to show the advantages of mechanization. Peasants 
will not do without their horses until they can be sure of 
obtaining spare parts in time to do the necessary repairs to 
their tractors. The tractor unit pays if it means the release 
of two or three men to the factory. If industry can be built 
up to the point where agricultural machinery and consumers'
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goods are available, and if the state can demonstrate in a 
practical way how the one can be used to acquire the other, 
there should be no difficulties in the development of 
agriculture.
In Iraq the break-through to the open path of eco­
nomic and social development is more difficult than in other 
countries, and the obstacles that need to be overcome are 
more formidable than elsewhere. It may well be that in this 
country, which is particularly plagued by the structural 
malaise just described, the strategy of development may have 
to be different from one suitable to countries more favorably 
structured.
^^See N. S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, op. cit., pp.
254-55.
CHAPTER VI 
PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURAL PLANNING
The Need for Planning
On the question of who should bear the responsibility 
for agricultural development, there is little unanimity. It 
is clear enough that the particular class which in advanced 
western countries had assumed the initiative in economic 
development is lacking in Iraq. Excluding oil industry, which 
is owned and operated by foreigners, there is no significant 
private enterprise in Iraq.
The planners of Iraq realized that development would 
not be attained through private investment. It is said that 
the private investors have neither the required resources for 
economic development, nor a willingness to risk their capital 
in the development of long-run projects.^ It is said that in 
Iraq not enough middle class capitalists have been developed 
to be capable of providing the capital resources for
Shwadran, o£. cit., p. 79.
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investment on a scale which is needed to achieve a break­
through from the old stagnant economy into a developing one. 
Most of the development projects are shunned by individuals, 
either because they involve high risks and low benefits from 
phe point of view of exploitation, or because they require 
the mobilization of a great deal of capital for a long term.^ 
Finally, it is argued that the limited size of the domestic 
market is an important factor in reducing the profitability
O
of potential investments. The reason for this attitude, 
apart from the lack of opportunity and of market, is that 
there is not enough confidence in political, economic, and 
social stability to persuade the individual to invest in an 
uncertain long-term project, such as building a factory.
The need for planning was illustrated with particular 
force in Iraq by the mutuality of two economic functions. The 
improvement of agriculture will affect, and in turn be affected 
by, the development of industry. The interrelated sectors of 
Iraq's economy impose a dilemma which cannot be solved without 
public planning. Iraq is an agricultural country and agricul­
ture has to be fostered in the process of development to raise
2
Jacques Berque, 0£. cit., p. 189.
^Doris G. Addams, Iraq's People and Resources 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 124.
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agricultural production which will continue to be an impor­
tant national objective; for without an adequate supply of 
food and raw materials, there can be no economic growth. The 
economy needs both an agricultural base and an industrial base; 
these are not in conflict but are complementary, and beyond a 
certain initial stage of development, the growth of one con­
ditions and facilitates the growth of the other.
In the main, when agrarian reform is undertaken with­
out reference to industrial development the development proc­
ess is abortive. Even in the agricultural sector, when agrar­
ian reform is undertaken as a general consequence of indus­
trialization, as in Japan, the development process is highly 
successful, even in the agricultural sector.^
It follows that obstacles to development in Iraq are 
so formidable that they can be overcome only by deliberate 
and immediate industrialization on the part of the state, 
the political apparatus should ertgage in planning, assume 
most of the entrepreneurial activities, and attempt to achieve 
a high rate of capital accumulation as soon as possible.^
^See Irving L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development : 
The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 202 ff.
G^. M. Meier and R. E. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 362.
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Two reasons for planning are apparent: First, in 
order to gather sufficient momentum, a development plan must 
ramify widely in space and rapidly in time throughout the 
economy. Unless the program involves large changes in class 
relations and social structure, the development process can 
never be self-generating and cumulative. If ambitious capi­
tal and technical programs are undertaken, social and cultural 
obstacles may disappear without being directly attacked. But 
industrialization will be achieved only if the scale of such 
investment is large enough to provide a "shock treatment" for 
the traditional ruling class, and to enable the unemployed 
manpower to be used productively. "Launching a country into 
self-sustaining growth" says one writer, "is a little like 
getting an airplane off the ground. There is a critical 
ground speed which must be passed before the craft can become 
airborne.
Economic development requires substantial productive 
investment which is large enough to achieve the "take off," 
the passage from stagnation to intensive development. The 
obvious cannot be done by small amounts of investment which
^Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for 
International Studies, "The Objectives of U. S. Economic 
Assistance Programs," (Washington, 1957), p. 70.
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are likely to be dissipated in a great number of minor proj­
ects. Second, only through large-scale development can old 
distinctions between rich and poor be broken down. Unless 
class extremes are blunted, political agencies would be un­
able to regulate the total economy for social purposes.
Rapid economic progress is not possible without pain­
ful adjustments. Inherited philosophies of life and colon­
ialist institutions have to be scrapped, old social institu­
tions have to be fought, bands of caste, creed, and race have 
to be eliminated; and people who cannot keep up with the 
canons of development may find their expectations of a com­
fortable life frustrated.7
Thus planning is needed, because economic development 
would not, under existing conditions in Iraq, take place 
automatically. Consequently it must be planned.
Development Plans 
Development Board--1950-1958 
The earliest development institution was the Develop­
ment Board established in connection with the five-year plan 
for development in 1950. Under the law of 1950, which created
^United Nations, Measures for the Economic Develop­
ment of Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1951), p. 15.
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the Board, all the government's revenues from oil were as­
signed to the Board. In 1953, a ministry of Development was 
established to take some of the Board's functions. Under the 
Law of 1955, 30 per cent of the oil revenues was allocated to 
the ordinary budget with the remainder allocated to the Board,
The broad lines of policy of the Board were described 
as; "Preparation of general economic and financial plan for 
the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of 
the standard of living of her people.
The first "plan" to be drafted in Iraq, the five-year 
plan, 1951/52-1955/56, was prepared in response to the Bank 
Mission's recommendations. Its total cost was to be ID 65.7 
million, which was to be supplied by oil revenue and domestic 
loans. The plan consisted of a number of projects already 
decided upon. The emphasis was placed on irrigation and 
flood control projects. Among these was the Wadi Tharthar 
flood control. Agricultural development, according to this 
plan, received priority in Iraq. The development of animal 
and extension work had received one-fourth of that allocated 
to irrigation and flood control schemes. Smaller amounts 
were to be expended upon transport and public buildings.
Q
Government of Iraq, Development Law, April, 1950,
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Industry was given scant attention. This is despite the 
fact that the Bank Mission's Report emphasized the need for 
an integrated, well-balanced investment plan, not only in 
dams and irrigation, but also in agricultural education and 
extension work, industry, etc. But the development policy 
at its beginning stage seems to be envisaged simply as more 
acres.
In 1952, a revised version of this plan was drafted 
to take account of the rise in oil revenue. The character 
and emphasis of this revised plan remained the same as those 
of the original one, but its scope in general terms was en­
larged. This plan called for expenditures of ID 155 million.
Soon the steadily rising oil revenues allowed much 
bolder planning than in the initial stages. In 1955, a new 
five-year plan was drafted, providing for a total expenditure 
of ID 304 million between 1955 and 1959. This plan was 
amended by law no. 54 of 1956, which called for an expenditure 
of ID 500 million in the period 1955-1960. The purpose of 
this plan was to take account of the experience of the previ­
ous five-year plans and, in particular, the failure to reach 
the stipulated goals of the existing plan. When this plan 
was introduced, both its targets and its economic instrumen­
talities showed the influence of Lord Salter strategy for
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economic development which was based on the development of 
agriculture and the expansion of Iraq's infrastructure and 
social services, with no attempt to develop industry. This 
plan, however, emphasized some kind of harmony between long­
term and short-term projects. Thus the sum allocated for 
housing was four times greater than that of the previous 
plan, and the allocation for the development of animal and 
plant resources was doubled. Tables 23 and 24 show these 
four plans.
TABLE 23
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ITEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD'S 
FIVE YEAR PLAN 1951/52-1955/56 
(ID million)
Revenue
Oil royalties 91.1
Loans 4.0
Total 95.1
Expenditures
Administration 1.0
Irrigation projects 30.0
Roads and bridges 15.9
Buildings 12.6
Other projects 6.2
Total expenditures 65.7
Source: Government of Iraq, Law No. 35 for 1951.
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TABLE 24
THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD'S PROGRAMS 
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
1951-56 1955-59 1955-60 % of Total
Expenditures
Administration 3.2 5.5 7.5 1.5
Irrigation 53.4 108.0 153.5 30.8
Roads, bridges and
communication 27.0 74.0 124.5 24.9
Main building 18.0 20.5 37.0 7.4
Summer resorts 2.0 2.5 0.5
Housing — 6.0 24.0 4.8
Reclamation of
land 23.0 — — * " ~ ~ —
Industry 31.0 43.5 67.0 13.4
Development of
animal wealth 6.5 14.5 2.8
Buildings and
institutes 32.0 59.5 11.9
Miscellaneous — — — — 6.0 10.0 2.0
Total Expenditures 155.0 304.0 500.0 100.0
Revenues
Oil royalties 164.6 215.0 385.1 98.9
Interest * * " — * . 6 4.7 .6
Loans 4.0 .5
Miscellaneous .1 .1 .2
Total Revenues 168.7 215.7 390.0 100.0
Source: Government of Iraq, Law No. 25 for 1952; Law No. 43
for 1955; :Law No. 54 for 1956.
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Planning Ministry--1959-Present 
In 1958, the new regime disbanded the Development 
Board and the Ministry of Development was replaced by a Plan­
ning Ministry in 1959. In that year, the government decided 
that 50 per cent of the oil revenues, plus any other revenues 
connected with the plan, would be allocated to finance devel­
opment planning. The deficiency was to be financed from the 
proceeds of internal loans.^
Premier Qassim stated to the Iraqi "Industrial Feder­
ation" that the government would undertake the development of 
heavy industry, while light industry would be left to the 
private sector. However, in an interview with a foreign jour­
nalist, Qassim explained that there was no actual change in 
the division of the oil revenue. He claimed that the 20 per 
cent of 70 per cent of the Development Board was taken for 
financing the light industry, while the remaining 50 per cent 
was used in long-range projects. From this one might conclude 
that the original plan of leaving light industry to private 
initiative was avoided, or probably did not work out.^0
In 1959, the Planning Ministry drew a new Provisional
^Government of Iraq, Law No. 181 for 1959.
^^B. Shwadran, o£. cit., p. 74.
192
Plan (1959/60-1962/63), shown in Table 25, which envisaged 
an annual expenditure of nearly ID 100 million per annum. 
According to this plan, the agricultural share of total in­
vestment showed a sharp decline. It declined in relative as 
well as absolute terms.
TABLE 25
PLANNING MINISTRY, THE PROVISIONAL PLAN 
(1959/60-1962/63)
Section ID Million Per Cent
Agriculture 48 12.2
Industry 39 10.0
Communication 101 25.5
Housing and resort 76 19.0
Public buildings 50 12.8
Public health 25 6.4
Public education 39 10,0
Projects of the Iraqi-Soviet
Agreement 10 2.6
Others 4 1.0
Total 392 100.0
Source: Government of Iraq, Provisional Economic Plan 
(Baghdad, 1959) .
In 1962, a new plan was drawn up which called for 
total five years expenditure of ID 556 million on economic 
and social development. Oil revenue was to provide ID 315.8 
million for financing this plan, while foreign loans would
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contribute about ID 77.2 million and revenue from government 
agencies would amount to ID 8 million. Agricultural share 
was about 20 per cent of the proposed investment. Tables 25 
and 26 show these two plans.
TABLE 26
DETAILED ECONOMIC PLAN, 1961/62-1965/66 
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
Expenditures
Agriculture 112.9
Industry 166.8
Transportation and communication 136.5
Buildings and housing 140.1
Total Expenditures 556.3
Revenues
Oil royalties 315.8
Profit from government enterprises 22.8
Revenues from government agencies 8.0
Foreign loans 77.2
Miscellaneous 1.0
Total Revenues 423.8
Source: Government of Iraq, Law No. 70 for 1961
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The decline in the share of agriculture in the 
planned investments of these two plans--the Provisional Plan 
and the Detailed Plan--was attributed to two factors: First,
most of the big irrigation projects, dams, flood control, 
etc. were nearing completion and were financed from the previ­
ous investment plans. Secondly, there was a new emphasis on 
the investment in social and industrial development.^^
The decline in the relative share of planned invest­
ments for agriculture was due to the feeling among the Iraqi 
planners that the marginal productivity of agricultural in­
vestment is lower than that of the industrial one.^^ Under 
these two plans, industry received a high percentage of total 
planned investments (12.6 per cent under the provisional plan 
and 30 per cent under the detailed plan).
In fact, the FAG Report estimated that for the period 
1958-65, investment in agriculture would be about ID 46 mil­
lion per annum.13 Under the provisional plan and the detailed
11Most of the agricultural projects included in these 
plans were related to irrigation and drainage works, water 
storage and drilling and silos, in addition to expenditure in 
connection with agrarian reform,
12Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in 
Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p.
61.
13FAG Report, 0£. cit., p. 30.
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plan, planned investments for agriculture amounted to ID 12 
million and ID 20 million respectively» If one has to allow 
for the lag of actual expenditures behind planned expenditures, 
the share of investment for agriculture will be lower than 
the figures shown in these tables.
Iraq's Five-Year Plan 1965-1969
On January 18, 1965, the government announced a new 
five-year plan of development, the basic objective of which 
was "to remedy the economic weakness resulting from one single 
form of national revenue, namely, oil." The plan envisaged 
total expenditures of ID 821 million. The share of this plan 
for the agricultural development was about ID 157 million.
Oil revenue was to provide ID 390 million, and foreign loans 
ID 95 million. The rest was to be met by mobilizing national 
resources. The main allocated expenditures for agricultural 
development are in the form of irrigation and drainage proj­
ects, storage projects, development of animal wealth, silos 
and in connection with the agrarian reform program. Table 27 
shows this plan. According to that table, the share of the 
five-year plan for the agrarian reform program was ID 
119,560,000, to be spent during the period from 1965 to 1969.
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TABLE 27
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ: THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1965-1969 
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
Sector Public
Sector
Private
Sector
Total
Expenditures
Agriculture 145.00 12 157.00
Industry, electricity and
water 210.00 5 215.00
Transport and communications 99.00 20 119.00
Buildings, housing, and
social services 122.53 141 263.53
Trade and services 1.00 3 4.00
International liabilities and
repayment of loans 25.00 — - — 25.00
Planning, statistical and
follow-up systems 2.47 2.47
Ministry of Defence
(productive projects) 35.00 35.00
Total Expenditures 640.00 181 821.00
Revenues
Cash balance brought/forward on 3-31-1965 30.69
Oil royalties (50% of total oil royalties) 390.00
Iraqi Ports Directorate 8.00
Profits from government enterprises 4.00
Foreign loans 95.00
Domestic loans 30.00
Other revenues 3.48
Total Revenues 561.17
Source; Government of Iraq, Law No. 87 for 1965.
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This plan constituted the first attempt in Iraq at 
comprehensive, integrated planning. For the first time, pro­
jections were made and targets were formulated for the per­
formance of the entire Iraqi economy--both public and private 
sectors, both current and capital needs. The resources and 
foreign exchange implications were calculated and conclusions 
for policy drawn.
It is the intention of the plan to raise the growth 
rate of gross domestic product from 6.4 per cent per year to 
8 per cent per year, and to achieve this through gross invest­
ment of 22 per cent of gross domestic production each year 
and its direction to the more directly productive sectors.
It is hoped that this rate of growth will double national in­
come in nine years and the per capita income in thirteen years. 
It is expected that this rate of growth will permit per capita 
private consumption to grow by about 5.5 per cent per year 
which is less than the increase in national income, (Assuming 
a rate of population growth of 2 per cent, the average per 
capita consumption will be 3.5 per cent.)
About 78 per cent of the total projected investment 
of ID 821 million is to be undertaken by the public sector. 
Private investment is to make up the remainder; it is hoped 
that ID 181 million will come from the private sector.
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Highest priorities in the plan were accorded to in­
dustry, agriculture, transport and communication, and build­
ings and social services. The planned investment in directly 
productive sectors--industry, agriculture, electricity, and 
transport--together accounted for 60 per cent of total cap­
ital expenditures.
The likelihood of this plan being faithfully imple­
mented depends primarily on political stability and the abil­
ity of the administrationo Financially, the government is 
perfectly capable, considering its high oil revenue, of 
channeling about ID 600 million toward economic and social 
developmento As for the private sector, much depends on the 
government's policy toward this sector.
By standards of the previous plans, these short-run 
aims are optimistic, or, perhaps one should say, unrealistic. 
These will be difficult to accomplish. As a matter of fact, 
the current data show that there is a lag in government ex­
penditure and there is no sign that the government will be 
able to execute its plan within the period specified by the 
plan,
Apart from the factors already mentioned, a number 
of other new factors have injected themselves into the pic­
ture. Among them are the following: First, while the
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planners estimated the population growth rate as 2 per cent, 
it is generally agreed that it is growing more rapidly, prob­
ably 2.5 per cent or more. Thus the estimates both of the 
level and rate of growth of gross domestic product seem to 
have been based upon faulty assumptions as to the level and 
rate of growth of population. As has been seen, Iraq does not 
as yet suffer from excess population. Provided that the extra 
workers can be put to use on the land or in the cities in pro­
ductive employment, rather than piling up into unemployment, 
population growth may constitute a national asset. But aggre­
gate rates of achieved income growth must now be re-evaluated 
as implying lower per capita growth rates. The target growth 
rate of the gross domestic product should be adjusted upward 
to about 2 per cent per year if the per capita targets are to 
be realized. Absolute investment targets must therefore be 
raised if the original per capita growth targets are to be 
attained.
Secondly, since the rural-urban migration is continu­
ing and urban unemployment is believed still to be increasing, 
employment creation is becoming a greater concern to policy 
makers. There is no prospect of the new modern industries 
employing significant numbers. As long as the overt unemploy­
ment persists it is likely to result in strong pressure upon
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policy-makers to employ labor-intensive techniques and under­
take employment creation projects, regardless of their eco­
nomic meritso The rising urban population, of which unemploy­
ment is a manifestation, is also likely to divert investment 
capital into less productive plans of capital such as low-cost 
housing, sewage systems, and other expensive social overhead.
Finally, the political instability which has marred 
the Iraqi and Arab Middle East regions, constitutes a major 
factor affecting the outcome of the plan.
Impact of the Development Plans 
on Agriculture
According to the 1958/59 agricultural census, about 
14 million donums had irrigation facilities; however, only 
56 per cent is cropped each year; the remainder is left 
fallow.
Views concerning the problem of water supply in Iraq 
differ, Atkenson, for instance, estimated total cultivable 
area that could be irrigated after the completion of the ir­
rigation and drainage projects at 35 million d o n u m s , A c ­
cording to Nelson Wesley's estimate, this area will be 18 
million donums. The K.T,A.M, report, which is based on the
^^El-Shaibani, 0£, cit,, p, 37,
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assumption of large storage capacity provided by ten new 
dams, estimates that an additional 9 million donums of land 
could be brought under cultivation.^^
The Hindiyah barrage on the Euphrates, which was 
completed in 1913, serves about 2.8 million donums. The Rut 
barrage system on the Tigris, which was completed during the 
1930's, provides irrigation water for about 1.6 million 
donums, and the Diala Weir system provides nearly 1.3 million 
donums.
Four dams or barrages for flood control and irriga­
tion were completed, following the creation of the Development 
Board in 1950. The two flood control projects, the Tharthar, 
on the Tigris, and the Habbaniyah, on the Euphrates, are the 
Board's major achievement under previous plans. The Tharthar 
project (completed in 1956) diverts water from the Tigris 
into Wadi Tharthar depression, a vast natural basin with a 
storage capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. The Tharthar 
depression, however, was assumed to fulfill a double purpose, 
flood control and storage water for irrigation. But the 
project's storage capacity was doubted and there was no
^^Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy Engineers, Report 
on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River System 
(Baghdad: Development Board, 1954; mimeo).
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agreement reached in this connection. The possibility of 
seepage, salination, and evaporation also created doubts 
about the feasibility of the project for irrigation. The 
inability of the experts to reach a decision about the pos­
sibility of using the Tharthar project for irrigation, and 
the fact that the project's efficiency could not be tested 
for about 10 years, led to the construction of alternative 
projects based on the assumption that the Tharthar depres­
sion was unsuitable.
Habbaniyah reservoir (also completed in 1956) stores 
2 billion cubic meters of water diverted from the Euphrates 
by the Ramadi Barrage. Dokan dam on the Little Zab (com­
pleted in 1959) has a storage capacity of 6.3 million cubic 
meters, Derbendi-Khan dam on the Diala Rivers (completed in 
1961), has storage capacity of 3 billion cubic meters. These 
dams and barrages are expected to provide adequate protection 
from flood damage and to bring about increased crop production 
from new lands opened for cultivation, higher yields in areas 
already cultivated, and double c r o p p i n g .
In 1966, water supply which can be provided by seven
Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 168.
S. Department of Agriculture, 0£, cit., p. 19.
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dams was estimated at about 60 milliards of cubic meters 
This is shown in the following table.
TABLE 28
IRAQ'S WATER STORAGE CAPACITY, 1966
(milliards of cubic meters)
Dam or Reservoir
Storage
Capacity
Date of 
Completion
Dokan (Little Zab-Tigris) 6.80 1959 completed
Derbendi-Khan-Tigris 3.25 1963 "
Habbaniyah-Euphrates 3.25 1964 II
Haditha-Euphrates 11.00 1968 work to
Mosul-Tigris 14.00 1968 commence
Himreen-Diala-Tigris unknown 1970 "
Bukhma-Greater Zab-Tigris 8.00 1980 II
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VI (February, 1966),
p o 5 .
According to the official statement, the above stor­
age capacity will irrigate about 17 million donums annually 
but more storage facilities will be required in order to cul­
tivate the area intensively. Thus the planning authority 
decided to undertake new projects which would irrigate nearly 
two million donums. This is shown in Table 29.
Under the current five-year plan about one-sixth of 
the total funds for water projects was to be spent on dams
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and barrages while the major part was allocated for other 
works on improvement of irrigation and drainage systems. The 
projects undertaken were to be completed in 15 years; when 
completed, they were to regulate irrigation and drainage of 
9,800,000 donums in the Tigris basin (including 2,240,000 
donums previously uncultivated) and 6,000,000 donums in the 
Euphrates basin (including 1,000,000 donums previously 
uncultivated)
TABLE 29 
NEW PLANNED IRRIGATION PROJECTS
Project Area in 
Donums
Date of Completion
Kirkuk-Adhaim-Little Zab 325,000
Eski-Kalak*Greater Zab-
Tigris 10,000
Extension in Diala Basin 100,000
Mindli-Badrah-Jas san 50,000
Work in process and 
expected to be com­
pleted in 1976
Expected date of com­
pletion is 1968
Work to commence with­
in the next 10 years
Work to commence with­
in two years
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VI (February, 1966), 
p. 5.
18
U. S. Department of Agriculture, o£. cit., p. 19.
205
In 1964, the government decided on the construction 
of the Mosul Dam on the Tigris north-east of the City of Mosul 
at an approximate cost of ID 68 million. The Dam will store 
13.5 billion cubic meters of water and will generate 350,000 
kw of e l e c t r i c i t y . 19 The Upper Euphrates Dam will also be 
constructed at the cost of about ID 40 million. Measures have 
been taken by the government to implement the construction of 
several other projects involving a cost of ID 50 million and 
serving 3.5 million donums of agricultural lands.
Evaluation of Planning 
Economic Development
Under Expenditure
Under the first five-year plan, the Board planned to 
spend ID 155.4 million during the period 1951/52-1956/57.
This would give an annual expenditure of ID 31 million. Over 
the five years (1956-60) the Board projected a total expendi­
ture of ID 500 million, an annual expenditure of ID 100 mil­
lion. Between 1960 and 1965, development expenditure was 
planned to be ID 649.1 million. These amounts seem very large 
in proportion to the Iraqi economy. Compare these sums with
^^Govemment of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Monthly Review, Bulletin No. 11 (November, 1964), p. 2.
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the estimated national income of Iraq in 1950 at about ID 150 
million, the rate of investment was almost one-third of the 
national income. These investments, judged from comparison 
with the total government expenditure, which up to 1950 did 
not exceed ID 30 million, and the total value of Iraq's ex­
ports, which in 1947-1950 averaged ID 16 million, appear quite 
great and lead one to think that Iraq is going to break its 
vicious circle. In addition, in 1950, government revenue from 
all sources amounted to ID 43.5 million, of which ID 5.3 mil­
lion came from oil. By 1965, however, government revenue ex­
ceeded ID 200 million, or about five times that of 1950. Fur­
ther, between 1950 and 1964, Iraq received a total of ID 1.056
billion ($2.95 billion) as oil revenue. Comparing these fig­
ures with the size of the country and its total population of 
7 million, the flow of revenue would seem apt to cause an un­
precedented economic and social revolution.
One of the main characteristics of the pattern of
Iraq's development policy is that not only are the actual ex­
penditures lagging behind the planned expenditures, but that 
the actual revenues were higher than the planned ones. For 
the first four years of the Board's operations, revenue 
totaled ID 107 million, and while total planned expenditures 
were ID 89.8 million, actual expenditures amounted to only
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ID 44.4 million. Between 1955/56 and 1959/60, planned ex­
penditures were ID 394.8 million, but actual expenditures 
were only ID 227.3 million, while actual revenue was ID 254 
million.
Actual expenditures fell far behind planned expendi­
tures even under the new regime which came to power in 1958. 
The Board planned ID 630 million to be spent in the period 
1960/61-1964-65. By the end of 1964/65, actual expenditures 
were only ID 270 million while actual revenues were ID 319 
million.
According to Table 30, which shows planned and actual 
expenditures and revenues from 1951/52 to 1954/55, the Board 
succeeded in spending only 50 per cent of projected expendi­
tures, or about 41 per cent of the total revenue during the 
period concerned. Even expenditure on irrigation fell far 
short of the allocated expenditures. Industry suffered most. 
In its first five-year plan, 1952-1956, the Board allocated 
ID 31.1 million or about 20 per cent of total investment for 
industrial development. Up to 1955, only ID 2.6 million had 
in fact been spent. The failure 'of the Board to spend on the 
development of other sectors of the economy such as road con­
struction, human resources and the like, meant that the only 
visible material result of the development expenditures was
TABLE 30
EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 1951/62-1954/55
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
1951-
Planned
52
Actual
1952-
Planned
53
Actual
1953-
Planned
54
Actual
Expenditures
Administration .2 .1 .4 .2 .6 .3
Irrigation 3.0 .8 7.1 2.5 10.8 4.8
Roads and bridges 2.1 .6 3.8 1.8 4.7 1,9
Land reclamation 1.7 .8 3.4 1.0 4.1 2,3
Buildings 2.4 .9 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.4
Industry .1 - — 3.0 .1 5.0 .5
Total 9.4 3.1 20.5 7.8 28.4 12.3
Revenues 10.5 7.5 20.5 24.0 33.8 35.3
Surplus of Actual 
Revenues over 
Actual Expenditures
Actual Expenditures 
Actual Revenues
4.4
41%
16.2
33%
23.0
35%
N3o
oo
TABLE 30--Continued
1954-
Planned
ID
-55
Actual
ID
Total 
Planned Actual 
ID % ID %
Actual
Planned
%
Expenditures
Administration .6 .3 1.9 2 .9 2 48
Irrigation 11.9 8.5 32.9 37 16.9 38 51
Roads and bridges 5.3 4.3 15.9 18 8.6 19 54
Land reclamation 4.4 3.0 13.9 15 7.2 16 52
Buildings 3.3 2.7 11.4 13 8.2 19 72
Industry 6.0 2.0 14.0 15 2.6 6 18
Total 31.6 20.9 89.8 100 44.4 100 49
Revenues 34.9 40.7 99.8 100 107.6 100 108
of which oil revenue 34.3 40.0 96.0 96 104.4 97 109
Surplus of Actual 
Revenues over 
Actual Expenditures
Actual Expenditures 
Actual Revenues
19.8
51%
63.2
41%
Ni
o
vo
Source: Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economie Development in Iraq (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 44-45.
210
the flood control schemes and the expansion of acres.
Table 31 shows that the period 1955/60 was character­
ized by an increase in development expenditures compared with 
the previous period; total expenditures reached ID 227.3 mil­
lion between 1956 and 1960, compared with only ID 44.4 million 
which were spent during the previous period. Although the 
level of actual expenditures was still behind that of planned 
expenditures, 58 per cent, this, however, constituted about
95 per cent of total actual revenues as compared with only 41
20per cent during the previous period.
The new regime which came to power following the mil­
itary revolution in 1958 introduced three economic plans--the 
provisional plan, the economic detailed plan, and the present 
five-year plan (1965-1969). According to Table 32, which 
shows the planned and actual expenditures from 1960 to 1965, 
the rate of performance under the new regime planning was only 
43 per cent with emphasis not on industry or agriculture where 
the rates of performance were 33 per cent and 34 per cent re­
spectively. A 60 per cent rate of performance, which is the
20por a general account of the oil impact on Iraq's 
economic development, see Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic 
Development in Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub­
lishers, 1967), which has been drawn upon extensively in this 
section.
TABLE 31
PLANNED AND ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES, 1955/56-1959/60
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
1955-
Planned
-56
Actual
1956-
Planned
■57
Actual
1957
Planned
-58
Actual
Expenditures
Administration 2.9 2.7 .8 .6 .9 .7
Irrigation 13.1 10.9 24.0 11.3 26.9 12.1
Roads and bridges 14.1 8.4 17.8 9.2 26.8 12.4
Buildings, housing 
and summer resorts 3.1 1.8 7.4 4.7 16.3 9.4
Industry, mining, 
and electricity 4.1 2.9 17.0 5.0 16.0 8.6
Animal wealth 1.0 .6 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.1
Other projects 8.3 6.0 12.0 11.2 11.8 13.1
Total 46.6 33.3 81.9 43.0 101.6 57.4
Revenues--Oil 43.0 59.1 65.2 48.2 65.2 34.2
Others 1.8 1.7 . 6 3.9 .6 1.6
Total Revenues 44.8 60.8 65.8 52.1 65.8 35.9
Actual Surplus
Actual Expenditures 
Actual Revenues
27.5
55%
9.1
83%
21.5
160%
N3
TABLE 31--Continued
1958
Planned
-59
Actual
1959
Planned
-60a
Actual
Total
Planned Actual 
ID 7o ID %
A
P
7o
Expenditures
Administration .9 .7 .7 . 3 6.2 1 5.1 2 82
Irrigation 27.0 10.8 21.9 6.1 112.9 29 51.2 23 45
Roads and bridges 32.2 7.9 15.1 11.4 105.6 27 49.3 22 47
Buildings, housing, 
and summer resorts 14.3 10.2 9.3 7.1 50.2 13 33.3 15 66
Industry, mining, 
and electricity 11.0 11.9 6.8 3.9 54.9 14 32.3 14 59
Animal wealth 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.6 11.4 3 6.2 3 54
Other projects 11.8 8.9 9.6 10.2 53.3 13 49.9 22 94
Total 99.6 52.2 65.2 40.6 394.8 100 227.3 100 58
Revenues 65.8 61.7 49.4 31.9 291.6 100 242.4 100 83
of which oil revenue 65.2 60.8 48.9 31.8 287.5 99 234.1 97 81
K)
hO
Actual Surplus 9.5 8.7 15.1
Actual Expenditures „ „ ,
Actual Revenues
^For the first nine months of the fiscal year 1959-60 (through December, 
1959), the provisional plan became effective in January, 1960.
Source; A. Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq, pp. 47-48.
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highest, was achieved in the field of housing and public 
buildings.
The inability to spend, therefore, persisted even 
under the new regime development policy which proclaimed that 
one of its main goals was to achieve a rapid social and eco­
nomic progress. As Table 32 shows, actual expenditures were 
only 63 per cent of the actual development revenue. There 
was a drastic reduction of investment in the area of irriga­
tion and agricultural improvement. During this period, actual 
expenditure in this sector amounted to only ID 36.1 million, 
or about ID 7.2 million per annum.
Similarly, under the five-year economic plan (1962- 
66), an amount of ID 166.8 million was allocated for major and 
complementary industrial projects. At the end of 1965, a 
total of ID 46.2 million was reported to have been invested 
while total planned investment for industrial projects in this 
period was ID 140.9 million or about 33 per cent of its allo­
cated investment for industrial development was in fact spent.
According to the new five-year plan (1965-69) an 
amount of ID 119.56 million was allocated for the purpose of 
agrarian reform programs, of which ID 17.56 million was to be 
spent during the first year of the plan (1965/66). At the 
end of the mentioned year, only 21 per cent of the allocated
TABLE 32
PLANNED AND ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND ACTUAL REVENUES, 1959/60-1964/65
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
1959- 60^ 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual
Expenditures
Agriculture 3.6 2.6 18.1 10.8 23.4 9.8 20.2 6.3
Industry 2.4 1.0 12.6 5.7 18.6 7.1 24.7 10.3
Transportation and 
Communication 5.6 1.2 36.2 7.9 38.3 14.1 32.4 15.8
Housing and 
Public Buildings 5.5 3.7 52.1 18.1 67.2 30.2 30.8 26.4
Other Expenditures 2.2 .7 18.0 3.0 —  — -  - —  — ----
Total 19.3 9.2 137.0 45.5 147.5 61.2 108.1 58.5
Total Revenues 11.5 47.8 66.7 70.0
ho
h-*
Actual Expenditures 
Actual Revenues
80% 95% 92% 84%
TABLE 32--Continued
1963-64 1964-65 Total A
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual P
Expenditures
Agriculture 22.8 4.5 24.7 4.6 112.8 38.7 34
Industry 39.6 9.5 43.0 12.6 140.9 46.2 33
Transportation and
Communication 29.8 18.3 27.9 10.3 170.2 67.6 40
Housing and
Public Buildings 25.5 21.2 24.0 24.3 205.1 123.9 60
Other Expenditures -  - — " —  - -  - 20.2 3.7 18
Total 117.6 53.5 119.6 51.8 649.1 279.7 43
Total Revenues 67.7 66.6 330.5
Actual Expenditures 
Actual Revenues 79% 78% 63%
N3
H*
Ln
^For the last three months of 1959/60.
Source: A. Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 50-51.
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expenditure was actually spent. In the year 1965/66 (Table 
33), actual expenditures on water storage projects were 5.6 
per cent. Expenditures on irrigation and drainage projects 
were 23.3 per cent and on agrarian cooperatives 16.3 per cent. 
It was also planned to distribute 567,000 donums during the 
year 1965-66. By the end of the year, only 80,682 donums 
were distributed, or about 14 per cent of those planned.
TABLE 33
PLANNED AND ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES 
ON AGRICULTURE, 1965-69 
(thousands of Iraqi dinars)
1965-66 
Planned Actual 7o
1965-69
Planned
Irrigation 11,055 2,457 22.2 88,450
Distribution 100 - - 1,000
Cadastral Survey 230 87 37.9 1,150
Agricultural Machinery 1,250 9 .7 8,000
Agricultural Production
and Cooperatives 1,580 188 16.3 11,400
Agricultural Bank 200 200 100.0 5,000
Total 14,415 3,041 21.0 115,000
Others 3,148 - - 4,560
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, A
General Report on the Investment Program of the First 
Year of the Plan 1965-69 (Baghdad: Directorate Gen­
eral of Planning and Relations, 1966), p. 20.
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A recent Iraqi-Soviet economic agreement provided 
for four machinery rental stations. These four, and nine ad­
ditional stations, are included in the current five-year plan. 
By 1965, however, official reports showed that the old four 
stations did not start operation yet due to the delay in their 
deliveries. In 1965, actual expenditures on SMS, agricultural 
machines and equipment, and buildings were 1.73 per cent of 
those planned for that year. This is shown in Table 33.
Despite the great concern of the new regime with 
social and economic development, the progress achieved in this 
area was poor, since 1958. If in most realistic development 
plans, the share of investment going to industry and agricul­
ture is at least 50 per cent, and if the plans assigned to 
these sectors about 36 per cent of total investment, the Plan­
ning Board has whittled them down to 12 per cent. And the 
envisaged government outlay is not to be an energetic effort 
at the mobilization of the existing resources, the post revo­
lution five-year plans turned out to be a second edition of 
the pre-1958 five-year plans--attaining rates of growth pro­
viding for only an insignificant increase of per capita in­
come . As Caractacas pointed out :
Worst of all (the board's shortcoming) in Iraqi eyes, 
was the failure to promote industry. Forever Iraq 
traded its oil for American cars and other luxury
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goods. Money was not spent either on large-scale 
industrial projects or on the rationalization of 
agriculture.21
Failure of the Board to invest in agriculture and in­
dustry which could create a permanent employment and lead to 
achieving a major structural change in the economy increased 
rather than lessened dependence of the development effort and 
the entire economy on the oil revenue.^
The new regime's economic difficulties have no doubt 
been caused partly by the uncertainties of the new situation 
and partly by the necessary adjustment to the new social and 
economic conditions. But in great measure they may also have 
been the result of the intensive political struggle associated 
with the revolution, the immaturity of the revolutionary forces 
coming into power, as well as of the inability of the regime 
to find the right policies and to create rapidly the machinery 
of the new administration. Nor has the regime been able to 
mobilize the people to make greater efforts in order to 
achieve a higher standard of living.
Because of ideological influences, the new regime was
21Caractacas, o£. cit., p. 36.
22A. Alnasrawi, o£. cit., p. 88.
23B. Shwadran, 0£. cit., p. 79.
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determined to concentrate on social services such as housing, 
health and education, and these items were given priority in 
the development policy. While the amounts planned for these 
items were about four times what they had been in the previous 
years, no adequate provisions were made for the revenue, and 
neither did the planners give sufficient thought to the uti­
lization of the social facilities once they were completed.
What conclusions can be drawn from this development 
policy in Iraq? It often seems that the stagnation of the 
economy and the inability to take-off inco sustained growth 
are caused by the difficulty in using sufficient amounts of 
capital above the "critical level." Despite the fact that 
Iraq has had more than two decades of planning experience, 
technical and administrative difficulties seem to persist.
Even when the required capital for development was made avail­
able, it was liable in the face of various social and political 
pressures to relapse fairly quickly, and with it the propor­
tional growth rate. This is not to say that the main obstacle 
to Iraq's development is the above mentioned difficulty: more 
important, as we have seen, may well be the smallness of the 
agricultural surplus, or the waste of it and of the oil
24
Ibid., p. 79.
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revenue on relatively unproductive purposes, which sets a 
limit upon total investment; to the extent that this is so, 
the removal of this bottleneck and the raising of the coeffi­
cient of investment may be considered as prerequisites to 
Iraq's development. It seems, however, that the problem of 
the impulse to rapid development in Iraq leads to the dis­
covery of remedies for wasteful utilization of all its re­
sources for the development purposes. In the final analysis 
this is not so much a financial problem as one of economic 
development.
Extension, Education, and 
Agricultural Research
In 1952, Iraq had created an extension service which 
had received the guidance and advice of foreign experts. Re­
cently, it was combined with other services in the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform. In 1958, there were over 1,200 foreign 
technical personnel of about 24 nationalities, including 
Agencies of the United Nations. The task of foreign experts 
was to develop Iraq's extension services and to train agents, 
supervisors, and managers for agricultural extension services.
These attempts made by national and international aid 
to support the creation of agricultural centers and extension
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work and research have not been successful. One could per­
haps attribute this failure to the lack of sufficient capital 
investment in agricultural improvement, education, and re­
search. Or one might say that the incentives were not effec­
tive because they were not made sufficiently attractive. But 
one could also argue that the efforts to initiate agricultural 
development failed because they were wrongly conceived and 
directed, and this is true because the nature and character 
of Iraqi agriculture were not understood. Most often, these 
experts have come to think about all economic phenomena ex­
clusively in terms of a capitalist economy, where the entre­
preneur seeks to maximize his profit, and where the commodity 
can be exchanged on the market at uniform prices and none ex­
changed otherwise.
As we have seen before, the economic structure of 
Iraq has been characterized with specific economic phenomena 
which do not always fit into the framework of the capitalist 
economic theory. Small holdings operated by sharecroppers 
or tenants for absentee landlords, producing mainly for 
home consumption, are not commonly found in Western modern 
agriculture. Nor are large, chiefly self-sufficient farms 
operated for the benefit of absentee sheikh-owners, and worked 
by semi-serfs tied to the farm and paid with a small share of
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the produce. The capitalist economic theory is based on 
cultural-institutional traits which do not exist in Iraqi 
economy, and lack of part or all of the capitalist institu­
tions in Iraq presents a distinct problem for analysis and 
a different set of problems to solve.
In addition, foreign experts are confronted, with 
what the Iraqi planners believe in approaching the agricul­
tural problem in Iraq. They emphasize that if the design 
and construction of a drainage system can be solved, then 
the other problems can be solved automatically. Yet the 
lack of sufficient plans for drainage construction most often 
has discouraged foreign experts. Closely related to this is­
sue is the conviction that time alone will solve any short­
comings in a department's work.^S
Competition between multilateral and bilateral advo­
cates was very keen. Two countries, each seeking to increase 
its influence with Iraq; or between individuals representing 
different national groups with planning models to sell. Poor 
coordination on the part of the government led to situations 
in which individuals with different ideologies were put to­
gether to work in one region. There was also an eagerness of
2 SJohn L. Simmons, o£. cit., p. 139.
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assisting groups to "sell" their services in spite of the 
danger of overstaffing and competition. There was a personal 
conflict of philosophy and prejudice reflecting national 
origin.26
Another handicap which discouraged foreign experts is 
connected with limited data. Lack of available data shows 
that the planning groups must work with limited knowledge when 
they are trying to develop the agriculture in Iraq. For that 
reason, there is little data concerning the process of agri­
cultural growth, and what meager information is available is 
more physical and technical than economic in nature.
The creation of a satisfactory extension service is 
affected by the lack of trained students for agricultural 
purposes. Illiteracy is an important factor affecting the 
improvement of agriculture in Iraq, It is hoped that the 
present campaign against illiteracy will raise the level of 
education among the youths. In 1965, some 489 students were 
enrolled in the Agricultural College and 155 students in the 
Veterinary College. The Agricultural and Forestry College 
in Mosul had 252 students. In 1964, there were about 5,950
2 g
Warren F. Adams, o£. cit., p. 285.
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Iraqi students studying in foreign c o u n t r i e s .^ 7 Further, in 
1960, about 1,600 students were enrolled in 11 secondary 
agricultural schools and 1,340 students in intermediate 
agricultural schools in ten provinces; students and teachers 
had been tripled since 1957.
Today, economists and sociologists argue that agri­
cultural development requires investment in farm people. 
Reading Hansen's Economic Issues of the I960's and Schultz's 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture leads one to think that 
education is a prerequisite to any development in backward 
countries. Both authors cited Japanese development as an ex­
ample of the role of education in this progress. Schultz 
showed that agricultural development in Japan was made pos­
sible by investment in agricultural research in schooling to 
develop a corps of specialists in farm development, and in 
farm people themselves in order to enable them to employ the 
new methods and techniques in farm practices.Hansen 
emphasized that;
The real basis of scientific agriculture in Japan 
is a system of universal and compulsory education:
27Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964 
(Baghdad: Government Press, 1965), p. 412.
28T. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture 
(New Haven : Yale University Press, 1964), p. 190.
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It introduced as early as 1868, a system of general 
education which enabled Japan to break the hold of 
traditionalism and thereby to utilize the vast pro­
ductive powers released by modern science.29
According to the Iraqi Government figures, an increase 
in the number of students in primary, secondary, and higher 
education from over 525,278 in 1958 to over 1,203,856 in
1964-65, an increase of about 130 per cent, is s i g n i f i c a n t . ^0 
But the youths, even with an elementary education, have re­
jected farming and left the countryside, seeking betterment 
in the city. The spread of primary education through the 
country creates a new value system which looks upon agricul­
ture as a vocation. Much higher status was associated with 
land ownership or public office or intellectual activity than 
is enjoyed by the profession connected directly with material 
production. For the villager, going to school meant an oppor­
tunity for him to find an escape from farming. Manual work 
is held in low regard in Iraq. Thus, experience in Iraq 
showed that better education for farm people paved the way for 
the youths to seek non-agricultural work, because with their 
education, they could earn more if they left farming. One
29
A. Hansen, Economic Issues of the 1960's (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 162.
^^Govemment of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964 
(Baghdad: Government Press, 1965), p. 412.
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explanation for this attitude is that agricultural work in 
Iraq is associated with hardship and cruelty. To operate as 
they do with very primitive implements uses up a great deal 
of energy and occupies a great deal of time. Yet the produc­
tivity is negligible. The root of the problem, however, lies 
in the low agricultural income. In 1963, the per capita in­
come of the agricultural people amounted to only one-four­
teenth of that of the non-agricultural people. Who would ac­
cept this low income earned from farm work, while the oppor­
tunity is opened to one with little education to earn many 
times more than that in other lines of work? The Iraqi society 
is handicapped by social imbalance. An elementary school­
teacher receives an annual income of ID 600 for the first 
three years and lives among peasants who may not receive any 
cash income in a season. Thus, there is every justification 
for rejecting farming by the educated person.
In the past, education has upset the balance of Iraqi 
society by creating unemployed semi-educated people because 
in the absence of economic and social progress the economy 
failed to utilize those who acquired a little education. With 
a low national income, the educational facilities are low.
When the economy is developing rapidly, the educational facil­
ities will develop rapidly too. The economy must be
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sufficiently productive to absorb the educated people. Thus, 
each determinant of the level of education is inevitably re­
lated to and affected by the level of economic development.
The several vocational schools now in Iraq are interested in 
teaching skills, and not in changing attitudes and values.
But with rapid economic growth, these values and attitudes 
will give way--as in post-feudal Europe--to a "commercial" 
approach to farming.
Improvement of Productivity
With regard to the water development policy in Iraq, 
the question that immediately arises is whether the new water 
supply provided by the new dams and reservoirs should be used 
for intensive cultivation on existing areas, for the cultiva­
tion of additional areas, or for both purposes? What matters 
here is not the quantity of water. Indeed, what confronted 
(and still confronts) the policy-makers is how to utilize this 
water in order to improve the agricultural productivity. Our 
discussion here is confined to the following: (1) drainage,
(2) improvement of existing areas, and (3) the use of 
fertilizers,
Beginning with the first, it should be noted that 
drainage is vital in Iraq, otherwise the land becomes salty
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and unproductive. In 1949, the Haigh Commission's Report 
estimated the cost of drainage at an average of ID 2 per 
donum which was considered less than the cost per donum of 
opening new land.31 The KTAM Report estimated the total
O O
cost of a full drainage system at ID 79 million. This will
gove an average cost per donum of between ID 3.5 and ID 4.
In Dujaila project, the cost of reclamation was about ID 3 
per acre. This was considered not high in comparison with 
the cost of reclamation of waste land in European countries. 
The cost of providing drainage and irrigation facilities to 
new areas alone, rather than to existing and new areas to­
gether, was very high. The cost of newly irrigating 800,000 
donums, for example, in the "Gharraf" area and of improving 
the irrigation of 3 million donums of existing area was esti­
mated at ID 8.74 million. If the entire cost were allocated 
to only the new irrigated land, the cost per donum would be 
ID II; if, however, it were spread over the whole area, it 
would be only ID 2.^^ Salter suggested that it is better to
31
Lord Salter, op. cit., p. 194.
32
F. Qubain, cit., p. 76.
O O
D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, p. 165.
^^Lord Salter, op. cit., p. 182.
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improve the existing land rather than to open new land, be­
cause the cost per donum of the latter will be higher than 
that of improving the existing land,^^ In 1959, Dutch engin­
eers estimated overall drainage costs, including excavation, 
pumping stations, main and farm drain at ID 20 per donum.
The benefits were estimated to pay for the costs within seven 
years. This was based on the marketing value of the poorest 
paying crop, barley, increasing average yields from 150 kg/
donum to 500 kg/donum. The costs were estimated in 1959 
36prices o
Some ID 30 million had been allocated for the period 
up to 1960. Data are not available for the years 1961-64, but 
the present economic plan called for an expenditure on irri­
gation and drainage of ID 77 million. Thus one might conclude 
that by 1970, Iraq's drainage program would be constructed.
This brings us to the second possible method of rais­
ing agricultural productivity which is closely related to this 
range of issue, that is improvement of existing areas. Under 
the present farming system, only one half of the cultivated 
land is cultivated in any single year due to the shortage of
^^Ibid., p. 194.
J. Dieleman (ed.), Reclamation of Salt Affected 
Soils in Iraq (Wageningen, 1963), p. 59.
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water supply and the almost complete absence of the use of 
fertilizers. The fallow system under which land is cultivated 
only in alternative years is generally used in Iraq. In the 
fallow years, the weeds and grasses are allowed to grow and 
it is used for grazing. Crop rotation is not used, and animal 
manure is used for fuel and other purposes and not applied to 
enrich the soil. By providing proper drainage only, some 
barley yields increased 4.4 times over the old yields. Ex­
perimental drainage programs were started in several areas in 
Iraq, and the results were dramatic.Table 34 shows the 
results of these experiments in Twarij and Dujaila.
Thus, the agricultural problem in Iraq is reduced to 
one of low productivity per worker and per donum. And because 
of this low productivity, Iraq's potential of agricultural 
development is great, because any serious attention paid to 
improving this productivity will result in a very high produc­
tion and income per cultivator.
The typical existing irrigation system in Iraq is 
based on cultivating half the area in winter, and one sixth 
or less in summer. By intensifying irrigation, it might be
37With an average depth of ground water at 50cm, the 
yields were 163 kg/donum. With the level reduced to 156 cm. 
below the surface yields were 714 kg/donum. Experiment at 
Annanah 1956-57.
2.31
possible to double the yields, and the summer yields in par­
ticular. This would double the margin of cash crops, because 
it is the winter crop which provides subsistence in kind for 
the farmer.38
TABLE 34
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY OF DRAINED LANDS 
(in 100 kg/donum)
Wheat Barley Cotton
Twarii Experiment
Before draining unsuitable 3 unsuitable
After draining 6.8 8 5
Highest production
after draining 8.9 13 -
Du.iaila Experiment
Average yields before
draining unsuitable - -
Average yields after
draining 6.8
Source: Government of Iraq, Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Fellah and Agrarian Reform, No. VI (February, 1966),
p . 6.
38
M. G. lonides, "Alternative of Irrigation Policy in 
Iraq," Middle East Forum (April, 1958), p. 16.
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It was pointed out by different economists that if 
the existing cultivated lands were given the benefits of the 
newly provided water, full use would be made of the existing 
structure of administration, roads, bridges, communication, 
and oublie services of all k i n d s . ^9 Salter, for instance, 
expressed that "It would seem to follow that agricultural 
development should from the beginning include the improve­
ment of production from existing cultivation."^^
It follows that the main problem of agricultural de­
velopment in Iraq is not the extension of the area but rather 
raising the productivity of the existing land. The new 
agrarian reform policy, by destroying the political power of 
the big landlords, may provide a possible scientific solution 
to this problem.
Intimately related to the foregoing is the use of 
fertilizers. Judging by the experiences of other advanced 
countries and taking account of conditions just analyzed, if 
farm production is to be increased, major reliance will have 
to be placed upon raising unit yield.
The present agricultural development policy in Iraq
Q Q
K. M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, pp.
122-23.
40Lord Salter, 0£. cit., p. 53.
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aimed at improving water conservation, extension of irri­
gated areas, and better use of water for irrigation--all at 
the same time, will produce results more slowly than if con­
centrated on the last. This is a field to which the govern­
ment is devoting most attention, particularly since it can 
be largely effected through mass application of unemployed 
labor force. These efforts will undoubtedly have some effect 
on agricultural output within the next few years, especially 
irrigation and drainage which will achieve some increase in 
the output.
It may be interesting to note that in Japan average 
rice yields increased about 20 per cent in the decade between 
1880 and 1890. Similarly, the combined unit yield of six 
major crops rose by about 50 per cent in the four decades be­
tween 1880 and 1920.^^ The major part of this rise was due 
to the use of fertilizers.
Today, the use of commercial fertilizers or animal 
manure is very small or non-existent. Peasants are not aware 
of the potential for increasing production through the appli­
cation of fertilizers. No commercial fertilizer is produced
^^Bruce F. Johnston, "Agricultural Productivity and 
Economic Development in Japan," Journal of Political Economy. 
LIX (1951), pp. 498-513.
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in Iraq. Under the Qassim regime, an economic agreement with 
the Soviet Union included the construction of an ammonium 
nitrate and ammonium sulfate plant for the Iraqi government 
in Basra. This plant, utilizing natural gas from oilfields, 
was to have an annual output of 60,000 metric tons of ammonia. 
It was expected to begin production by 1965. The present re­
gime has recently projected the construction of another fer­
tilizer plant.
In 1964, imports of fertilizer were estimated at about 
8,750 metric tons.^^ Since domestic fertilizer capacity is 
still very small, most of it has to be imported, Iraq will 
have to spend more of its foreign exchange on imports of fer­
tilizers. By increasing the application of chemical fertili­
zers, Iraqi agricultural production could be increased by at 
least 30 or 40 per cent.
There is a real possibility that the agricultural 
productivity in Iraq could increase the food supply even 
without adding new land for cultivation. The low yield of 
agricultural land is a symbol of this backwardness. Compare 
the average yield of wheat, rice, the principal food in Iraq. 
In Japan, the only industrial Asiatic country, the average
42
U. S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit., p. 15.
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yield in 1952 was 41,3 quintals (1 quintal = 100 kilograms) 
per hectare. India produced 11.8, Burma 15,4 (1951), Thai­
land 12,9, and Indonesia 15,8 as an average. Iraq produced
5.0 quintals per hectare (1952).
Solution of Agricultural Problem Complex
It should be emphasized that the provision of water 
supply, drainage system, agricultural machines, etc. will not 
increase farm productivity automatically, nor is it contingent 
merely on supplying certain amounts of effort and capital and 
the general application of modern techniques. It is a far 
more complicated task than that. Realization of the potential 
growth of Iraqi agriculture will require building a comprehen­
sive organization for disseminating technical information, for 
providing seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and other materials 
and services to the peasants, and other facilities, for financ­
ing the expenditures on improvements, organizing community 
works for the rural population, and marketing the products of 
agriculture. Agricultural development depends no less on 
the enthusiasm, civic consciousness, and discipline of the 
people, as well as on the ability of the administration to 
manage a large scale agricultural program.
43
W. Brand, 0£. cit., p. 26.
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The government of Iraq is committed to a policy of 
fostering the development of agrarial cooperatives as the 
basic machinery for these tasks, with a comprehensive rural 
extension service supplying technical assistance. A prelim­
inary work has been done during the last decade in creating 
the organization, which is now in the process of building 
staff and getting started. Now the organizational structure 
is to be extended over the entire agricultural sector. The 
present government is trying to create a massive rural co­
operative system, numbering more than 800 societies by 1970.
Another essential is substantial progress in coping 
with the problem of waste resources resulting from progressive 
land fragmentation. In accepting an optimistic view of agri­
cultural development during the next decade, we assume that 
land consolidation will be substantially accomplished within 
the period; though not very much may have happened in the way 
of actual pooling of land for cooperative or collective cul­
tivation. The probability is, however, that there will be a 
gradual trend over the long run toward large-scale operating 
units, beginning with the pooled use of some large implements 
and livestock. Eventually this may pave the way for mechani­
zation of farming, but that seems unlikely to get very far 
within the next decade, or until the value of human labor has
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risen to perhaps several times what it now is in Iraq.
Agricultural development will call for continued in­
vestment outlay on a large scale, both private and public. 
Under the current five-year plan, the proposed level of pub­
lic investment for agriculture, community development, agra­
rian cooperative, irrigation, and flood control averaged to 
about ID 24 million a year but expenditure has lagged far 
behind. It is difficult to estimate the order of private in­
vestment, but it would be very small. The level of outlay 
for agricultural development will certainly rise further as 
development proceeds. Although some programs such as irri­
gation, land reclamation, and flood control may now be nearing 
maximum levels, many other important programs have hardly got 
under way for the country as a whole. For example, the pro­
grams of agricultural extension and community development, 
still at their beginning, have so far reached only few vil­
lages . Experience to date has shown that a long period is 
required to overcome the strong initial resistance and factors 
of inertia. The rural development programs have not yet been 
in operation long enough to judge the range of potential 
improvement.
The perspective for agriculture in the long-run aside 
from the essentially negative probability that it will decline
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relative to industry, is not clear. However, considering 
Iraq's agricultural resources, availability of capital, and 
the plan now in operation, it is technically possible that 
Iraq might double its total output within the next two de­
cades, and substantially progress toward desirable modifica­
tions in its cro^ patterns. This rate of development will 
exceed the rapid population growth rate that will take place 
during this period, and it is unlikely to be limited by man­
power availability. However, such rapid growth will not be 
automatic or easy. Major factors now limiting Iraq's agri­
cultural development are obvious; The badly salted soil, the 
lack of enough water supply in the major part of the country, 
the lack of investment, aside from irrigation projects, the 
prevalent-illiteracy and ignorance, and the lack of adequate 
organization for securing supplies, financing, and marketing. 
Intimately interrelated as they are, they cannot be overcome 
in isolation.
The crucial deficiencies are in capital, labor, 
management skills, and organization. These are the main fac­
tors accounting for the present extremely low levels of pro­
ductivity in Iraq. The adoption of new techniques and the 
evolution of further improvements are amendable not only in 
capital goods such as machines and chemicals, but also
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extensive outlays devoted to improving the quality of the 
human factor ani the use of technology. As poverty, illiter­
acy, and disease breed mythology, so does the sway of tra­
dition-bound past retard the development of human resources. 
Capital does not seem to be a limiting factor in this proc­
ess, for the problem of investment seems to be one of in­
ability to spend and administrative deficiencies. This is 
the case because up to the present time the administration 
nowhere has shown a capacity to spend the available revenue 
or to manage the proclaimed agrarian reform program.
CHAPTER VII
THE OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
PROBLEMS AND TRENDS
The transition from stagnation to growth requires 
changing all the aspects of feudal society. This is an es- 
esntial condition for the attainment of economic and social 
progress. This transition entails a number of problems:
First, the task confronting the national government of Iraq 
today is the mobilization of the country's potential economic 
resources which represents the decisive step. Secondly, one 
task has to do with the allocation of economic resources in 
their best alternative uses. This implies a shift from the 
earlier policy of austerity and limitation of current con­
sumption for the sake of the highest attainable rates of 
productive investment and growth, and to do so by the most 
productive technological methods. Thirdly, there is the prob­
lem of unemployment and underemployment. For Iraq, as we 
have seen, the existence of unemployed labor, while it pre­
sents a problem, affords also an opportunity for development
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if only the means can be found for harnessing this labor re­
serve to productive employment. Fourthly, the small domestic 
market presents another problem. Without rising incomes in 
the economy as a whole, and in the rural sector, in particular, 
it will not be possible to provide wider markets for indus­
trial products as well as agricultural ones. Finally, newly 
created problems lie partly in plans and policies and in the 
administration and planners, and partly in the great difficul­
ties under which the planners work.
The Availability of Capital
Measures of economic planning cannot be separated 
from the problems of investment. The rate of investment usu­
ally expressed--as the ratio of current investment to total 
output; i.e. the proportion of resources devoted to adding 
to the existing stock of capital, equipment, plant, and build­
ing, and of working capital. In western countries the capi­
tal coefficient or capital-output ratio is calculated as hav­
ing a value of 3 or 4. This means that $3 or $4-worth of 
productive capital will be needed to produce each $l-worth of 
annual output. For some Asiatic countries in post-war years 
this ratio has been calculated as follows: Japan 4.7, Ceylon 
2.6, India 2.3, Malaya 2.3. It was explained that "a better
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use of already existing idle capacity may have been responsi­
ble for the low values found for Ceylon, India and Malaya.
The Iraqi planners calculated this capital-output 
ratio as having a value of 3.6. They also set a target rate 
of increase of income at 8 per cent per year for the plan 
period 1965-69. Further, population increase was estimated 
at 2 per cent per annum. Accordingly, this country will have 
to save and invest 7.2 per cent of its national income merely 
to keep pace with population increase and to prevent the 
standard of living from falling. To maintain a growth rate 
of 8 per cent and hence raise output per head by 6 per cent 
per annum, will require the investment annually of 28.8 per 
cent of its national income. A very high percentage, in terms 
of its magnitude and not in terms of its relation to the na­
tional income. In fact, the rate of total gross domestic in­
vestment was estimated to be 14.8 per cent of the GNP in 1950, 
23 per cent in 1956, and 20 per cent in 1960.^
The government, under the present five-year plan,
1965-69, projected ID 640 million to be spent in a five-year
^United Nations, Programming Techniques for Economic 
Development, Commission for Asia and the Far East (Bangkok, 
1960), p. 11.
2
A. Alnasrawi, op. cit., p. 124.
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period which constituted about 22 per cent of the national 
income. The private sector was expected to make an invest­
ment of 6.8 per cent of the national income. Considering 
the government planned investment of 22 per cent of the na­
tional income, we may say that this requires an annual in­
vestment of ID 128 million compared with an average annual 
investment of about ID 37 million for the past two decades. 
The important question that must be raised is, what are the 
sources of financing this program?
There are three sources of accumulation: (1) profit 
from the public sector--the industrial sector, (2) taxing the 
peasants in one form or another might lead to some accumula­
tion, and (3) various forms of levies attracting capital from 
the people, through taxes, state loans, etc.
These are the three main sources of accumulation 
which constitute the main foundation of industrial as well as 
agricultural development in Iraq.
The Public Sector 
In Iraq, the major industrial enterprises, the banks, 
insurance companies, and commercial concerns, are owned and 
operated by the state. Further, oil revenues which consti­
tute the main source of capital accumulation are received by
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the state.
Since Iraq's petroleum industry is a vital factor in 
the economic development, its influence on the Iraqi develop­
ment must be briefly discussed.
Oil is an exhaustible asset. Even if the exhaustion 
of oil for the world as a whole is not expected at any rate, 
as far as an individual country is concerned, the substantial 
and increasing production makes the danger far from minor. In 
view of this, the income gained from a wasting natural re­
source must be invested in development that will go on bring­
ing in further income after oil has gone.
Iraqi crude oil production rose from 110,000 long tons 
per year in 1927 to about 60 million long tons in 1964, and 
oil royalties rose from ID 0.6 million in 1927 to ID 126 mil­
lion in 1964.3
Greater Iraqi production is technically possible.
Early in 1959, intensive exploration revealed that proven re­
serves amounted to about 3.5 billion long tons, or 14.4 per 
cent of the proved reserves of the Middle East, and it was 
believed that further reserves may yet be found.^
3
Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964, p. 261.
K^. M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 263.
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Higher production, therefore, will depend upon world 
demand and upon distribution facilities. It is true that new 
sources of energy might be discovered, or new sources of oil 
be found elsewhere. There is no reason, however, to believe 
that the demand for oil will decline. On the contrary, the 
world demand for oil now is increasing rapidly, and the 
largest proportion of the increase required will have to be 
supplied from the Middle East,^
Given the pattern of the world oil markets and the 
possibility of greater production in Iraq, the prospects for 
higher production will be affected by the political instability 
in the region and outside the region as well as the policy of 
the oil companies towards production.
In 1963, oil industry produced ID 281 million, or 
about 59 per cent of Iraq's national income. Of this, the 
government of Iraq received ID 110 million as royalties; the 
remainder was taken by oil producing companies. It should be 
recalled that the significance of this transfer can be fully 
appreciated only if it is considered not only in relation to 
national income but also as a share of capital formation.
Yet, vast as it is, oil companies' operations in Iraq cannot
^"The Development of Oil in the Middle East," The 
Economist, June 5, 1965, p. 1163.
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be considered as contributing to the economic development of 
Iraq, except in a financial sense. This is so because oil 
production is carried on by giant concerns that are highly 
organized and well-financed. In a thoroughly planned develop­
ment these concerns moved in with trained and experienced 
managers, a whole corps of engineers, and all the technical 
devices. Local skills were not developed.
The total amount of capital invested in oil industry 
was large; the part of it spent in Iraq was small. The bulk 
of the expenditures involved took place abroad on the impor­
tation of foreign-made machinery and equipments. The stimu­
lating effect on the economy as a whole resulting from such 
investment was slight.
Up to 1952, Iraq was confined to meager royalty pay­
ments on crude, with neither a share in the profits nor in 
the capital and labor returns of refining. None of Iraq's 
petroleum production was refined at home for export. It was 
piped to refineries in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, while 
domestic demand was met by a small plant at Alwand refinery 
or by imports from Abadan (Iran). In 1951 Iraq bought the 
Alwand refinery and the Rafidain marketing facilities and be­
gan the ID 10 million refinery at Doura, a suburb of Baghdad, 
supplied by pipe line from Kirkuk.
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Furthermore, when IPC-Iraq Petroleum Company was 
organized, it monopolized the oil production in Iraq and elim­
inated any chances of another enterprise operating in that 
field. The concession made to IPG and its allied companies 
covered the whole country, except a small territory Iraq could 
claim as its own in the Naft Khanah area, which produced only
200,000 tons a year.
In 1961, the government took away from IPG and its 
associates all unexploited concession (99 per cent of the 
original concession areas), and its decision to form a na­
tional oil company to exploit the seized areas was made. This 
decision led to a complete breakdown in the IPG-government 
negotiations, which had been stalled for nearly three years by 
IPG's rejection of every government demand and by an IPG slow­
down in production which held royalties to the 1961 level.&
Thus the IPG attained exclusive control over the mar­
ket and fenced itself in by government concession, blocking 
further industrial growth while its monopolistic price and out­
put policies minimized the expansion of its own enterprise. 
Since IPG integrated with marketing companies, the amount of
^In 1963, the government announced discovery of huge 
oil reserves, estimated at 3.5 billion tons, in the seized 
areas. T. Petran, o£. cit., p. 31.
248
its profits can be manipulated so as to keep royalty pay­
ments to a minimum.7 M. Hadid, a minister of Finance, 
charged early in 1958 that the 50-50 deal in Iraq allowed 
IPC to make 50 per cent return on its capital cash each year. 
Various accounting practices in effect reduced Iraq's share 
to 35 per cent.^
One of Iraq's most important endeavors is to enter 
the world oil market which is blocked by eight major inter­
national oil companies. Penrose emphasized that "inability 
to sell oil is the enduring difficulty; this makes even the 
most reasonable and reflective Arab passionately believe that 
the companies are exploiting their country in an oppressive 
sense.Further, Penrose added, "the company did in fact 
exploit the country because it received a higher return than 
the minimum it would have been willing to receive and stay 
in business." Penrose concluded that "whether the oil com­
panies are giving up all they could give up without making
R^. F. Mikesell and H. B. Chenery, Arabian Oil 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1949), p. 39.
H^. O'Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1962), p. 313.
^Edith T. Penrose, "Profit Sharing between Producing 
Countries and Oil Companies in the Middle East," Economic 
Journal (June, 1959), p. 247.
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the (oil) operations unprofitable can not be decided; it 
seems i m p r o b a b l e . N o r  had the oil companies provided 
price data concerning their actual sales of oil. "Without 
quite conveying a flat 'No' they have made it known to the 
governments . . . that they are not prepared to provide the 
price data that had been requested; indeed, they have not 
promised to provide any price details at all
Inasmuch as IPC provided neither a market for agri­
cultural produce nor outlets for agricultural surplus labor, 
and was not supplying agriculture with cheap manufactured 
consumer goods and implements, agriculture was forced back 
towards self-sufficiency and the idleness of the structurally 
unemployed was perpetuated. In 1963, IPC employed about
11,000 Iraqis who received about ID 7.45 million.Deter­
mined by Iraqi labor's low rate of pay, and reflecting a high 
degree of mechanization with a correspondingly small size of 
labor force employed, the part of the IPC's total revenue 
that is absorbed by wages is generally small. Thus in Iraq,
^^Ibid., pp. 251-52.
^^"Middle East Oil: A Special Survey," The Economist. 
June 5, 1965, p. 1156.
l^Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964, p.
259.
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oil accounts for over 95 per cent of all exports and about 
59 per cent of the total national income, while the oil in­
dustry employs less than .3 per cent of Iraq's labor force, 
and its local currency expenditure (exclusive of government 
payments) does not constitute any sizable amount in compari­
son with the value of exports.
The small part of the total revenue secured through 
oil production did not serve to widen Iraq's internal market, 
because: (1) Some of the labor involved consisted of for­
eigners who fill managerial and semi-managerial positions and 
whose pay is high. Although they enjoy a high standard of 
living, they are in a position to save a greater part of 
their income which is usually sent abroad. (2) A large por­
tion of their spending is directed towards goods that are 
supplied from abroad.
In the case of Iraqi labor, the situation is differ­
ent. Since most of them are unskilled, they earn wages which 
are far lower than those of foreigners. These wages allow 
for a somewhat better standard of living, but they do not 
leave room for saving. Further, the Iraqi workers are
Lanczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 211-212.
l^ibid., p. 212.
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attracted by the "demonstration effect" which renders for­
eign-made goods far superior. Yet a certain part of their 
purchases are supplied by the company.
Nor does the welfare program, in which the IPC en­
gages and which receives much publicity make a significant 
contribution to the improvement of the living conditions of 
the people in the areas of the company's operation. It is 
said that the IPC has provided relatively better housing for 
its employees, has run some kind of thrift plan or savings 
scheme and the like.^^ Yet as far as the welfare of the 
Iraqi people is concerned, the importance of this type of IPC 
spending tends to be exaggerated. For one thing, it is sim­
ply an aspect of the policy indispensable in order to secure 
necessary labor force and to increase its efficiency.
It is not enough for the company simply to train 
workers and to pay good wages. . . .  the workers must 
be sociologically conditioned to a different mode of 
living if they are not to be spoiled in the process.
It is also a fact that one of the most important con­
tributions to productivity which flows from a higher 
standard of living lies in the improved health that 
is provided by the physical conditions of healthful 
living for themselves and their families.
^^"Oil and Social Change in the Middle East," The 
Economist, July 2, 1955, p. 11.
81 ff.
F. Mikesell and H. B. Chenery, 0£. cit., pp.
252
In any case, the number of people benefiting from these 
facilities constitutes a tiny proportion of the country's 
total population. The IPC, with its long start in produc­
tion, provided only 875 Iraqi families with housing.This, 
indeed, is a small number for a country inhabited by over 
7.5 million people from whom IPC has derived billions of 
dinars of profits I
It was not until the beginning of the 1950's that 
the government of Iraq was able to receive a significant por­
tion of revenue resulting from oil production. Although the 
actual revenue from oil companies does not correspond to the 
proportion of their revenues due to the Iraqi government un­
der the new prevailing terms of the concession, the amount 
currently received by the Iraqi government is large. The 
transfer of revenue to the Iraqi government might be con­
sidered as an indirect contribution to the development of 
Iraq.
However, the contribution of this revenue can be 
judged by the way in which it was used. Fifty per cent of 
oil royalties was devoted to the ordinary budget (current ex­
penditures) . The other 50 per cent was directed towards
Lanozowski; o£. cit., p. 303.
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unproductive investment (with minor exception).
By a simple calculation one can get a rough notion 
of the opportunities lost. Assume that the $2,956 billion 
received by Iraq in the last two decades, 1950-1964, had been 
invested in productive projects at a capital-output ratio, 
say, 3:1, that is, similar to what it is in the United
1 Q
States. According to this assumption, the current income 
of the Iraqi people would be higher than it is today by $1 
billion per year, or by about 50 per cent. Furthermore, if 
the annual oil revenues had been productively invested as 
they came in, the aggregate income increase for the two 
decades would have reached about $3 billion. This does not 
take into account the entire income increase that would have 
resulted from other investment stimulated in turn by the
18
While on one hand, in the earlier stages of devel­
opment there is a possibility that the capital-output ratio 
may be high due to the inadequacy of the labor force and the 
rapid wear and tear of machinery resulting therefrom, on the 
other hand, there are other factors that tend to lower the 
ratio in underdeveloped countries by comparison with the ad­
vanced ones. First, underdeveloped countries have the ad­
vantage of being able to introduce right away most advanced 
and productive equipment without having to carry along old 
machines and equipment with the attendant low productivity. 
Secondly, under conditions of planning, Iraq can make use of 
such available capital goods to the full capacity in contrast 
to the idle capacity which exists in advanced countries. See 
V. V. Bhatt, "Capital-Output Ratios of Certain Industries: A 
Comparative Study of Certain Countries," Review of Economics 
and Statistics (August, 1954), pp. 309 ff.
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investment of the oil receipts, Nor does it involve any as­
sumption of what might have happened if the oil resources 
were exploited for the country's benefit rather than for the 
benefit of oil companies.
The oil sowing policy has been painfully slow in 
bearing fruits. Only the fringes of the country's economic 
resources have been touched. What is spent on economic de­
velopment is considerably less than what is at its disposal, 
and the purposes of such spending are not determined by the 
best interests of the Iraqi people. "The oil revenues sink 
into a bottomless pit of a corrupt administration controlled 
by absentee landlords which by . . . applying its oil royal­
ties to the ordinary budget . . . .  has been able to curtail 
the taxes on the capitalist class, and at the same time to 
enlarge its administrative apparatus
The Board used its resources almost wholly in long- 
range dam and irrigation projects which, while essential to 
economic development, affected hardly at all the immediate 
plight of the masses. Aside from this, the bulk of expendi­
tures were absorbed by construction of roads, buildings, etc.
19Henry A. Atkinson and associates. Security and the 
Middle East, the Problem and its Solution, Proposals Sub­
mitted to the President of the United States (New York, 1954), 
p . 72.
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but contributed little to the emergence of a balanced na- 
20tional economy.^ The government confined its outlays to 
providing sources of "external economies" to free enterprises. 
But since Iraq is still going through the mercantile phase of 
capitalism, and since for all the reasons that we have en­
countered earlier there is little inducement for industrial 
investment on the part of domestic capitalists, such invest­
ment as is facilitated by the expenditures on external econ­
omies, it expands but little the country's market and does 
not lead to the emergence of basic industries--indispensable 
to rapid and lasting economic growth. It is true that these 
expenditures on buildings, roads, and small factories, such 
as textiles, reflect in themselves an improvement in the 
country's economic condition. Yet an improvement attained in 
this way not only does not tend to generate a momentum of its 
own, but it cannot even be counted on to survive its original 
stimulus: the government spending of the oil revenue. "Most 
of the actual spending was on projects which, on the one hand.
20Under the Detailed Economic Plan, 1961-65, for ex­
ample, 25% of gross total investment was allocated for housing 
and buildings (ID 140.1 million), of which ID 40 million was 
allocated to the Ministry of Defence, ID 10 million to army 
officers' housing, ID 8 million for sewage in Baghdad alone, 
and only ID 14 million for popular housing. A. Alnasrawi, op. 
cit., p . 62.
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provided neither permanent nor sizable employment, and, on 
the other hand, did not show tangible results in raising the 
living standard.
Before leaving this topic, a point should be made 
with regard to the other branch of the public sector, that 
is, the industrial sector. Iraqi industrial sector is still 
weak and at its first stage of development. Hence its con­
tribution to capital accumulation is very slight. In 1963, 
public enterprises provided a total revenue equal to ID 120.3 
million at an operating cost of ID 105.1 million. Since the 
operating cost does not include depreciation there is no way 
to find out the exact profitability of these enterprises.
Under the present five-year plan, 1965-69, the public 
sector--excluding oil extraction--was expected to contribute 
to total investment of the plan an amount equal to ID 12 mil­
lion, or about 2 per cent of total planned investment for the
O O
five-year period.
Taxing the Peasants 
With regard to the whole problem under consideration, 
it is important to study the impact of agrarian reform program
^^Ibid., p. 58.
^^Government of Iraq, Law No. 87 for 1965.
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on capital accumulation.
Before 1958, there was one tax imposed on agricul­
tural produce--istihlak, It was a tax on farm products 
brought to the market for sale and was believed to be shifted 
to the consumer through its influence on prices, The re­
ceipts from this tax were very small and declined for several 
reasons. Among these were the administrative difficulties of 
taxing agricultural incomes, Only a small portion of istihlak 
tax was eventually collected in any one year, and the collec­
tion costs were very high. There was no land tax or income 
tax applied to the agricultural sector. Up to 1958, there 
were little improvements in respect to tax evasion and irreg­
ularity in tax collection. For instance, in 1954, of the land 
tax due of ID 1,137,000, only ID 264,000 was eventually 
collected.
In 1961, the istihlak was replaced by an agricultural
O Q
land tax. This tax is levied at a rate ranging from 5 to 
15 per cent depending on the method of irrigation. The tax 
is levied on the average yield of certain products of the 
area unit (donum).
^^Ministry of Finance, The Republic of Iraq's Budget 
in its Third Year (Baghdad: The Government Press, 1961), pp. 
15.
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According to this law, all beneficiaries from the 
agrarian reform are to be exempted from the tax. The govern­
ment intended to deliver this responsibility to the agrarian 
cooperatives which were supposed to absorb the tax and other 
l e v i e s . 24 Further, the law exempted a number of agricultural 
products from the tax. These products were considered as 
necessary for the development of the Iraqi economy and some 
of them were necessary for the consumption of the populace.
Also, certain products were exempted from the tax in order to
2 Sencourage their exports. Among these products are fruits, 
cotton, vegetables, sugar beets, grains, and other similar 
products .
Thus, according to the first exemption, about 210,562 
peasants, or about 48 per cent of the total agricultural hold­
ings escaped tax payments. The second category of exemption 
excluded about 95.8 per cent of the total value of agricul­
tural produce, excluding livestock, for the year 1961.
In 1962/63 and 1963/64, total agricultural land tax 
amounted to ID 711,323 and ID 681,924, respectively. In
2'^ Ibid., pp. 15-16.
25A. Alnasrawi, op. cit., p. 136.
ZGlbid., p. 136.
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other words, land tax has contributed to the total government 
revenue only .6 per cent for the year 1962/63 and .5 per cent 
for the year 1963/64.^7
Yet it is precisely here, where the mobilization of 
potential economic surplus is more complicated. With the pre­
vailing low agricultural productivity, and as a consequence 
low per capita income for the peasant, the most probable re­
sult is that the peasant will save nothing and any increase in 
his income resulting from land distribution will be scattered 
and consumed.
Professor Raup argues that under agrarian reform, 
which is aimed at the creation of a system of privately owned 
and operated peasant farms, any attempt to finance the indus­
trial sector out of agriculture is to invite the failure of 
both p o l i c i e s . 28 jt is argued that investment in agriculture 
by small peasants may easily lead to uneconomic duplication 
of equipment and draft power. The foregone conclusion is that 
measures of state control of the process of capital investment 
in agriculture is necessary if capital is to be efficiently 
used.
27Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964, p
226.
28P. M. Raup, 0£. cit., p. 262
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One method which was used by certain countries is 
that of obligatory deliveries. The long run effects of this 
method are reduced by the weakening of incentives for the in­
tensive agricultural production.29 For in that case, the 
supply curve of agricultural produce is believed to be in­
elastic in relation to prices. The effect of increasing the 
income of the peasants may lead to increases in their demand 
for manufactured goods such as textiles and household goods.
It is often suggested that the most practical way to 
tax income arising in agriculture is to develop a form of 
personal tax or "simple" income tax.20 This device is all 
but useless in the framework of a poor peasant economy. Nei­
ther the assessment of income accruing to nor the collection 
of the tax from the now multiplied number of subsistence 
farmers is a manageable task. The fiscal authorities run into 
strong opposition on the part of the peasants just freed from 
the tax and rent burdens of the pre-reform days.21 More
29See R. Goode, "Taxation of Agriculture," Leading 
Issues in Development. Economics, ed. Gerald M. Meier (New 
York; Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 128.
30
Walter W. Heller, "The Government as Saver," in 
Meier, o£. cit., p. 117.
31
A vast peasant movement in 1961/62, for instance, 
won peasant exemption from the land tax and some enforcement 
of the law on the division of the crop. T. Petran, o£. cit., 
p . 37.
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important is that the very nature of a subsistence agricul­
ture renders the payment of the tax impossible. Since the 
Iraqi agriculture consists of a wide variety of agricultural 
products and markets a minimum amount of its produce, it 
leaves the subsistence peasant with insignificant money re­
ceipts. The traditional method of taxation, that is, the 
collection of taxes in kind, however, is an administratively 
hopeless undertaking.
Not much more promising is the establishment of a 
state agricultural marketing board which pays the producers 
less than the international prices received by the board and
OO
uses the resulting gain for nonagricultural purposes. The 
so-called "opening the scissors," i.e., a shift in relative 
prices in favor of publically-owned industry, is defeated by 
the fact that the subsistence farmer would exchange a minimum 
amount of his produce for manufactured goods. The richer 
farmers, on the other hand, who accumulate some surpluses, 
tend to increase their consumption or to use their surpluses 
for the purchase of livestock or other assets from other 
peasants rather than to trade with the government on terms
32See J. Price Gittinger, Planning for Agricultural 
Development : The Iranian Experience (Washington: National 
Planning Association, 1965), p. 92.
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below what they consider to be the "parity" ratio.
Finally, a price policy favoring agriculture would 
not solve the problem. This strategy may not be sufficient 
to attract a larger flow of agricultural products on to the 
city, since the peasant may be content to take advantage of 
improved terms of trade in getting industrial products for 
the same total quantity of agricultural exports as formerly. 
And because industrial products are scarce, owing to the poor 
development of Iraqi industry and restricted import-possibil- 
ities, even such a price policy may be precluded.
Some economists have argued that the Japanese exper­
ience, where suitable devised tax policy was undertaken, and 
where the government succeeded in raising the marketed surplus 
both relatively and absolutely, might be followed by the pres­
ent backward countries in order to solve their development
OO
problems. This policy, however, needs an efficient adminis­
trative system capable of mobilizing this surplus. Further, 
Japan was able to capture this surplus after it succeeded in 
raising agricultural productivity significantly. Between 1882 
and 1913, the agricultural productivity in Japan was increased
W. H. Nicholls, "The Place of Agriculture in Eco­
nomic Development," Agriculture and Economic Development, C< 
Eicher and L. Witt (eds.) (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 
1964), pp. 40-44.
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by about 80 per cent» Moreover, in Japan, the rapid expan­
sion of agricultural output was accompanied by speedy indus­
t r i a l i z a t i o n  These conditions are lacking in Iraq today.
The importance of this problem obviously differs from country 
to country, depending on the economic and social structure.
Generally speaking, one might conclude that in condi­
tions that prevail in Iraq, where the oil sector is dominant 
in the national economy, the smaller or larger agricultural 
surpluses are of secondary importance from the viewpoint of 
the general investment process. In such conditions, the in­
ternal accumulation of rapidly developing oil industry, agri­
culture should be gradually developed and aided by industrial 
development.
Mobilization of Internal Resources
Between 1949 and April, 1956, public expenditures 
rose ID 39.3 million, at an annual rate of 19.9 per cent, 
while by the end of 1955, imports had increased ID 60.7 mil­
lion, an annual increase of 20.2 per c e n t .35 up to 1964,
34
K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture 
in Modern Japanese Economic Development," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, X (October, 1960) .
178.
3 3K. M. Laqgley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p.
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while exports were declining, imports have continued to rise 
at a rapid rate. Imports of consumer goods for the year 1962 
constituted over 82 per cent of Iraq's imports. And even the 
imports of those consumer goods which can be produced domes­
tically were rising at a rapid rate, such as cotton textiles, 
clothing, paper and the like. This means that investment 
policy still encourages the consumption pattern which through 
the "demonstration effect," permits a pattern of imports with 
a bias towards durable consumer goods and luxuries, such as 
T.V. sets, cars, and household equipment. In 1964, Iraq's 
oil revenue amounted to ID 126.1 million, while Iraq's imports 
were about ID 147 million, and exports constituted an insig­
nificant portion of Iraq's national income. While oil exports 
constituted 95 per cent of Iraq's total exports, non-oil ex­
ports were only 5 per cent (ID 15 million). This is evidence 
that the oil industry and its operations in Iraq do not con­
stitute an integral part of the economy. It makes Iraq com­
pletely dependent on foreign trade with the absence of diver­
sification in the export trade. The gap between imports and 
exports is narrowed by oil royalties which reduced this defi­
cit to about ID 6 million. Table 35 shows the relation be­
tween oil revenue, development expenditures, and imports.
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TABLE 35
VALUE ADDED BY THE OIL SECTOR, DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES,
AND IMPORTS, 1950-64 
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
Year Value Added by Oil Sector
Non-Oil
Exports Imports
Development
Expenditures
1950 12,3 20.0 29.2 m>
1951 25.1 27.0 42.2 3.1
1952 48.7 18.8 47.4 7.8
1953 64.9 19.1 55.5 12.3
1954 73.8 18.0 68.4 20.9
1955 81.1 15,9 90.9 34.0
1956 77.7 13.2 107.2 43.0
1957 67.2 12.9 111.8 57.4
1958 87.7 14.0 99.8 52.2
1959 95.4 11.5 99.4 49.9
1960 104.1 8.0 124.9 45.5
1961 104.4 7.9 133.5 61.2
1962 105.2 19.0 127.7 58.5
1963 120.2 16.7 112.5 53.5
1964 136.3 15.3 146.7 51.8
Source: Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in 
Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 
1967), p. 85; Government of Iraq, Statistical Ab­
stract 1964, op. cit., p. 266.
In 1963, the national income of Iraq amounted to ID 
515.4 million, of which the agricultural sector contributed 
ID 106.5 million. The share of wages and salaries (non­
agricultural sector), in the national income was ID 163.2 
million, while the share of rent, interest, and profits
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amounted to ID 244.8 million.
How far was the fiscal system applied to mobilize 
these resources and accumulate capital for investment? In 
1963, total development expenditures amounted to ID 53.5 mil­
lion (Table 35). In the same year the current expenditures 
of the government were ID 149 million. These current expen­
ditures were met as follows; 50 per cent of oil revenue, or 
ID 55 million, was devoted to the ordinary budget; non-oil 
revenue covered ID 69.5 million, and there was a deficit of 
ID 25 million which was met by external loans.
In recent years the significance of taxes relative 
to the national income was declining. Both the total non-oil 
revenue and the tax revenue have declined in importance in 
relation to the national income. Total non-oil revenue as a 
percentage of national income declined from 26.2 in 1950 to 
19.1 in 1964, while tax revenue as a percentage of national 
income was 14.9 in 1950 and 13.7 in 1964. In comparison with 
other countries, the share of government revenue in national 
income in Iraq is low. It is more than 20 per cent of the 
G.N.P. in Ceylon, Italy, Egypt, Burma, France, the U.S.A. and 
over 30 per cent in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and New
K. Haseeb, "National Income of Iraq 1962-1963," 
op . cit., p . 23.
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Zealand.37
In attempting to achieve a balance between current 
revenue and current expenditure, the government reduced the 
share of development expenditures from 100 per cent of the 
oil revenue in 1950 to 50 per cent in 1960. If this policy 
continues, one might expect a further reduction in the rate 
of capital expenditure.
Table 36 summarizes the fiscal system in Iraq. It 
is apparent that nowhere did current revenue keep pace with 
current expenditure, and it was only possible for the govern­
ment to increase its current expenditure when oil revenue 
started to grow rapidly. The role of foreign trade was pre­
dominant and there was no minimum effort to mobilize internal 
resources. Government revenue is composed of oil royalties 
and imports duties which constituted about two-thirds of total 
revenue in 1964. More than that, development expenditures, 
which have a separate budget, are met by oil revenue. What 
all these factors mean is that the Iraqi economy became com­
pletely dependent on foreign factors, that is, oil revenue 
and import duties, and no attention was paid to the country's 
future in case an interruption of oil flow for international
37a. Alnasrawi, o£. cit., p. 125
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trade would cause this nation to suffer from the lack of com­
modities and the means for financing the economic development
O Q
of the country. Iraq is becoming more and more dependent 
on a single extractive industry, more and more sensitive to 
events abroad.
Although progressive income taxes appear on the books, 
they exist for the most part largely on paper. Despite the 
highly developed tax evasion, the tax rates are very low. In 
1961 the per capita income was ID 57.2 but a married person 
with three children was exempted from paying any income tax 
up to ID 750, an income which is more than thirteen times the 
per capita income. Compared with other countries, this exemp­
tion is very high. This ratio was 1.9 in Mexico, 0.7 in Aus­
tralia, and 1.3 in the United States. More, an income between 
ID 1,000 and ID 1,500 or 17.5 to 26.3 times the per capita 
national income in Iraq was taxed at 5 per cent; the same 
ratio of income to the per capita income would be taxed at 16
38
An example of this interruption is that during the 
Suez crisis, 1956, the pumping stations in Syria were blown 
up. In addition to this damage of the pipelines, the block­
age of the Suez’Canal--1956--oil exports dropped drastically. 
Again, at the time of writing these pages, the government of 
Syria claimed the seizure of Iraqi pipelines and pumping sta­
tions in Syria which led to the cutoff of oil flow. The pres­
ent Middle East crisis which started June 5, 1967, and is 
still without solution seemed to have serious consequences on 
oil revenues.
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per cent in Argentina, A3 per cent in Australia, and A4 per
OQ
cent in the United Kingdom.  ^ These high exemption and low 
income tax rates are accompanied by an administrative diffi­
culty in collection and a significant tax evasion, which 
caused the tax revenues to fluctuate widely from one year to 
another. In the final analysis, however, it is not a problem 
in tax administration. It is determined by the structure of 
the Iraqi society and by the class character of its govern­
ment. As Mason observes, "the elimination of tax avoidance 
on the part of some very large income receivers may require 
changes that run considerably beyond the improvement in ad­
ministration . "40
Little needs to be said at this juncture about for­
eign borrowing. Experience with development in Iraq, follow­
ing the establishment of the Republic of Iraq, that is, since 
1958, showed that Iraq had to borrow capital from foreign 
countries and International Agencies in order to meet the re­
quirements of the new regime. In 1959, for instance, an 
Iraqi-Soviet economic agreement provided both for a Soviet 
loan of ID 117 million and for technical assistance for an
^^A. Alnasrawi, o£. cit., pp. 127-128.
4^E. Mason, Promoting; Economic Development (Claremont, 
California, 1955), p. 60.
TABLE 36
NON-OIL REVENUE, TAX REVENUE, AND CURRENT EXPENDITURES, 1950-1964
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
Year
Non-Oil Revenue
Expenditures
Tax Revenue 
as % of Ex­
penditures
Direct Taxes& Indirect Taxes
Total Tax
Revenue
Total Personal 
Income Tax
Total Import
Duties
1950 38.2 21.8 29.2 74.7 3.4 1.0 18.3 9.0
1951 30.9 23.6 30.8 76.6 3.3 1.1 20.3 10.1
1952 41.0 21.7 44.5 48.8 2.6 1.0 19.4 11.0
1953 32.7 25.8 50.1 51.5 3.4 .8 22.4 14.5
1954 33.4 28.9 53.8 53.7 3.6 .9 25.3 16.3
1955 50.0 31.9 55.3 57.7 3.8 2.1 28.2 19.4
1956 42.1 32.6 70.3 46.4 4.3 1.3 28.3 19.1
1957 47.2 37.0 73.9 50.1 4.7 1.2 32.2 20.8
1958 49.6 36.2 79.2 45.7 5.7 1.4 30.5 18.8
1959 46.4 35.5 100.2 35.4 6.2 1.8 29.4 19.4
1960 54.1 41.6 114.3 36.4 7.0 2.6 36.6 24.1
1961 62.6 47.1 119.2 39.5 8.4 2.6 38.1 23.9
1962 65.2 47.9 128.4 37.3 11.6 3.0 36.2 22.9
1963 69.5 47.3 149.0 31.7 12.7 3.5 34.6 21.5
1964 78.3 56.0 141.6 39.5 14.9 3.6 41.1 25.5
^Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes are part of the Tax Revenue shown in the
lo
o
second column.
Source: Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economie Development in Iraq (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), Tables 22 and 23, pp. 166-167.
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industrial program. In 1963, an ID 90 million interest-free 
loan was made available by Kuwait, a Swedish loan of ID 15 
million was granted for Swedish capital equipment, the Fed­
eral Republic of Germany has loaned ID 13 million, and loans 
have been granted by the Export-Import Bank.41 In 1966, the 
World Bank approved an ID 8.2 million loan to Iraq.4^ Table 
37 shows Iraq's foreign loans.
As a backward country, Iraq needs everything: water 
control, clean water for drinking, better farming, sewage, 
drainage systems, educational facilities, health services, 
road construction, development of industry, and so on. There­
fore, one might argue that the emergence of the new regime 
would call for greater investment expenditures, and as a con­
sequence, oil royalties are not sufficient to meet the new 
requirements. It is equally true that one might say that the 
increase in the new expenditures was not used for the above 
mentioned purposes. Official data do not show a significant 
increase in development expenditures, but there was an in­
crease in the current expenditures.
41u. S. Department of Agriculture, o£. cit., p. 69
1966.
42IBRD, Press Release, Washington, D. C., July 8,
TABLE 37
IRAQI GOVERNMENT DEBT, 1960-66 
(millions of Iraqi dinars)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total
Oil Companies 4.5 .4 4.9
Kuwait Loan —  — —  — —  — 30.0 30.0 30.0 —  — 90.0
Soviet Loan 1.6 6.7 16.5 25.0 32.5 34.7 —  — 117.0
Agricultural Surplus 
Agreement (P.L. 480) 1.6 4.2 3.9 9.7
Export-Import Bank Loans .9 2.4 —  - 3.3
Swedish Loan -  - -  — -  - 15.0 —  - -  - —  — 15.0
F. R. of Germany -  - —  - 13.0 -  - —  - -  - 13.0
IBRD Loan —  — 8.2 8.2
Grand Total 6.1 7.1 16.5 84.6 67.6 71.0 8.2 261.1
N5
N5
Sources: U. S. Department of Agriculture, The Agricultural Economy of Iraq 
(Washington, D. C., Economic Research Service, 1965), p. 69; IBRD, 
Press Release, Washington, D . C ., July 8, 1966; Central Bank of 
Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin.
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Between 1960 and 1965, actual development expendi­
tures amounted to ID 270.5 million which were almost equal to 
the above funds borrowed from abroad (ID 261.1 million), while 
in the same period, Iraq received ID 710 million as oil 
royalties. Accordingly, one can hardly justify the need for 
such foreign borrowing, the impact of which would only be to 
enable the government to increase its unproductive expendi­
tures lavishly and to increase its imports rapidly without 
any countervailing increase in exports.
We have thus far surveyed the forces impeding capital 
formation and productive investment in both the rural and the 
urban sectors of the Iraqi economy. One can conclude that; 
with any moderate calculation, there can be hardly any doubt 
that 25 per cent and even 30 per cent of national income 
could be invested without any reduction of mass consumption. 
What is required for this purpose is the fullest attainable 
mobilization of the potential capital that is currently gen­
erated by the country's economic system. If the government 
clings to a system of financing development projects out of 
oil revenue, the latter, if efficiently administered, will 
generate a sizable amount of capital which could finance both 
agriculture and industry without tears. In fact, an invest­
ment of ID 100 million a year, and even more, financed by
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oil royalties would constitute above 25 per cent of Iraq's 
national income which is considerably high. Meanwhile the 
government should turn to internal sources besides the oil 
sector to generate the required funds to meet its current ex­
penditures. Tax reform, therefore, is inevitable if a rapid 
and sustained economic growth is to be achieved.
It is needless to stress that such a mobilization of 
the potential surplus would not operate in a vacuum. It is 
bound to meet with formidable difficulties, the most important 
of which is the prevailing political condition in the Middle 
East. The emergence of a national government, the creation 
of Israel, the atmosphere of a danger which was created and 
re-created in order to slow down Iraq's growth rate, military 
assistance from abroad, and the tension within the country 
compelled the government to devote considerable portions of 
the national income to the building up and maintenance of 
large military establishments. The defence expenditure in­
creased from 33.2 per cent of government expenditures in 1950 
to 40.1 per cent (ID 9.7 million to ID 56.8 million) in 
1964.^^ Put in other terms, the percentage of national income 
devoted to military outlays by the country shows an increase
43
Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964, p.
224.
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from 6.6 per cent to 13.9 per cent respectively. It should 
be recalled that the significance of this burden can only be 
fully appreciated if it is considered not in relation to 
total national income but as a share of capital accumulation 
available for investment. Indeed, one year's military ex­
penditure, 1964, is equal to or exceeds Iraq's total in­
vestment in 1951-55 inclusive. The inescapable necessity for 
the maintenance of military establishments would force the 
country to use a larger share of what would enable it to
emerge from its present state of backwardness.
The Problem of Unemployment
In Iraq, unused labor force and low level of national 
income as well as a correspondingly small volume of capital 
accumulation, raises a conflict between the structure of in­
vestment leading to maximum growth of the output and that 
which is conducive to a rapid growth of employment. Since the
Iraqi agricultural worker has on the average an effective em­
ployment of about 50 per cent, the agrarian reform policy 
should be aimed at creating employment opportunities in both 
agriculture and industry to absorb those unemployed.
Statistics released by the government of Iraq indi­
cated that the private industrial firms employed 73,116
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persons with an annual wage bill of ID 20 million while the 
public concerns employed 44,332 persons at an annual wage 
cost of ID 12 million, in the first quarter of 1966.^^ Ac­
cordingly, Iraq's industrial sector employed only 117,448 
workers.
According to Iraq's Five-Year Plan, 1965-69, the 
creation of about 261,483 jobs during the plan's period was 
projected, of which 144,465 jobs were planned to be created 
in the agricultural sector and 40,792 in the industrial sec­
tor. The planners recognize that the present gross invest­
ment will not be sufficient to absorb all the present idle 
manpower in Iraq. This total employment of 261,483 was ex­
pected to be realized by applying intensive methods of produc­
tion (intensive use of capital). This is due to the nature 
of projects to be undertaken according to this plan, which 
are mainly capital intensive projects.
Migration from agriculture and the rapid development 
of industry are general economic truths. The process of pop­
ulation shifts from sectors of low productivity to those of 
higher labor productivity leads to an increase in the social
44
Middle East Economic Digest (London), September 23,
1966.
^^Govemment of Iraq, Law No. ^  for 1965.
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productivity, that is, a rise in national income. The pres­
ent industrial labor force is small, and there is a consider­
able disparity between Iraq's agricultural and industrial pro­
ductivity. At this point one might say that a rapid economic 
growth seems to require an increased industrial employment as 
rapidly as possible.
The transfer of labor from agriculture to the capital­
ist sectors of the economy, however, is a sound economic pol­
icy, if this can contribute to economic growth by powering 
labor inputs in basic investment (e.g., in communication and 
power spheres) which raise the productivity of labor in both 
agriculture and industry, and at the same time, increase the 
productivity of the additional workers. The building of rail­
ways, surface roads, and electric power installations seem to 
make possible the mobilization of a considerable portion of 
labor force, enabling the achievement of a basic turning point 
in labor productivity in the whole national economy.
M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, pp.
225-6.
^^The remark of W. Rostow: "The development of a
cotton-textile industry sufficient to meet domestic require­
ments has not generally improved a sufficient impulse in it­
self to launch a self-sustaining growth process." Railway 
building in the past, he things, was far more important. His 
search for an explanation is in terms of the effect on demand
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Moreover, migrant labor may enable in the long run the ex­
pansion of the industrial growth and the fundamental techni­
cal reconstruction of the whole economy, assuming the amount 
of machinery and equipment made available.
At present, the slow growth of the industrial sector 
makes it unnecessary to encourage rural migration on large 
scale. The planner's problem is more likely to be that of 
finding suitable employment for the already urban unemployed 
and the spontaneous increase in urban population rather than 
in finding means of encouraging labor migration. In addition, 
most migrants, who were freed for outside agriculture not 
through increases in productivity per man-hour or through pro­
ductivity increases per acre; rather, they were induced by 
the pull factor, are not prepared for factory work. Ignorant, 
illiterate peasants are worse prepared for work in factories 
with complicated techniques. It also will bring about a cer­
tain disproportion in housing construction. The housing 
shortage, long trips to work, etc., may make it difficult to 
raise the qualifications of additional workers and may lower 
labor productivity.
occasioned by the growth of some "leading sector." "The 
Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth," Economic Journal, LXVI 
(March, 1956), p. 44.
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Accordingly, current planning policy should pay at­
tention to considerations such as those which lead to higher 
agricultural productivity achieved largely by devices other 
than labor-saving techniques. In Iraq, the under-employment 
of manpower in agriculture can be matched by underutilization 
of arable land. In certain cases the choice of creating new 
jobs is to increase the intensity of agriculture. This may 
raise the demand for agricultural labor, and may at the same 
time relieve the problem of underemployment. It will thus 
dispose of the problem of a superfluous agricultural popula­
tion over a long period. Preferred investments which enable 
a quantitative rise in breeding and an increase in the cul­
tivated area may play an important role here. This type of 
investment is of particular importance for Iraq, where irri­
gation can effect a revolution in the manner of cultivation, 
and may cause an increased demand for agricultural labor 
force (e.g., irrigation makes possible changing over from bar­
ley to rice cultivation and to extend summer cultivation). 
Under such circumstances, aggregate agricultural output can 
be at any rate in the early stages, rapidly increased by tak­
ing into cultivation previously uncultivated areas, although 
even in such cases major difficulties are caused by lack of 
agricultural implements, fertilizers, and livestock.
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Agriculture becomes subsidized by industry. This is exactly 
as it should be, except that these subsidies do not lead to 
an adequate expansion of agricultural output.^8 pn the long 
run this problem can be solved through a considerably higher 
stage of economic development, namely, through industrial­
ization .
Some Problems of Investment
It is interesting at this point to see whether Iraq 
would use capital- or labor-intensive methods of production 
in its development policy. In other words, should development 
policy aim at maximizing total production or total employment?
The Iraqi planners emphasized that future development 
policy should pay attention to considerations that would lead 
to maximized employment by the application of intermediate 
technology that employs relatively small amounts of capital 
and relatively more of labor.
The question of whether to use labor- or capital-in­
tensive techniques is very frequently treated as a foregone
48The combined expenditure of the Directorate General 
of Irrigation for the years 1956 and 1957 was ID 807,000; its 
revenue, on the other hand, was ID 39,000 or 4.5 per cent of 
its expenditure. A. Alnasrawi, op, cit., p. 135.
^^Government of Iraq, Law No. 87 for 1965.
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conclusion. It is argued that since in underdeveloped coun­
tries there exists a large supply of unemployed or underem­
ployed labor force, the most labor-intensive methods should 
be chosen so as to secure a rapid increase of employment. 
Nurkse, for instance, emphasizes that in underdeveloped coun­
tries, "the same capital intensity as in economically ad­
vanced countries should be neither desired nor permitted. 
Nurkse's argument is based on the assumption that the trans­
fer of rural surplus labor force in underdeveloped countries 
from the state of disguised unemployment to some alternative 
occupation would result in an increase of total output.
This notion is derived from the classical theory of 
production where labor is abundant and capital is scarce; 
efficient production here calls for the most labor-intensive 
techniques.It also implies that certain industries must 
be chosen for development which require relatively little cap­
ital compared with labor (a low capital-labor ratio). Accord­
ingly, in the first stage, light industries are preferable to 
heavy industry equipped with modern m a c h i n e r y . 52 Thus, a
Nurkse, o^ . cit., p. 45.
Higgins, 0£. cit., p. 668.
52Maurice Dobb, Economic Growth and Underdeveloped 
Countries (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 46.
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theory of stages of development was constructed. First, a 
country concentrates on simple labor-intensive techniques and 
on light industries which by nature require relatively little 
capital and have a low capital-labor and capital-output ratio. 
Secondly, when the country accumulates capital and surplus 
labor is drawn into employment, the country can move slowly 
towards more advanced techniques and develop the more capital- 
intensive-type of industry. Yet, "this theory is essentially 
'static'; it is relevant to conditions ruling at a point of 
time and is accordingly not very suitable as a basis for de­
velopment planning."53
It excludes some important factors in growth. If 
these crucial factors are taken into consideration, it is 
possible that the development policy which makes employment 
and output large today is not necessarily the one that will 
maximize the growth-potential of the economy tomorrow. A 
development policy aimed at maximizing the latter, which might 
be at the expense of giving an immediate yield and employment 
smaller than under an alternative policy, will lead to higher 
output and employment, and hence consumption, later.
This conclusion depends on what determines the growth
53
B. Higgins, o^ . cit.
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potential of the economy, and what are the limitations to 
realize this potential? If the resources available can be 
directed towards widening these limitations "bottleneck," 
they will evidently contribute very much more to promote 
growth than if they are used in any other way.
Iraq's main resources are petrochemical operations, 
natural gas, and agriculture. National income can be improved 
only by greater utilization of these resources. As was shown 
in previous chapters, the failure of agricultural output to 
expand has made it more difficult for the rest of the economy 
to maintain a high growth rate.
In the industrial sector, Iraq has developed its oil 
resources which provided commodities for export, and hence 
foreign exchange, which was the only source of financing the 
economic development in Iraq. The Board did not devote any 
serious attention to Iraq's chemical resources. Industry 
based on chemical resources relies on local as well as inter­
national markets. World demand for chemicals is rising and 
Iraq is better situated to compete in the markets of the 
Middle East and the Far East.
Through the development of export market, domestic 
income is enlarged. According to a number of in­
dependently undertaken calculations, there can be 
hardly any doubt that the productivity of new
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chemical industries will be as high as that of the
oil industry.54
It follows that the implication is that whatever in- 
vestment-potential the country has, investments should be 
concentrated upon methods and lines of production which will 
increase this investment-potential still further. Insofar 
as the growth-potential lies in these crucial sectors, the 
possible growth rate in the future will be higher the larger 
the proportion of current investment that is directed towards 
expanding these sectors of the economy. This is for the 
simple reason that one will have a larger output and capital 
with which to construct and equip new factories and power 
plants and steel mills. Even in the case of agriculture and 
consumer goods, capital-intensive techniques seem to be 
favored, because these are more productive, and will by 
achieving a higher level of productivity per worker make the 
surplus product larger, thereby enabling a larger labor force 
to be employed in other sectors of the economy.
A high growth rate policy of this kind will involve 
a conflict in the very near future between the requirements 
of growth and a quick expansion of employment and consumption. 
Lange distinguished between the methods of production which
54
K. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, p. 226.
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employ much more labor and those which are more productive 
in the sense of contributing more to the increase of national 
income. In the view of Lange, if planning is made only for a 
short period, then labor-intensive techniques are the best 
because they lead most rapidly to the absorption of unemploy­
ment or underemployment. But, according to Lange, if a 
longer view of development is considered, then investment in 
methods as well as industries will lead to a more rapid in­
crease in national income.
Indeed, if one considers the development policy from 
the long-run angle, this conflict will disappear, because a 
high investment policy will soon make possible a more rapid 
expansion not only of investment but of employment and con­
sumption as well. It may well be that, when starting from 
a low level, an initially larger amount of resources devoted 
to development will "pay off" very rapidly even in terms of 
available consumption, so that consumption will increase too. 
In fact, the reluctance of the Iraqi government to reduce its 
present consumption, which presumably, explains why it is un­
willing to devote a larger percentage of the national income
^^Oscar Lange, Economic Development, Planning, and 
International Cooperation, Three Lectures delivered by Lange 
at the Central Bank of Egypt in 1961 (Cairo: Central Bank of 
Egypt, 1961), pp. 21-22.
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to development, could conceivably mean that the present gen­
eration will receive, over its lifetime, less consumption.
Under conditions of Iraq, labor-intensive methods may 
prove to be more expensive than capital-intensive methods.
The transfer of the worker from the rural sector to the in­
dustrial sector must be accompanied by provision of industrial 
equipment sufficient at least to enable him to produce his 
own subsistence. Further, the transfer of workers from the 
villages to the industrial sectors requires expenditure on 
housing, hospitals, schools, social services, etc., which 
might double the amount needed for the setting up of an addi­
tional worker. Furthermore, the industrial workers have to 
be provided with food, clothing, and the like, that corres­
pond with the prevailing standard of living in the country. 
This is quite higher than their previous standard of living 
in the rural sector, and since the underemployed worker does 
not bring his food with him, the need of providing consumer 
goods for the workers employed on the new projects implies 
that the expansion of the industrial sector calls for a 
greater expansion of the agricultural sector. Thus, with 
labor-intensive techniques, there is no prospect to increase 
agricultural production. This, in fact, will check further 
expansion of the industrial sector, and consequently lower
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the growth rate of the economy.56
The Domestic Market
In 1963, the population of Iraq was about 7-7.5 mil­
lion, and per capita income, excluding oil royalties, was ID 
50. Looking at the sectorial distribution of income, one can 
get a rough idea about the high disparity in income distri­
bution. Agriculture, with population of 5 million, produced 
ID 80.4 million (constant prices), or about 16.4 per cent of 
the national income in 1963. The wage bill of the industrial 
workers (in both private and public concerns) was ID 19.5 
mil lio n.T hus  both rural population and the industrial 
workers have received about 20 per cent of the national in­
come in 1963. On the other hand, salaries and wages of the 
government employees have accounted for ID 78 million (15
C O
per cent of the national income)
Accordingly, about 6.6 million of Iraq's population 
received 35 per cent of the national income, while the share 
of interest, rent, and profits was 65 per cent. It follows
^^See C. Kindleberger, Economic Development (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), 253 ff.
^^Government of Iraq, Statistical Abstract 1964, p.
109.
58Ibid., p . 73.
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that the market provided by the majority of people is re­
stricted by low incomes, especially agricultural incomes.
Economists maintain that one of the reasons why 
agricultural growth is a necessary concomitant to industrial 
expansion is to provide a market for the output of manufac­
tured goods. Our previous analysis showed that the agricul­
tural sector was not successful in filling this role. The 
greatest share of total expenditures by peasants is still ac­
counted for by food. Between 67 and 71 per cent of total 
consumption expenditures is devoted to food compared with 
20 to 30 per cent in advanced countries. With the exception 
of textiles and low grade consumer goods, the Iraqi agricul­
tural sector has provided only a negligible market for indus­
trial products. Expenditures by peasants upon industrial 
products constitute a tremendous potential market for domes­
tically produced manufactured goods when their incomes rise.
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The importance of agriculture in Iraq was recognized 
in the earlier planning efforts since the poor performance 
of the agricultural sector was the major cause for dragging 
economic development. These efforts were not successful, 
however, because there was no all-out systematic attenpt 
to improve agriculture. Instead, efforts for improvement 
were limited to the construction of dams and flood-control 
projects. Poverty, inequality, and social immobility, despite 
investment in agriculture, continued to be outstanding fea­
tures of the agricultural sector of the economy. Productivity 
was extremely low and the cultivated portion of the total 
land area was only 12 per cent. The water supply was inade­
quate. Feudalistic small-scale peasant farming predominated. 
Only 3.5 per cent of the peasant families (about 2,680 fami­
lies) possessed land, and some 739,000 families were landless.
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Evaluation of Past Plans
The Development Board was created in 1951 to be the 
instrument by which the social and economic problems were to 
be solved. But, as we have already seen, the Board failed to 
achieve any of its economic and social objectives. The Board 
had been guided by a development strategy which emphasized 
total dependence on royalties derived from the oil industry 
to develop agriculture and not industry and stipulated that 
Iraq should obey the "rule" of free trade, that is, not at­
tempt to industrialize through the use of protection and so 
on. This strategy brought nearly complete disappointment and 
failed to lessen the economy's dependence on the oil sector.
The first Five-year Plan drawn by the Board, based 
on a strategy which emphasized government passivity in indus­
trial development and reliance on private capital, was so 
poorly drawn and implemented that Iraq actually had no eco­
nomic development at all. When the second Five-year Plan was 
introduced in 1956, both its targets and its economic instru­
mentalities showed the influence of Lord Salter strategy for 
economic development which was based on the development of 
agriculture with no attempt to develop industry.
Iraq is an agricultural country. The Board was guided 
by a development policy which emphasized that the development
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of Iraq must be generated or stimulated by diffusing capital, 
institutions, and foreign technical assistance to Iraq from 
western countries. Consequently, neither dam building nor 
flood-control projects alone could solve the dilemma of Iraq's 
agriculture. This lop-sided development program, dependent 
on investment of oil revenues and centered on agricultural 
development has failed to evoke a strong response from the 
non-oil sector to the development stimulus and has failed to 
achieve major structural change in the economy. Thus, in the 
pre-1958 period, the Iraqi economy was characterized by the 
following features: First, in structural terms, Iraq kept 
more than two-thirds of the economically active population 
in agriculture, but agriculture produced only about 20 per 
cent of the total national income. Rural unemployment and 
underemployment were high and farm income barely rose at all.
Second, the industrial growth in Iraq has been slow. 
All but a small percentage of industrial output has gone to 
import-replacing goods; nothing has flowed into international 
trade to earn foreign exchange. Most industries employ less 
than 10 workers, and there are no economies of scale. In­
dustry (excluding oil extraction) has constituted only nine 
per cent of the national income and employed about 3 per cent 
of the labor force.
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Finally, although national income increased in statis­
tical terms, both in the aggregate and per capita, the dis­
tribution of the social gains has been very unequal. A sur­
vey of income distribution in Iraq showed that rural per cap­
ita income was less than one-eighth that of the urban per 
capita income and that less than 5 per cent of the population 
has received nearly 60 per cent of the national income.
These three problems described above combine to 
inhibit the structural economic changes that have been the 
main features of the western countries which achieved economic 
growth in the past. In today's developed countries, economic 
development involved a structural change. The proportion of 
population in agriculture was reduced and the non-agricultural 
productivity was raised. Simultaneously, agricultural pro-
i
ductivity was raised and consequently the farmer's income in­
creased. In Iraq, these shifts have barely begun, and nowhere 
has a significant structural change taken place. Furthermore, 
early in 1958, agriculture and industry together generated 
only 29 per cent of the national income produced in Iraq.
Iraq, experiencing an extremely high rate of import 
with no offsetting increase in its exports, lost large amounts 
of its foreign exchange. The development of the Iraqi economy 
from 1950 showed that the level of income has been connected
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with the expansion of oil industry. It was only during that
period in which there was increased importing capacity. The
1950-1958 period is marked by a substantial increase in the 
relative importance of external demand as a determinant of 
the size of import. As a matter of fact, whereas oil export 
constituted 97 per cent of Iraq's total exports, Iraq's non- 
oil exports accounted for only 3 per cent, while imports in­
creased by 367 per cent. Expressed differently, Iraq's ex­
ports constituted 3 per cent of Iraq's national product, while 
imports constituted 27 per cent.
Statistics on Iraq's foreign trade show that non-oil 
exports were declining since 1950. In 1950, exports were ID 
20 million, or about 14 per cent of the national income, but 
in 1958, they were ID 14 million, or 2.7 per cent of the na­
tional income.
Economically, foreign investment went only into oil 
extraction as a kind of "enclave" of the western economies, 
detached from the rest of the Iraqi economy, seeking their 
markets abroad and sending their profits abroad. In con­
sequence, the Iraqi economy became a one-sided, oil-exporting 
economy. Equally significant is the fact that the profits 
of the oil industry were not used for industrial investment, 
which is the real dynamic facter of modern economic develop-
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ment. This is another reason why Iraq was not capable of 
following the classical capitalist path of economic de­
velopment .
In fact, the growth of the oil industry which con­
tributed indirectly to the Iraqi economy by providing the 
government of Iraq with some oil royalties has discouraged 
the government from taking any minimum measures to raise 
revenues from non-oil sectors. Thus, between 1950 and 1962, 
while current expenditures rose from 20 per cent to 28 per 
cent of national income, non-oil revenue declines from 26 
per cent to 15 per cent respectively.
In the midst of Iraq development difficulties, the 
new regime, which came to power following the revolution in 
1958, proclaimed economic and social reform which proposed 
to sweep away all the fetters to such development. It 
emphasized planning, considered economic growth as the na­
tional objective, and sought to achieve self-sustaining de­
velopment. The new regime, described as anti-feudal, con­
sidered agrarian reform an objective necessity in Iraq. 
Abolition of the existing land tenure system and the freeing 
of the peasants from the various forms of feudal and semi- 
feudal dependence were considered indispensable to progress 
and to combating poverty and ignorance among the peasant
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masses.
Consequently, a program was worked out which would 
provide economic growth and an equitable distribution through 
a fundamental reorganization of the agricultural sector. It 
was assumed that oil royalties would provide the capital for 
investment in the agricultural sector while the latter, newly- 
structured through agrarian reform measures, would be the 
main engine of economic development. The planned result of 
agrarian reform measures was primarily the replacement of a 
system of functionless landownership by a system of small- 
peasant proprietors. Such a change was expected to enhance 
social justice and to increase social integration. From the 
point of view of economic development, an assumption was made 
that the main effect of agrarian reform would be the loosen­
ing of the hold of tradition on agriculture and on rural life 
in general. The peasant would develop an interest in improv­
ing his own land and in obtaining higher yields.
Quantitatively, the agrarian reform was supposed to 
affect a large area of the country, both absolutely and rela­
tively. This reform was to be supplemented by various other 
government measures such as the following: (1) The construc­
tion of dams and irrigation and flood-control projects which 
will lead to the development of large-scale intensive fijirming,
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the use of mechanization and chemicals, and extensive settle­
ment; (2) the building of roads and increased motor trans­
port; (3) rural electrification; and (4) the provision of 
educational facilities, medical care centers, and clean drink­
ing water. These measures, as proposed, were impressive and 
seemed to constitute a wide-scale agrarian reform for solving 
Iraq's problem of low productivity with, the attendant evils 
of poverty, ignorance, and wasted man-power.
The progress actually achieved, however, shattered 
this initial optimism. First, the implementation of the 
program was extremely slow. The 1958 Agrarian Reform Law 
stipulated a program to be carried out over a five-year pe­
riod. But even after a period of eight years, that is by 
1966, only 6,594,672 donums were expropriated instead of the 
11,436,000 donums planned. In addition, during this eight- 
year period only about 2 million donums were distributed, 
some of which were part of the State domain (Miri Sirf) and 
therefore not subject to expropriation. Thus, about 80 per 
cent of the peasant families remained landless. If the land 
expropriation and distribution continues at the same pace, 
the expropriation will not be completed until 1972 and the 
land distribution will not be fully implemented until the 
early part of the next century.
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Second, while the agrarian reform law tended to weaken 
the economic and political position of the landlord and to 
strengthen the legal status of the tenant since the landlord 
was now forbidden to impose feudal duties and levies and forced 
to abide by rent ceiling and three-year leases, the landlord's 
position was not weakened in other aspects. He was allowed 
to retain large holdings many times greater than that of the 
average peasant holding and he was given prior choice on the 
land he wished to retain. This led to a refusal of the land 
granted on the part of some of the peasants since it was un­
suitable for cultivation. It also brought about a movement 
of peasants from one district to another which, in turn, in­
duced the authorities to enact a law prohibiting such move­
ment. Also, the landlord was allowed to retain the bulk of 
the farm machinery and implements. Finally, there were ex­
ceptions and ambiguous stipulations in the law that would be 
to the advantage of the landlord.
Third, the agrarian reform law provided for compen­
sation to the landlords and established high prices for the 
land sold to the peasants. The State collects the money from 
the peasants and turns it over to the landlords. In addition, 
the landlords were permitted to lease land from the state 
even though the law gives this right only to small peasants.
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What is the explanation for these results of the 
Iraqi agrarian reform program? The answer is of a political 
and social nature, as well as economic.
In the course of development of Iraq, faced by a 
narrow and restricted home market and lack of industrial en­
vironment, the rich class succeeded in penetrating into the 
agricultural sector by acquiring land or by providing capital 
to introduce pump irrigation. Historically, the establish­
ment of the pre-conditions of economic growth in the West was 
the work of the middle class which destroyed the institutions 
of feudalism and created a political structure capable of 
serving its own interest. In Iraq, however, a sizable and 
important middle class has had no chance to develop and exert 
effective political influence. Among the reasons for this 
failure, reasons connected with the internal make-up of the 
business class itself which was connected with its traditional 
attitude toward seeking greater social status and economic 
security by reinvesting its earnings in land rather than long­
term productive facilities. Thus, the business class has 
sought the protection of and joined forces with, rather than 
attempting to destroy the feudal elements in Iraq. This group, 
therefore, not only failed to urge or support effective 
agrarian reform, but opposed any call for it.
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Upon coming to power, the new regime declared that 
the new government aimed at modifying the structure of power 
in order to create a modern national, independent, industrial­
ized society. This was to be achieved, at the top of the 
socio-political structure, by the abolition of the monarchy 
and the establishment of the Republic of Iraq, the elimination 
of the traditional political power, and its replacement by a 
new type composed of army officers, economists, and engineers. 
At the bottom of the pyramid, this reform was to be imple­
mented by agrarian reform which sought to weaken the economic 
basis of the landowning class. It also planned to increase 
the number of small landowners and redirect capital invest­
ment to industry.
The existing land system was established under the 
British rule in the first half of this century. The continued 
Iraqi backwardness can be in part attributed to a persistence 
of feudal elements and habits. The land system was con­
sidered as the product of the colonial rule which, rooted in 
the past, did not seem to meet the present requirements for 
growth. The system, however, was deeply rooted in customs and 
traditions, which retained a hold on the majority of the 
people, and led to an attitude hostile to change. Thus, the 
new regime directed a heavy blow at the feudal class by trying
299
to deprive it of political power. However, the economic in­
fluence of this class was not completely eliminated, only 
somewhat limited. The feudal class used this influence to 
bring pressure to bear on the government. Thus, soon after 
the enactment of the agrarian reform law, the feudal class 
was called upon by the military Governor to manage and oper­
ate its big lands. It is also true that the rich class con­
tinued to exert influence on the development of the country, 
relying on its economic strength and the support of foreign 
power.
In analysis of the prevailing confusion about the 
position of the national middle class (composed of the free 
army officers, professors, and foreign-educated intellectuals) 
a wide divergence in political and economic philosophy is re­
vealed. On the one hand, national middle class sought to 
carry out the agrarian reform within limits which would enable 
it to abolish or reduce the absolute land rent paid to the 
landlord. It wanted the agricultural surplus to flow into 
its hands as a result of capital investment in agriculture.
On the other hand, the national middle class, fearing that a 
wide-scale agrarian reform might lead to further socializa­
tion and nationalization, which might run counter to its in­
terest, applied a strong pressure to stop further
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nationalization in Iraq. The military regime had earlier 
shown its hand by nationalizing the banks, insurance companies, 
and 32 of the largest industrial and commercial companies.
This constituted the public sector as against the private one. 
Recently, there was a retreat from this policy. The Iraqi 
government has given assurance that there will be no new acts 
nationalizing property which is now private.
With the implementation of agrarian reform program, 
one expects that investment in agriculture should increase 
rapidly due to the emergence of new needs and to the need to 
undertake a massive rural development. Under the new regime 
rule, however, there was a deliberate reduction of expenditure 
on agriculture. There was a reduction in the rate of spending 
on projects such as irrigation from 45 per cent in 1957-58 to 
28 per cent in 1959-60. Again, under the Detailed Economic 
Plan, 1961/62-1965/66, agriculture received the lowest share 
of the total planned expenditures. While the Detailed Econ­
omic Plan estimated that agricultural development requires 
ID 389.5 million, only ID 112.9 million or 29 per cent of the 
total was planned to be spent on agricultural development.
This is much less than the proportionate allocation to indus­
try which was 76 per cent of the funds needed for industrial 
development.
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Agrarian reform has a double purpose: as a social 
system, it must release the peasant from the exploitation to 
which he has been subjected under the feudal system: as an 
economic pattern of agricultural production, it must provide 
for the basic needs of the country. The social aim is partly 
achieved; the economic aim seems at first rather unsuccessful. 
The failure of the agricultural development policy is demon­
strated by the fact that the agricultural output was declining 
rather than rising. The contribution of this sector has de­
clined in both absolute and relative terms. In 1953, agri­
cultural output was ID 85.7 million, while it was ID 80.4 
million in 1963. Thus the political revolution and the agrar­
ian reform which accompanied the military revolution in 1958 
have not changed the pattern of income distribution in favor 
of the peasant. Nor has agrarian reform achieved one of its 
main purposes, that is an increasing flow of surplus to the 
towns. Soon after the enactment of the 1958 Agrarian Reform, 
the peasants did increase their consumption and hence reduced 
the landlord's share of crop which went to the towns as sur­
plus product. As a result, internal trade declined, a decline 
assisted by a deliberate landlord campaign to sabotage pro­
duction. This reduction in the surplus affected the capital­
ists as landowners and merchants and also middle and small
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merchants, many of whom, unable to perceive their long term 
interest in the reform, began to turn against it. Thus the 
new government, which carried out some necessary expropria­
tion measures, could not substitute itself for the rent col­
lections, moneylenders, and traders who were eliminated by 
the very revolution that put it into power.
The above factors are not the only causes of the fail­
ure of the agrarian reform program in Iraq. In discussing 
the agricultural development policy in Iraq, one cannot over­
look the political events which accompanied the application 
of the agrarian reform program. Since 1958, Iraq witnessed 
seven years of revolutionary and political instability which 
have been rich in turmoil, violence, and sudden changes in 
the economic policy. It saw a development program which 
caused the state to be engaged intensively in political cri­
ses and issues. In 1959, soon after the regime had come into 
power, a military uprising took place in the northern part of 
the country. This was followed in 1961 by the Kurdish revolt 
in the mountainous part of Iraq, a revolt continuing until 
1965. While this revolt was going on, a coup d'etat brought 
a new government to power in February, 1963. This was fol­
lowed by another coup d'etat in November of that year.
During the years 1958-1966 when the military regime
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was in power, the country was passing through a serious po­
litical crisis, the state was trying to formulate its new 
development policy. Through this program, the state controls 
the tempo, the objectives and the methods of growth of the 
national economy as a whole. The state also provides about 
80 per cent of new capital formation. This program also en­
ables the state to impose its own priorities in economic de­
velopment, such as large-scale industrialization, construction 
of dams and irrigation systems, building power stations, and 
road systems.
Although the state conceived such a comprehensive 
program it was unable to implement it efficiently.
Conflicts always appear when economic policy is put 
into practice, and development programs inevitably bring 
frustration which may too readily be relieved by blaming 
others. The trouble is not just that there is a shortcoming 
of efficient administration, but that a number of crucial 
policy lines have yet to be tried and mapped out. Economic 
development depends on the enthusiasm, civic consciousness, 
and discipline of the people, as well as on the ability of 
government to find the right policies and to create rapidly 
the machinery of the new administration. It was certainly a 
difficult enterprise to set peasant agriculture on its way
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to progress along a route where it could dominate its own 
destinies. The attempt could succeed only with the support 
of the most dynamic elements of the population and total 
backing from the government. The United Nations Report cor­
rectly states that: "if the leaders win the confidence of
the country, and prove themselves to be vigorous in eradicat­
ing provilege and gross inequalities, they can inspire the 
masses with an enthusiasm for progress which carries all be­
fore i t T h e  government that undertook the responsibility 
of economic and social progress in Iraq should have placed 
reliance on the initiative of the masses. However, the new 
leaders had scarcely prepared the masses for these responsi­
bilities and the only conclusion which is to be drawn from 
this fact is that the government had considered that the 
masses were not then ready to assume their responsibilities.
The failure of the economic development policy in 
Iraq did not lie in the peculiarity of Iraq circumstances.
It failed because the attempt to break with Iraq's backward­
ness was not made soon enough, and when it was made, it was 
not complete enough. The causes of the slow growth are defi­
nitely not those most often identified by the academic
^United Nations, Measures for the Economic Develop­
ment of Under-Developed Countries, op. cit., par. 38.
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economists: shortage of capital, lack of entrepreneurial tal­
ent, or over-population. These are symptoms, not causes, and 
they reflect the existing social and economic organization.
Recommendations for Future Plans
The essential difficulty lay in the field of agricul­
ture. The low agricultural productivity would mean that de­
velopment plans for industrial expansion, which of course re­
quires a steadily increasing flow of agricultural products to 
the towns and raw materials to the industry, cannot be ef­
fectively implemented. In the past, the shortage in food 
supply did not create a problem because this was avoided by 
importing foodstuffs at the expense of using foreign exchange. 
Foreign exchange, however, could be used for import of capi­
tal goods. The government would be faced with the necessity 
of making a choice which could not help having decisive con­
sequences for the whole future course of Iraqi development.
At the bottom there are two possible courses.
The government might continue to implement its pres­
ent agrarian policy, that is, the creation of small family­
sized type of agricultural organization. If this policy was 
applied, one might expect that the supply of agricultural 
products to the cities and for industry would be restricted.
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This result is confirmed by the fact that instead of being a 
net agricultural product exporting country, Iraq has failed 
in recent years to be even self-sufficient. If measures are 
undertaken to improve agricultural productivity, this may not 
enlarge the marketed surplus of agricultural produce--the 
extra productivity may be absorbed either by more consumption 
in the village or by an addition to the reserve of underem­
ployed manpower. This is apt to constitute a crucial "bottle­
neck" limiting the growth of industry. Even if industrial 
expansion is speeded up successfully (under state development 
plan) and increased employment is afforded in the towns, the 
resulting transfer of laborers from agriculture to industry 
may fail to be matched by an equivalent and parallel transfer 
of agricultural products from village to city. If this course 
was followed, in order to induce the peasant to produce more, 
the state has to direct industry toward increased supply of 
those commodities which would be exchanged for the agricul­
tural products. In addition, the government would have to de­
pend on industrial sector (oil revenues) to accumulate capital 
for development rather than to extract any sizable surplus 
from agriculture. Finally, the planners may face a sharp rise 
in foodstuff prices, hence the import of foodstuffs from 
abroad would seem a possible solution. The second course
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which the government might pursue is a change in the social 
and economic organization of agriculture itself to bring it 
under state control, and raise productivity sufficiently to 
supply the needs of both the countryside and the towns. But 
such a reorganization of agriculture could be undertaken only 
in conjunction with a rapid industrialization drive to supply 
the necessary agricultural tools, equipments, and chemicals, 
and to drain off the surplus of rural manpower.
Under prevailing social and economic conditions in 
Iraq, it is most unlikely that the second choice will be fol­
lowed. As a matter of fact, the present State machine is not 
suitable for shaping the agrarian sector on lines of large- 
scale farming. But one can safely say that in principle there 
is no incompatibility between the economic development in 
Iraq and the adoption of small peasant agriculture. For Iraq 
has everything necessary for extensive development, and with 
industry largely nationalized, industrial growth will pro­
ceed, given competent administration, at rapid rate. Coupled 
with oil royalties, it will materially influence the volume 
of capital accumulation, and may well be able to afford to 
allow its peasants to "sit it out" for a while, and learn 
through cooperatives and government extension work the advan­
tages of a rational and modern organization of agricultural
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production.
Certainly land distribution must be completed or put 
right. But as we already know, progress in that field would 
be of no avail whatever if it were not to go hand in hand 
with a far larger effort towards the teaching and building 
of technical staff and advisers, cooperative management and 
organized credit. External aid and international cooperation 
alone can never be sufficient to bring about a quick enough 
rate of development in Iraq. The efforts of the native popu­
lation themselves will always be the decisive factor. More­
over, intellectual effort must be aimed at the liquidation 
of illiteracy. Here too, foreign cooperation can be valuable, 
in providing all aspects of research and instruction to be 
accelerated, not to jnention the training of adults for pro­
fessions. To push a tiny minority into higher education with­
out a general move towards literacy is merely to reinforce 
the privileged caste.
At the present time, the following measures seem to 
be necessary for agricultural improvement: First, the mobili­
zation of all available means, better use of manpower, and 
the control of water by drainage and irrigation combined.
The first aim ought to be the full employment of the labor 
force, before the introduction of expensive machines which may
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be badly maintained and under-utilized. The machine could 
be introduced only if it pays, if it means the release of two 
or three men to the factory. Efforts must be directed toward 
a chemical industry, the manufacture of fertilizers. In its 
oil and natural gas industry, Iraq possesses a great poten­
tial for producing chemicals not just for the internal market 
but for international markets too. At this stage, priority 
should be given to methods that promise greater production per 
acre; intensification, genetics, provision of enough water 
supply. Second, later on when social, technical, and educa­
tional improvements in agriculture have developed and industry 
has gathered sufficient strength to establish the material 
foundations for the reconstruction of agriculture, it will be 
easier to reopen the way to voluntary cooperation, which might 
halt for a time at the stage of service cooperatives.
In a broad sense, economic and social progress in 
Iraq can only be accomplished by major and far-reaching struc­
tural change. Large investment in construction and machinery, 
long-term planning, overcoming tradition-bound patterns of 
work and thought are needed for the country to shift into high 
gear and achieve a large and continuous enough increase in 
output and productive capacity to outstrip population growth 
and bring about a meaningful rise in living conditions. But
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this means a reorganization of Iraqi society, an all-out 
mobilization of the surplus now flowing into waste. Without 
a profound upheaval in social structure, Iraq cannot open the 
way to a regular, rapid, and self-sustaining growth. The 
Iraqi economy must industrialize, but it must increase its 
agricultural productivity too. Under the conditions of Iraq, 
there can be no question as to whether development should take 
place in industrialization or in agriculture. Indeed, the 
only way this development can take place is by simultaneous 
investment in both sectors. Inasmuch as these two sectors 
are closely interrelated, the problem of developing one cannot 
be separated from the other.
Measures of economic planning, however, cannot be 
separated from the problem of capital formation. In 1965, Iraq 
received nearly ID 127 million from the oil sector alone. Oil 
revenue, other things being equal, is increasing and by 1967 
it might reach ID 140 million. This revenue, in fact, will 
provide the government with all the capital required for de­
velopment and still leave a surplus to be used for current ex" 
penditure purposes. Furthermore, through monetary policy, 
taxation and a few controls (although in the circumstances of 
Iraq, these indirect instruments are weak), the state may be 
able to cut its imports by about 20 per cent and even more.
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By applying a reasonable income tax with a strict enforcement, 
assuming that the government is able and willing to challenge 
the resistance of urban and rural vested interests, one could 
expect the tax revenue to increase several times, which would 
be another source of finance.
Finally, the elimination of the drain on current in­
come resulting from excess consumption of landlords, capital 
removal abroad, and other untapped resources and forms of 
waste, when coupled with the distribution of landed property, 
the nationalization of banks and industrial enterprises will 
lead to an increase of potential capital accumulation.
The economic question that would face the government 
is the mobilization of these resources into productive invest­
ments . Up to the present time, however, this decline of un­
productive consumption has not led to a corresponding increase 
of actual capital accumulation. The expropriation of big es­
tates, the splitting of large landholdings and the abolition 
or reduction of rent payments, as well as the elimination of 
usurers, did not transfer capital from private to public dis­
posal. By destroying the social foundations of this capital, 
however, the government will be able to realize this capital 
directly, and correspondingly one might say that this will 
lead to an increase in the real income of the rural population.
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Such an Increase of consumption and actual surplus is not ex­
pected to take place immediately after the reform. The gen­
eral upheaval and disorganization that accompanied and followed 
the revolution resulted in a decline in total agricultural 
output. Once the political stability is achieved, agricultural 
production will increase and thus economic growth might follow.
The degree to which rural consumption will be affected 
by government policies, particularly those aimed at the trans­
fer of the surplus resulting from the agrarian reform, will 
not be much because oil revenue placed in the hands of the 
state is so large that employment of part of it for an immedi­
ate mass consumption and for the import of consumer goods may 
still leave enough so that the government can initiate an am­
bitious program of productive investment.
In summation, the principal obstacle to Iraq's devel­
opment is not shortage of capital but the way in which its 
capital is utilized. It is absorbed by various forms of ex­
cess consumption of the upper-class, by hoarding at home and 
abroad, by import of luxury goods and by the maintenance of a 
vast unproductive bureaucracy. The new elite or managerial 
class is not comparable to the entrepreneurial class which 
came to the fore during the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in the West; and has nothing in common with the
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leading strata of the socialist countries. It is not the 
bourgeoisie in the classical sense, creating industry and the 
means of production. In the early 1960's, a commercial mid­
dle class was rising to join the military and bureaucracy in 
skimming the cream from the oil revenues of ID 127 million 
which constituted 90 per cent of the government's income. 
Luxury imports rose as non-oil exports dwindled; Iraq showed 
every sign of following a development policy characterized by 
down the primrose path by "sowing its petroleum to the winds."
Somewhere between ID 1300 million and ID 1500 million 
would provide the means for the development of both industry 
and agriculture. This means that if five years of oil pro­
duction incomes were powered into Iraq's development properly, 
the country would break out the circle of the misery in which 
it is at present enclosed.
To be sure, one can be skeptical of the chances of 
seeing such a thing happen. It is nonetheless true that the 
key to the solution of the problem of backwardness lies in 
oil profits, although they can be a great help, but in the 
new and strong expansion of the productive forces. The only 
way by which Iraq can expand its production and realize its 
expansion is to overthrow the present social structure and 
to develop efficient administrative machinery to implement a
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comprehensive economic plan. Indeed, the difficulties in­
volved here are not small. They are related to various fac­
tors- -such as Irrationality on the part of the intellectuals 
who are under the influence of different ideologies, differ­
ent theories of national and international development, and 
different interpretations of the problem.
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